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Cert to CA 2 
(Kaufman & Smith; 
Meskill, dissenting) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
SUM1-1ARY: Petitioner was convicted of ~is~g material, ~ublic 
inform-ation in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in 
...----___ 
violation of SectionslO(b) and 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of --1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a), and SEC Rule 10-b-5. He contends: 
(1) his activities were not proscribed by§ lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5 because 
he had no fiduciary relationship to, and did not derive the information 
from, the issuer of the shares he purchased and so d; (2) that "retroactive" -
application of the Second Circuit's expansive interpretation of 10-b-5 
C .f.~. lh\~ ?ebf(l~ -\t, ML ci dtav 2>0\A\ I ~~ ~ 
~ ~ ck a ccm\\td. ~ 
violated his right to due process; (3) tha~ the trial court erroneously 
refused to instruct the jury that specific intent to defraud is an essential 
element of the violation alleged; and (4) that admissions used against him 
at trial, which were derived from statements made to the N.Y. Dep't of 
Labor in connection with an application for unemployment compensation, 
were privileged under N.Y. law and therefore inadmissi~le under Fed. R. 
Evid. 501. 
FACTS: Petitioner was an employee of a financial printing establishmerl 
near Wall Street that printed tender offer disclosure statements for a 
number of corporations. By examining the data contained in the disclosure 
statements, petitioner was able to _deduce the names of the companies 
that were the targets of the yet-undisclosed tender offers. He would 
then buy stock in the targeted company and sell it upon announcement of 
the tender offe~. After his activities were discovered, petitioner 
entered a consent decree with the SEC requiring him to disgorge his profits. 
He was also fired and lat~r indicted under Section 32(a) of the '34 Act 
on 17 counts charging violations of Section lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5. 
After denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for failure . ' 
to charge an offense, petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury. He .got 
concurrent sentences of one-year imprisonment on ~· - 13 counts, with all 
. 
but one month of the sentences suspended. He was sentenced to a five-year 
term of probation on the other four counts. 
CONTENTIONS AND HOLDINGS BELOW: On appeal petitioner first argued 
that Section lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5 did not proscribe his conduct because 
he had no fiduciary relationship to, and did not derive his nonpublic 
information from, the issuer whose shares he traded. Petitioner principal!~ 
relies on General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), which holds that a 
corporation planning a tender offer for, or merger with, another 
corporation may buy the target company's stock on the open market without 
disclosing its plans and yet not violate Section lO(b) or Rule 10-b-5. 
Petitioner reasons that, if the source of his nonpublic information may 
buy and sell the shares of the target company prion to the announcement 
of the tender offer, then he should be able to do so also, subject only 
to the same. 5% ·purchase limitation .imposed under the \villiams Act. 
The CA majority disagreed. Though conceding that this was a case 
of first impression, the court reasoned that the same principles that 
prohibit a corporate insider or its fiduciaries from trading on material, 
nonpublic corporate information applied to "market insiders" as well. 
The court held that 1 
"Anyone--corporate insider or not-..:.who regulah y ,receives material 
nonpublic information may not use that ~1nformation to trade in 
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. 
And if he cannot disclose, he may abstain from buying or selling'.' 
(emphasis in original) . 
A test of "regular access to market information," that is, information 
that affects the price of a company's securities without affecting the 
firm's earning power or assets (e.g., a "buy" recommendation to be issued b y 
an investment adviser), would apply. In support of its holding, the 
CA relied on Affiliated Ute· Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), 
\ 
for the proposition that a duty to disclose arising out of regular access 
to market information is ~ot stranger to Rule 10-b-5. General Tire, 
on which petitioner relied, was distinguishable because a tender offeror 
was not regularly the "recipient of market information other than that 
concerning its own stock, ·· and, - with respect to tender offers, was the 
creator of the information rather than its recipient. Moreover, the pre-
\. offer trading in which the offeror engages , involves an economic risk 
to which other traders are not subject because, when the offer is 
announced, the offeror will be buying , new shares, not selling the ones 
obtained at the pre-offer price. 
In dissent, Judge Meskill rejected the majority's application of 
10-b-5 as a departure from prior precedents that limited the duty to 
disclose under 10-b-5 to persons with a special fiduciary or inside 
· relationship to the company affected by the information. Unlike the 
majority, Judge Meskill found no support for the notion of a "market 
insider" in the concept of --of the new Securities Code a "quasi-insider" incorporated in § 1062 h: proposed by the American ·Law Institute. /1 L / 
Moreover, the concept of a "market insider" was unprincipled and 
~ 
limitless in its potential reach. In Judge Meskill's view, § lO(b) 
p~d, ~nee. And, silence is fraudulent under lO(b) 
only when there is a duty to speak owed to the sellers of the stock 
he purchased. To be sure, petitioner owed a duty to his company's 
client not to misuse confidential information, but the concept of "fraud" 
embodied in lO-b-5 does ·not bring within its ambit "all breaches of 
fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction." Sante Fe 
Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). 
Petitioner next argued that the CA's application of the novel rule 
it derived from 10-b-5 violated his right to due process because he 
did not have "fair warning" that his conduct was criminally proscribed. 
The CA's "unforseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of [the] narrow 
and precise statutory language" of Rule 10-b-5 operated like an ex post 
facto law and violated his right to due process. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 u.s. 347, 352-54 (1964). 
5 
., 
TheCA disagreed. Though agreeing that no prior · case had settled 
the precise fact pattern at issue in this case, the CA believed that its 
holding was a logical and forseeable application of the congressional 
policies underlying the "disclose or abstain" rule of SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 976 (1969). Moreover, the SEC had filed complaints against other 
financial printing houses that had engaged in activities similar to 
petr's, and the consent decrees that emanated from those proceedings had 
been well publicized in the financial printing industry. Indeed, 8-by-10-
inch signs had been posted throughout petr's plant, which advised him 
that use of information learned from customer's copy would subject 
petitioner to criminal liability, as well as immediate discharge. Similar 
notices had been given ·all employees in the union newspaper, on the back 
of timecards, and in separate cards distributed to the employees. 
Judge Meskill reasoned that the warning to wbich a criminal defendant 
was entitled must emanate from the statute itself or prior judicial 
interpretations, so he failed to see the relevancy of the employer's signs 
--other than as circumstantial evidence on the issue of willfulness or 
intent. Under settled principles of .due process of law; petitioner wa~ 
entitled to a "clear and definite statement of the conduct proscribed" 
by the statute, United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1975), 
which the majority's novel construction of the statute failed to afford him . 
~ 
Petitioner next argued that, in light of· Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
~25 u.s. · 185, 193 (1976), the jury should have been instructed that specific 
~ntent to defraud was an essential element of the crimes charged. The 
"willfullness" formulation in ·terms of a "realization of wrongful conduct" 
derived from Section 32(a) and un·i ·ted State·s v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971), and United States v. 
Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976), was insufficient because that 
defined only the general intent necessary to criminalize any rule violation, 
rather than the intent necessary to establish a substantive violation under 
the particular rule at issue here--10-b-5. 
Unlike petitioner, the CA majority reasoned that Hochfelder did 
not require anything more than "knowingly wrongful" conduct to establish 
a 10-b-5 violation--"some element of scienter" such as "knowing and 
intentional conduct" rather than mere negligence. 425 u.s. at 197, 201. 
Last petitioner argued that the use of admissions contained in 
statements made to the N.Y. Dep't of Labor in connection with an 
unemployment compensation claim that were mandated by, and privileged 
under, state law were inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 501. Petitioner 
notes that under one of the 13 specific rules of privilege formulated by 
this Court in submitting the federal rules to Congress, a person making 
a report required by law has a privilege to prevent any person from 
disclosing the report. Supreme Court Standard 502. Though not adopted 
in that form by Congress 7the Standard reflects a privilege derived from 
principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States 
within the meaning of Fed. · R. Evid. 501. 
The CA majority again disagreed. State-created privileges were 
not controlling in federal criminal cases except to the extent that they 
reflect principles of federal common law. Thus, to the extent that the 
N.Y. statute on which petitioner relied created an evidentiary privilege 
under state law, it mattered not because the privileg.e was unknown to 
' · the common law. 
~ 
ANALYSIS: Although I am inclined to believe that the CA's 
extension of the principles of Texas Gulf Sulphur to the circumstances 
of this case is defensible, the announcement of a new category of 
"'insiders" saddled with a duty . to disclose under Rul in a 
criminal proceeding 
~
~o save the statute 
raises a very troubling due process problem. 
/ ---· from a void-for-vagueness attack, I would be ---inclined to hold that specific intent to defraud is an essential 
element of a criminal violation of Section lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5. 
Cf., Screws v. United States, 321 U.S. 91 (1945). Hochfelder neither 
supports nor precludes such a holding since that case's scienter 
holding was expressly limited to the "intent" element of a 10-b-5 
civil action for damages. ~25 u.s. at 193. 
But, whatever one's views on the merits, I regard at least the 
~ first three questions presented for review as sufficiently substantial 
to warrant plenary review. though the want of any clear conflict with 
prior decisions of this or other courts might bode against plenary 
review at this time. At the very least, this petition warrants a response 
from the Solicitor General. 
There is no response. 
3/30/79 Walsh opn in petn 
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Motion of Chiarella to Dispense 
with Printing the Appendix 
SUMMARY: Petr moves to dispense with printing the appendix 
(Rule 36(8)). None of the questions involved turn on an extensive 
analysis of the record. 
The Clerk advises that the SG has no objection to this motion. 
DISCUSSION: The request seems appropriate. 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Ellen 
September 28, 1979 
Chiarella v. United States, No. 78-1202 
November argument (?~ p~) 
This is a criminal prosecution under Section 10(b) of the ____ ...................... 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. There are four issues: 
1. Whether Rule 10b-5's "disclose or abstain" prohibition 
applies to an employee of a financial printing firm who obtained non-
public information concerning a prospective tender offer by 
"decoding" the offeror's disclosure statements prior to publication. 
2. Whether this petitioner had fair notice that his conduct 
......_____.... - ......... 
was proscribed by §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. ( fn.u-~ ~ J 
3. Whether the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 is 
satisfied by a finding of knowingly wrongful conduct rather than 
specific intent to defraud. 
4. Whether Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
required the district court to exclude an admission made in 
connection with an application for New York state unemployment 
benefits and at least partially privileged under New York law. 
2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1975 and 1976 petitioner was a "markup man" employed by 
Pandick Press, a financial printing firm in New York City. His job 
was to select type fonts and page layouts. Among the documents he 
worked on were the "raw material" for 5 separate takeover bids. 
Because of the extreme need for secrecy, these were sent to Pandick 
"in code": the names of the companies involved were either omitted or 
fictionalized, and the real names inserted into the pre-set type at 
the very last minute. Petitioner, however, was a knowledgeable stock 
trader who spoke with his broker 10 or 15 times a day. He studied 
the documents and deduced the identities of the parties from the data 
contained in them (price histories, par values, and the number of 
letters in the fake names). He then bought substantial amounts of 
target company stock. When the tender offer was publicly announced, 
he quickly sold out and turned a handsome profit. In the course of 
the 15 months covered by the indictment, he netted $30,000 in five 
transactions. 
No one has told us what led to petitioner's undoing. The 
SEC became aware of him in early 1977. In May, he agreed in a 
consent decree to disgorge his profits to the sellers of the target 
stock. The same day, he was fired from his job. In January, 1978, 
he was indicted on 17 counts of willful misuse of material non-public 
information in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. 
After moving unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment on the ground 
that it did not charge a crime, he was convicted by the jury on every 
count. He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment with all but one 
month suspended, and to a consecutive term of five years' probation. 
3. 
The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction in an opinion by 
Judge Kaufman, in which Judge Smith joined. Judge Meskill dissented 
in an opinion in which he voiced disagreement with the majority's 
conclusion that Rule 10b-5 reaches petitioner's conduct at all, and 
concluded that such an extension should in any event not have been 
made in a criminal case. 
II. THE REACH OF §10(b) and RULE 10b-5 
This is the most critical issue in the case. The core 
concern of Rule 10b-5 as interpreted in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 
401 F.2d 833 (CA2 1968) (en bane) (hereinafter sometimes TGS) has 
always been thought to be ~rading by individuals having some special 
relationship with the issuer corporation, and therefore having access 
. -
to confidential information about it. Since Chiarella does not fit 
this mold, he claims he falls without the ambit of 10b-5. 
A. CA2's analysis. 
The CA2 majority disagreed, announcing a rule that "Anyone -
corporate insider or not - who regularly receives material nonpublic 
information may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose [or abstain]." The 
authority cited by CA2 in support of this rule consists in its 
entirety of a broad view of the policy of 10b-5, a peculiar reading 
of the comments of the ALI Federal Securities Code, and a broad 
reading of this Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 u.s. 128 (1972). 
First, CA2 quoted the TGS court's view that Rule 10b-5 
protects the investing public's justifiable expectation of relatively 
equal access to material information. The securities markets cannot 
4. 
function properly if those who occupy strategic positions in the 
market mechanism can reap personal gains from their position. The 
ban on corporate insider trading is just one instance of this policy, 
and CA2 1 s rule simply gives it full effect. 
Second, CA2 noted that the ALI 1 s Federal Securities Code 
had declined to establish a disclose or abstain rule for 11 quasi-
insiders11 under §1603, its insider trading rule. Quasi-insiders were 
defined as 11 people like judges• clerks who trade on information in 
unpublished opinions, Federal Reserve Bank employees who trade with 
knowledge of an imminent change in the margin rate, and perhaps 
persons who are about to give profitable supply contracts to 
corporations with which they are not otherwise connected. 11 The court 
drew support, however, from the ALI 1 s suggestion that 11 egregious 11 
cases would fall under ~1602, the codification of Rule 10b-s•s 
general proscriptions. A full reading of the comments dramatically 
undermines even this limited support. They begin by noting that 11 it 
is hard to find justification today for imposing a fiduciary•s duty 
of affirmative disclosure on an outsider who is not a •tippee•n. 
Although the ALI thought that a 11 new category 11 of quasi-insiders 
11 Would be convenient 11 , it rejected it because it 11 does not lend 
itself to definition. . Where, for example would one place the 
outsider who is about to make a tender offer - or his depositary 
bank? 11 In such cases, the relatively more specific §1603 should be 
used where possible. 11 But, to the extent that a sufficiently 
egregious case of trading while silent cannot be rationalized on an 
•insider• analysis, a plaintiff may fall back on ~1602(a) (1) [barring 
•fraudulent acts• and 11 misrepresentations 11 in connection with 
5. 
purchase or sale of securities]." It is hard to draw support for 
anything but a strict pase by case analysis from this studied refusal 
to take a position. The ALI is willing to allow Rule 10b-5 to serve 
its catch-all function in prohibiting clearly fraudulent conduct. 
Beyond that, it left the area to "further judicial development", and 
specifically rejected any "universally applicable theory of 'market 
egalitarianism'". 
Affiliated Ute is no more helpful. This Court there found a 
10b-5 violation where defendants had bought shares in an Indian 
corporation directly from Indian sellers and arranged for their sale 
to non-Indians without disclosing that their value on the resale 
market was far higher than the sellers believed. CA2 said this case 
was an example of its thesis that "a duty to disclose arising out of 
regular access to market information is not a stranger to the world 
of 10b-5." This is true in a narrow sense, but no broad rule 
applicable to "market insiders" can be drawn from the case. Justice 
Blackmun's opinion for the Court is brief and cryptic on this point, 
focusing on the facts of the case before him. He noted first that 
there would be no liability if the defendants had been transfer 
agents only - a dictum which in itself would seem to dispose of CA2's 
broad rule since transfer agents inevitably do have regular access to 
market information. There was liability only because the defendants 
had actively developed a resale market and accepted standing orders 
for Indian stock. They acknowledged a duty to ensure the propriety 
of the sales, and the Indian sellers were relying on their expertise. 
These activities as a whole were a course of business that operated 
as a fraud on the Indian sellers because the defendants "devised a 
6. 
plan and induced the mixed-blood holders • . . to dispose of their 
shares wihout disclosing to them material facts . " Since the 
individual defendants were "market makers", they possessed an 
affirmative duty to disclose that fact. The Ute case has been viewed 
as a "trust and confidence" case, with the defendants performing a 
fiduciary role for the sellers. It seems to me to be a prime example 
of Rule 10b-5 performing its catch-all function. 
Finally, CA2 distinguished the established rule that tender 
offerors do not violate 10b-5 by purchasing target company stock 
without disclosing their intentions. The leading case states baldly 
that "we know of no rule, applicable at the time [a reference to the 
subsequently enacted Williams Act], that a purchaser of stock, who 
was not an "insider" and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective 
seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise a 
seller's demands and thus abort the sale." General Time Corporation 
v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968). CA2 held 
that the offerors are not within its new rule because they have no 
regular access to market information and because they undertake 
substantial economic risk. Of course, offerors are now covered by 
the Williams Act, which requires disclosure but permits offerors to 
purchase up to 5% of the target's stock beforehand. 
B. The case for reversal. 
Petitioner's argument is a straightforward one. Section 
10(b) prohibits the use in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" 
in contravention of SEC rules. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful 
(1) to employ an device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact •• 
. , or 
(3) to enqage in any act, practice or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . 
7. 
. The question is whether Chiarella's scheme involved fraud or 
deceit. Although Rule 10b-5 is admittedly broader than the common 
law, no one (with the possible exception of Judge Kaufman and two of 
his colleagues who concurred in SEC v. Great American Industries, 
Inc~, 407 F.2d 453 (CA2 1968){en bane)), contends that absolute 
parity of information is a goal of the Securities Acts. On the 
contrary, the Acts should preserve incentives to perform market 
_._, -...;:. 
research in order to discover undervalued stocks and thereby brinq 
------------~----------~--------------------------------· about a more efficient allocation of resources. Thetefore, failure 
to disclose is not fraud in the absence of an affirmative duty to 
disclose. 
Petitioner wisely does not rest his case on any distinction 
between "market" and "inside" information. Instead, he says that the 
duty to disclose has traditionally been limited to persons having a 
special relationship with the company affected by the information. 
Thus, the rule of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961), and Texas 
Gulf Sulphur is limited to "those persons who are in a special 
relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs". 40 
SEC at 911-912. The duty arises from the special trustee-type --
relationship between corporate insiders and the shareholders of that ---corporation. The courts have repeatedly held that "the essential 
8. 
purpose of Rule 10b-5 •.• is to prevent corporate · insiders and 
their tippees from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed 
outsiders." Radiation Dynamics; Inc~ v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 
(CA2 1972). 
I 
~ past flatly rejected the notion that anyone but a corporate insider 
As General Time, supra, shows, the Second Circuit has in the 
I 
I has an insider's duty to disclose. 403 F.2d at 164. Several district 
courts have agreed (see Petr's Brief at 28-29). And the commentators 
all acknowledge that petitioner's conduct falls well outside the 
traditional scope of 10b-5, although some have suggested that it may 
fall within the policy of the Rule. 
There is thus no real dispute that the Second Circuit has 
worked a major extension of Rule 10b-5. This is so even if the 
holding is narrowed as suggested by the SG (see infra). In so doing, 
the court and the SG ignore this Court's recent warnings that a 
flexible construction of the Securities Acts in light of their 
remedial purposes, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and 
Casualty Co~, 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1972), cannot be allowed to expand them 
indefinitely. E.g., Teamsters v. Daniel, 47 USLW 4235 (1979)(pension 
plan not a security); Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 47 USLW 4732 
(1979)(cannot use "remedial purposes to construe §17(a) more broadly 
than its language permits); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. · v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462 (1977)(10b-5 does not cover all fiduciary breaches); Ernst & 
Ernst ·v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required); Blue 
Chip Stamps · v~ Manor Drug ·Stores 421 u.s. 723 (1975)(offeree 
plaintiff under §10(b) ). Indeed, your comment, concurring in Blue 
Chip · stamps, has some relevance: "If such a far-reaching change is to 
9. 
be made, with unpredictable consequences for the process of raising 
capital so necessary to our economic well-being, it is a matter for 
the Congress, not the courts." Although CA2 is not actually -
rewriting the statute, it is redefining "fraud" in a way not 
... --- --
previously contemplated by the Commission and in a way that may have 
extensive unforeseen effects. Arguably, some orderly consideration 
of the consequences - by the Commission if not by Congress - is in 
order. 
In fact, the SEC has previously addressed the precise 
practices at issue here (trading on non-public knowledge of a tender ---- -._.- ...... 
offer) and recommended that the attacked under Rule 
10b-5. Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d 
Cong. 1st Sess. xxxii (1971). The position that "market information" 
should not be regulated under 10b-5 was reiterated in 1973. 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10316, 2 SEC Docket 229. 
Specific rules to cover trading on tender offer information were 
proposed under §14(e) (not 10(b)) of the Act this year. 44 Fed. Reg. 
9956 (Feb. 2, 1979). Of course the SEC has also brought a number of 
enforcement actions against "market insiders", including printers, 
under 10b-5. And it is not necessarily inconsistent to attack the 
conduct under 10b-5 even if it is also covered by other, more 
directly relevant sections of the Act. The cited comments do 
suggest, however, SEC agreement with petitioner's view that orderly 
rulemaking is preferable to an attempt to cover everything with Rule 
10b-5. 
I am less persuaded by Judge Meskill's view that the Court 
should not expand Rule 10b-5 in a criminal case because criminal 
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statutes are to be narrowly construed. This Court recently addressed 
the problem of criminal sanctions under open-ended remedial statutes 
in the context of the Sherman Act. United States v. United States 
Gypsum ·co., 438 u.s. 422 (1978). The Court cited with approval the 
Attorney General's conclusion that Sherman Act criminal penalties 
should be reserved for cases in which the law was relatively clear 
and the conduct egregious. Id., at 438-439. This is highly relevant ~ 
to the "notice" issue in the case. It does not bear on the correct 
construction of 10b-5, however. There seems to be general agreement 
that there cannot be two versions of the statute - one for civil and 
'--.. - ---
one for criminal cases. See United · states v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 
287 (CA2 1975)~ United · states v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 355-6 (CA9 
1976)(Sneed, J. concurring). If the statute has been construed so 
broadly in civil cases as to deprive criminal defendants of due 
process, then some prosecutions may have to be dismissed. But the 
construction of the statute is nevertheless unchanged. 
C. The case for affirmance. 
The SG does not defend CA2's broad brush approach in this 
~ ~- __............. ___. 
Court. In fact, the Securities Industry Association convincingly 
opposes that approach in a somewhat hysterical amicus brief which 
argues that there are many market insiders (specialists, block 
positioners, floor traders, risk arbitrageurs, and various dealers) 
who perform a valued stabilizing function by trading on "inside" 
information. Of course, these professionals are closely regulated by 
rules adopted under other sections of the Act. In general, however, 
Rule 10b-5 is applied even to highly regulated offenders (e.g., 
broker-dealers). Thus, the amicus fears that CA2's rule will 
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severely disrupt an established pattern of professional practice. 
The rule would also threaten the arguably legitimate practice of 
"warehousing" by tender offerors, whereby certain institutional 
investors are advised of a possible tender offer in advance. This 
technique has been defended as an interim method of financing for 
purchases that the offeror could legally make. In its Institutional 
Investor Study Report, supra, the SEC suggested that "if such 
activities are to be prohibited, this should be done by a rule 
specifically directed to that situation rather than by an expanded 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 resting on a somewhat different theory 
than that underlying that rule • . . " Others have disagreed. See 
sources cited in Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry 
into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U.Pa. 
L.Rev. 798, 813 (1973). Whatever the correct result, the exampl.e 
illustrates the 1ifficulties with a broad rule for "market insiders". 
Such a rule seems to require an analysis of the social value of the 
challenged activities in each case. I am unclear as to the merits of 
these hypothetical cases. But the uncertainties are enough, together 
with the SG's skittishness about CA2's position, to convince me that 
affirmance can only be justified on a considerably narrower ground. 
Seeking a more acceptable theory for affirmance, the SG and 
}_~ ~(f ~the amicus derive the necessary duty to disclose from Chiarella's 
~overt breac~ of a~ relat~ip. The theory is~that he 
committed common law fraud by converting to his own use confidential 
information entrusted to him with the expectation that it would 
remain private. This worked two separate frauds:~e on the offeror 
corporation an~e on the tar~ et com~n; sh~reholders. 
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1. Common law theories. 
With respect to the offeror, Chiarella earned secret profits 
through his employer's agency relationship in violation of the law of 
agency. Pandick was an agent because it assumed a fiduciary duty to 
use confidential information entrusted to it only for designated 
purposes and acted under the control of and for the benfit of its 
customers. Chiarella was a sub-agent with identical fiduciary 
responsibilities. His wrongful action could haveharmed the offeror 
by driving up the price of the stock through artificial demand: in 
act Chiarella's purchases of target stock on two occasions 
- ~ ~stituted more than half its trading volume on that day. In 
addition, such unusual trading patterns could reveal the offeror's 
plans, particularly when a single investor known to his broker to 
work in a printing firm shows a pattern of predicting tender offers. 
This theory was charged in the indictment and went to the jury. The .. --
~kp~blem ~-t_h_a_t_i_t_i_s_h_a_r_d_t_o_f_i_n_d_t_h_e_e_l_e_m_e_n_t_o_f_d_e_c_e_p_t_ion 
~ or manipulation required by Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 
u.s. 482 (1977). The SG argues the tort is deceit, because an agent 
contemplating one of these transactions must disclose it to his 
~ 
principal in advance. This seems a bit facile since Chiarella's { ?~ ~ 
conduct would have been tortious on the SG's theory even if he had 
di~losed~;uably, however, this Court endorsed a similar ~ 
theory in the pre-Green case of Superintendent of Insurance v. -1--o~ · 
Banker's Life · and Casualty, supra, 404 u.s. 6 (misappropriateion by 
corporate officers of proceeds of sale of bonds violated 10b-5; 




With respect to the shareholders, there is ~e common law ~ 
authority for a duty of disclosure where "one party had access to 
~. 
material information that was hidden from the other and good faith 
required candid dealing". A few cases imposed the duty when a 
purchaser had misappropriated or illegally obtained information that 
formed the basis for the transaction. But the principal authority 
for this point is an old English case which rested on equitable 
principles in denying specific 
that the same principle should 
performance. Professor Keeton thought 
CA.<.. 
apply law. Keeton, Fraud ~ 
" Concealment and Non~Disclosure, 15 Texas L.Rev. 1, 25-26(1936). 
Harper and James take a much more limited view, although they 
recognize that new duties of disclosure have recently been developed. 
1 The Law of Torts 589-590 (1956). My sense is that cases could be 
found to support either view. 
2. Rule 10b~S applied to "outsiders"(~ "f SG/: ~~) 
Even if conduct like Chiarella's is not common law fraud, it 
~esso 
and Rule 
close to it as to fall within the core concerns of §10(b) 
10b-5. The fact that the information was market information 
(concerning market demand), rather than corporate information 
(concerning the value of the assets or earning power of the issuer) 
makes no difference to the policies underlying the rule. Nor should 
it matter that the information was not obtained from the issuer 
corporation or anyone associated with it. Although the leading cases 
have all assumed that insider trading requires that the information 
be obtained through some relationship with the issuer corporation, 
there are cases imposing liability without such a connection. 
Affiliated Ute is among them, as is Zweig v. Hearst Corp., CCH Fed. 
1 
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Sec. L. Rep. §96,851 (CA9 1979) (financial columnist who bought stock 
in corporations prior to extolling them in print, then sold when the 
price went up); and Courtland v. Walston & Co~, 340 F.Supp. 1076, 
1082-1084 (SDNY 1972)(investment adviser who bought stocks prior to 
recommending them in market letter, then sold). The SEC has obtained 
a number of consent decrees in similar situations. E~g~, SEC v. 
Healey, Lit. Release No. 6589 (1974) (employee of tender offeror 
utilized knowledge of target company to profit in its stock); In r~ 
Blyth &·co., 43 SEC 1037 (1969)(market professional traded on the 
basis of inside information obtained illegally from a government 
agency); In re Herbert L~ Honohan 13 SEC 754 (1943) (use of 
information about sealed bids); SEC v. Hancock, LIT. Release No. 505 
(1949)(investment company employee tipped a broker about planned 
purchases); and a number of cases in which information about 
forthcoming acquisitions was misappropriated by outsiders or by 
employees of the acquiring company. 
Since there was fraud in connection with the purchase of 
securities, and since the absence of an insider relationship is not 
dispositive, the judgment should be affirmed. I find this argument 
quite persuasive. The Court would not have to say anything more - as 
in the cases cited, Rule 10b-5 operates here in its "catch-all" 
capacity by picking up new ingenious schemes that are egregious if 
not technically within the definition of common law fraud. Although 
such a disposition would provide little guidance, I have great 
difficulty accepting the rules proposed by the SG and the amicus. 
The SG proposes that liability may properly be imposed 
whenever confidential information is converted or misappropriated in 
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violation of some confidential relationship, whether or not it 
derives from the issuer. The problem is that the SG has to go beyond 
traditional concepts of conversion to reach this case, so that the 
rule is already fuzzy. The amicus proposes that liability may be 
predicated on the "deliberate and purely personal utilization of 
market information, where the information was received solely by 
virtue of a confidential business relationship, and where there is a 
clear showing 'that an expectation of fair dealing •.. is 
justified. The test unfortunately suffers from a serious vagueness 
problem: it superimposes on the imprecise standard of materiality 
the further imprecise test of fairness and could therefore inhibit 
investor trading. Moreover, it easily blurs into the broad "parity 
of information" rule it was adopted to avoid. 
The SG has attempted to distinguish the legitimate activity 
of tender offerors and market professionals on the ground that they 
participate in bona fide economic activity within a scheme of 
regulation. Congress has already balanced their interests against 
those of the investing public. There are, however, many others who 
possibly ought to be allowed to trade. What about the "warehousing" 
case? What about individuals or companies who are about to give a 
profitable contract to an issuer corporation? What about government 
employees who know of impending changes in economic policy? Because 
of these problems, the law review article that orginially proposed 
this "fairness" test abandoned it and argued that liability should be 
imposed only on certain identifiable groups of professionals who have 
held themselves out in such a way as to create an expectation of fair 
dealing. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 
1 6 • 
822. This combines an element of the "regular receipt" notion with 
the "misappropriation" test of the SG. Liability would be limited to 
people who provide services to the securities industry and therefore 
regularly receive material nonpublic information to be used for 
limited legitimate purposes. Note, 92 Harv. L.Rev. 1538, 1547 
(1979). This test would not apply to the president of the offeror 
corporation who trades on his knowledge of a tender offer. It would, 
however, apply to Chiarella. 
Such a standard would be inapplicable to many cases that 
plainly violate the spirit of 10b-5, and thus is seriously 
underinclusive. But courts should not try to cover all possible 
situations by creating broadly applicable rules under a section that 
was designed as a catch-all. Such a section by its nature calls for 
a case by case analysis. Moreover, the SEC has .the power to remedy 
the situation by adopting specific rules, as it has in fact proposed 
to do. 44 Fed. Reg. 9956, supra. The relatively narrow proposed 
rule may thus avoid the pitfalls of judicial legislation under 
broadly worded statutes, while providing some guidance to investors 
and to courts. 
III. DUE PROCESS - NOTICE 
CA2 held that its rule was "but a logical application of the 
congressional policies underlying the rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur." 
The fact that there is no litigated fact pattern precisely on point 
is not determinative as long as there was "a clear and definite 
statement of the conduct proscribed". Since the SEC had previously 
brought a widely publicized enforcement action against printers in 
identical circumstances (ending in a consent decree), Chiarella could 
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not contend that there was no such "statement." Moreover, Pandick 
had posted a sign notifying its employees that they would be fired 
and would be liable for criminal penalties if they used any 
information learned from customer copy or talked about it except to 
give or receive instructions. Although Chiarella testified that he 
did not read the sign, he conceded that he passed it at least 640 
times. "Few malefactors ever receive such explicit warning." 
A. The case for reversal. 
Petitioner does not seriously contend that he lacked actual 
notice that his conduct would be viewed as illegal by the SEC. In 
fact he admitted on the stand that he was aware he was going "against 
the SEC." But this Court has held that "whether a criminal statute 
provides fair warning of its prohibitions must be made on the basis 
of that statute itself and the other pertinent law, rather than on 
the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expectations of 
particular defendants." Bouie v~ ·city of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355 
n.5 (1964). In the same case, the Court said that "there can be no 
doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not 
only from vague statutory lanquage but also from an unforeseeable and 
retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory 
language." Id. 352. The test is whether the statute as interpreted 
at the time of the offense "give[s] a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." United 
States · v~ Batchelder, 47 USLW 4611 (1979). Criminal liability is not 
available unless the words of the statute "plainly impose it". United 
States · v~ Naftalin, 47 USLW 4732 (1979). 
There is no doubt that the result of this case works an 
----------------------------
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expansion in the law of 10b-5. Although petitioner's conduct fell 
'---------------------- --
within the policy underlying the rule, there was and is considerable 
doubt that that policy should be applied beyond the classic insider 
situation. A number of cases had held that it should not, and the 
ALI model code had concluded that the law was too uncertain to permit 
codification. Although the SEC had interpreted the statute more 
broadly, there was at least enough conflict among the authorities to 
support petitioner's contention that he was forced to guess at the 
meaning of the statute. Certainly, the case is not one in which the 
law is relatively clear and the conduct egregious, so as to permit a 
criminal prosecution under the dicta in US Gypsum, supra p. 10 . 
B. The case for affirmance~ 
The statute and rule themselves in the clearest terms 
broadly prohibit all fraudulent schemes. Cf. United States v~ 
Naftalin, supra (holding that criminal penalties may be imposed for 
frauds against brokers -as well as investors -under §17(a) of the 
1933 Act because the proscription was "plainly imposed"). This Court 
and others had applied Rule 10b-5 outside the corporate insider 
context. Affiliated Ute, supra. Moreover, the agency charged with 
interpreting the statute had expressed its view that Chiarella's 
precise conduct was illegal. Thus, the law was "relatively clear." 
In this situation, Chiarella had at least as much notice as 
do offenders in Sherman Act "rule of reason" violations, Nash v. 
United ·states, 229 u.s. 373, 377 (1913), or in prosecutions for the 
sale of goods at "unreasonably low prices", United ·states v. National 
Dairy · Products ·corp., 372 u.s. 29, 31-36 (1963). Indeed, his 
conduct was so unreasonable, so egregious, and so plainly wrong -
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even under common law principles - that he can scarcely claim to have 
been unfairly surrrised. 
C. The jury · instructions. 
In a related argument, petitioner contends that even if the 
Act and Rule may be interpreted to cover his activities on CA2's 
theory that he had "regular access to market information", that was 
not the theory on which he was tried. As this Court held in Rewis v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971), the jury must be charged as 
to each element of the offense. A new element introduced on appeal 
cannot be used to justify a conviction if the jury was not charged 
that it must find it. Here, the jury was not instructed that it must 
find regular access to market information. This argument is a little 
thin since petitioner would probably have conceded the point at 
trial. If this Court adopts a narrower theory of liability as 
proposed by the SG or the amicus, the argument is equally attenuated. 
On the SG's view, there would be no need for a finding of regular 
access at all - a finding of misappropriation would be enough and the 
the jury was charged on that point. If one of the intermediate 
positions recommended by the amicus is adopted, we have the same 
situation as we would under CA2's rule: There should technically 
have been a finding under the "fairness test", but the facts are 
overwhelmingly clear that the test would have been satisfied. 
IV. INTENT 
The district court charged the jury that it could convict 
only if it found that Chiarella had acted "knowingly" and 
"willfully", defining those terms to mean that "the defendant must be 
aware of what he was doing and what he was not doinq" and that he 
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must be acting deliberately and not as a result of "innocent 
mistakes, negligence, or inadvertence or other innocent conduct." He 
concluded that "all that is necessary •.. is that the government 
establish a realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a 
wrongful act • • . and that the knowingly wrongful act involved a 
significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred." This 
instruction has been approved as sufficient under the "willfulness" 
requirement of §32(a) of the 1934 Act, the authorizing provision for 
criminal prosecutions. United States v~ Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (CA2 
1970); United ·States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (CA2 1976). 
Petitioner argues, however, that Rule 10b-5 itself requires 
more than the criminal penalties provision. Under Ernst &· Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, he says, the government must prove a specific intent to 
defraud. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (question was whether a cause of action 
for dam~ges will lie without allegation of "'scienter' - intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud"), 194 n.12 ("In this opinion the 
term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is 
ocnsidered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of 
imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the 
question whether . reckless behavior is sufficient for civil 
liability ... under 10b-5"). 
follows: 
Petitioner accordingly asked the trial court to instruct as 
Intent to defraud means the specific intent to deceive, 
cheat or trick someone. And, an intent to deceive, 
before being considered the specific intent which 
satisfies the statute, must be coupled with what may be 
best described as an evil ambition to injure someone 
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and deprive him of something of value. 
CA2 held that the trial court pr0perly refused to instruct 
on specific intent. Your Hochfelder opinion, read as a whole, does 
not define what element of scienter is required since the only 
question was whether negligence (no scienter at all) would be enough. 
Although the two references quoted above suggest that the Court had 
specific intent in mind, there are numerous references elsewhere in 
the opinion to willful, purposeful, and knowing conduct in more 
general terms. Moreover, the question of reckless conduct is left 
open. Therefore, Hochfelder cannot provide the answer. 
Specific intent was not viewed as necessary by any of the 
cases or commentators cited in Hochfelder as favoring scienter, and 
the only court to reach the question since then held the Peltz-Dixon 
charge sufficient. United States v. Charnay, supra, 537 F.2d at 357-
359. The SG adds that a number of other courts have now joined CA9's 
conclusion, many of them holding that recklessness is sufficient. 
Brief at 85 n.65, citing cases from CA3, 5, 6, 7, and 10. Chiarella 
testified that he knew his conduct was "wrongful" and "against the 
SEC". This was sufficient, as the jury found. 
Petitioner argues that the general intent requirement is 
inconsistent with Hochfelder. This argument is insubstantial, as 
CA2's ~easoning shows. The decision must turn instead on the 
policies underlying Hochfelder, an analysis petitioner has not 
undertaken. I am hard pressed to construct a rationale in his favor. 
It seems clear to me that Congress did not intend to limit §10(b) 
liability to individuals who subjectively intended to defraud their 
"victims". As in this case, most fraudulent schemes are inflicted on 
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stockholders unknown to the perpetrator. Although he may have known 
his conduct was wrong, it will be difficult to show that he intended 
to deceive. I also doubt that the Court can justifiably require a 
showing of specific intent only in criminal cases. This would appear 
to fly in the face of the statutory scheme, since §32 explicitly 
resolves the question of the need for a higher threshold of scienter 
in criminal cases ("willfulness"). 
This Court's refusal in US Gypsum to require specific intent 
under the Sherman Act also supports the decision below. The Court 
found that a requirement that defendants have a "conscious desire to 
bring [anticompetitive effects] to fruition" would be "unnecessarily 
cumulative and unduly burdensome." 438 U.S. at 446. 
Finally, petitioner's suggested instruction was wrong even 
if specific intent is a requirement. "Evil ambition to injure 
someone" is never an element of a crime, since "motive" is always 
distinguished from "intent". The fact that petitioner desired only 
to make money, not to hurt anyone, is utterly irrelevant under any 
rule. 
IV. PRIVILEGED EVIDENCE 
This issue arises from petitioner's application to the New 
York State Department of Labor for unemployment compensation after he 
was fired. He was instructed to supply a statement giving the 
reasons for his discharge, and responded as follows: 
I was discharged for violations of the company rules 
re: disclosure of client information. The allegation 
is true. It was a matter of printing of stock tender 
offers nd I utilized the information for myself .•.• 
This statement was admitted against petitioner at trial. _, ____________________________________________________ __ 
New York Lab. Law §537 provides in part that 
Information acquired from employers or employees 
pursuant to this article shall be for the exclusive use 
and information of the commissioner • . • and shall not 
be open to the public nor be used in any court in any 
action or proceeding • . . unless the commissioner is a 
party •.•. Such information . . . in the 
commissioner's discretion, amy be made available to the 
parties affected in connection with effecting 
placement. 
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Petitioner contends that this statute absolutely privileged 
the above-quoted statement as a matter of state law, and that the 
federal court ought to have respected that privilege under Rule 501 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. CA2 disagreed, noting that state 
privileges are not controlling in federal criminal cases under Rule 
501 except to the extent they reflect 11 the principles of the common 
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in 
the light of reason and experience. 11 Since the §537 privilege was 
11 Unknown to the common law 11 and federal policy strongly favors 
admissibility in criminal cases, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 708-713 & n.18 (1974), the statement was admissible. 
A. The case · for reversal. 
Petitioner argues that §537 creates an absolute privilege, 
and that the statement could not have been admitted against him in 
the courts of New York. Although federal courts have come to 
differing results in cases involving state 11 required reports 11 
privileges, there is a consensus that Rule 501 requires federal 
courts to weigh the applicable policies in the tradition of the 
common law. 
The policies favoring extension of a privilege are as 
follows. New York has a strong interest in facilitating the work of 
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its unemployment department by obviating unnecessary investigations. 
This interest should not be ignored in the absence of a strong 
federal interest. Here, a number of federal authorities support the 
state policy. Proposed Rule 502 of the FRE would have required 
federal courts to respect state "required reports" privileges. 
Congress did not, in refusing to enact the specific scheme of 
privileges because it desired to proceed on a case by case basis, 
disapprove any of the enumerated privileges. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d 
Cong. 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1974). Thus, proposed Rule 502 may provide 
guidance to the courts in fashioning a federal law of privileges (by 
adopting certain state privileges, in this instance). 
Required reports privileges are common in federal statutes 
(See Petitioner's Brief at 63) and to some extent reflect a federal 
policy parallel to New York's. The specific statutes emphasized by 
petitioner are unhelpful, however. He cites the Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act as providing a parallel privilege in a 
federal unemployment scheme. In fact, however, that statute only 
bars publication of information "in any manner revealing an 
employee's identity" - surely not a concern in these circumstances. 
45 U.S.C. §362(d). Equally unavailing is 26 U.S.C. ~3304(a)(16)(B) 
which requires that state unemployment tax laws contain safeguards 
against misuse of certain wage · information made available for very 
limited purposes. 
Finally, the privilege should be respected to avoid the 
possibility that the unemployment statute could infringe petitioner's 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
These three federal sources support New York's policy and 
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override the federal interest in the truth-determining process in 
I 
criminal cases, particularly where, as here, the statement was 
largely cumulative. Petitioner walks a thin line here between his 
assertion that this interest was not violated and the SG's assertion 
that in that case the admission was harmless error. Even if the 
evidence was cumulative, he says it forced him to take the stand to 
explain his admission, thus prejudicing him. 
B. The case for affirmance. 
Since there was no common law required reports privilege, 
petitioner must show substantial policy reasons to justify a 
departure from the general rule that evidentiary privileges are not 
favored. Herbert v. Lando, 47 USLW 4401 (1979); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709 (1974). His attempt to do so is not 
persuasive. 
First, the New York privilege is not absolute. The statute 
itself allows disclosure where countervailing interests are strong 
enough. The information may be revealed to third parties in the 
course of placing applicants for employment. There is no indication 
that it may be admitted in New York criminal trials. But the New 
York Department of Labor interprets the statute to permit disclosure 
of confidential files to the FBI, and the report in question was 
released for use at the trial of this case with the approval of the 
New York Commissioner of Labor. This in itself would seem sufficient 
to destroy petitioner's claim that New York's strong policy interest 
ought to be respected. 
Although the SG is less successful in refuting petitioner's 
federal policy arguments, they do not appear to be so substantial as 
to require exclusion of evidence that the state has agreed is 
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admissible. The statutory argument is unpersuasive since the cited 
statutes invoke different policy concerns and do not suggest any 
broadly applicable required reports privilege. As to Proposed Rule 
502, the SG says (1) the rule does not apply since New York approved 
the use of the statement in this case, (2) the statement was not 
"required by law" since it was the product of a voluntary application 
for unemployment benefits (somewhat disingenuous), and (3) Congress's 
decision to require the courts to look to common law should give us 
pause in relying on the proposed rule 502 to adopt state privileges. 
The fifth amendment argument would appear to be largely foreclosed by 
your opinion for the Court in Garner v. ·united States 424 U.S. 648 
(1976)(information supplied on tax return properly admitted against 
petitioner since he failed to claim the privilege at the time), and 
by the plurality view in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 , 427-431 
(1971)(statute requiring motorist to stop and furnish name and 
address after accident not unconstitutional). The only unanswered 
question is whether petitioner could, as a practical matter, have 
claimed the privilege. If the fifth amendment appears to you to be a 
serious concern, you might ask at argument what consequences would 
flow under the New York scheme from a claim of privileqe and a 
refusal to state the reasons for discharge under the New York scheme. 
The parties have not discussed this, and it is important to the 
Garner analysis. 
Finally, the admission of the statement was probably 
harmless error, since the fact that Chiarella engaged in the 
proscribed conduct was not really disputed and was established by 
substantial independent evidence. The admission here said little 
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about the central issue in the case - Chiarella's state of mind at 
the time of the offense. His brief in this Court comes close to 
admitting that the statement was of little relevance. If so, it is 
difficult to see why it forced him to take the stand, as he claims. 
V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
1. With respect to the scope of Rule 10b-5, CA2's rule is 
plainly too broad. At the other extreme, I would be prepared to -------accept the argument that conduct as egregiously dishonest as (91-~ ... 
~..vc... 
Chiarella's, falling within the proscriptions of the common law or 4..J......,'f24. 
..Y.e-11 ~ ..... ~ 
very nearly so, violates Rule 10b-5 when practiced in connectio~~!it~ 
 
the purchase of stock. As in Affiliated Ute, the Court could affirm ~ 
~ 
on the basis of the "catch-all" nature of 10b-5 without saying more.
If the Court is disposed to give more guidance (a course which, after~ 
trying to make sense of Affiliated Ute I agree is highly desirable), 
the case is considerably more troublesome. 
The SG's position is essentially that trading on undisclosed 
"stolen" information violates the rule. I wouldn't have any problem 
with this if it were limited to actual common law conversions 
involving an element of deception. But it is extremely questionable 
that that standard was met here, since the fraud on the offeror was 
not "deceptive" and the fraud on the shareholders may not have been 
actionable at common law. 
As to the amicus' test (seep. I~), I am scared by the 
vagueness of the "expectation of fair dealing" language. It would 
require courts to evaluate the legitimacy of business behavior in a 
wide variety of cases with no congressional guidance. If the test is 
limited to certain market professionals, it is less troubling but 
also less useful. I wonder if it really adds much to a case by case 
28. 
approach. If you think it does, the proposed rule could easily be 
justified as within the policy of §10(b). ' It is more difficult to 
give a principled explanation of the derivation of a duty to disclose 
I 
by analogy to the corporate insider duty. I am ~nclined to think 
that Congress intended to cover this type of "cunning device," and 
that the duty can adequately be justified by reference to the common 
law tradition and its modern development. 
2. Although I have no great sympathy for Mr. Chiarella 
himself in view of the facts of this case, I am much troubled by the 
imposition of criminal liability with the law in such a state of 
flux. Most persuasive is the ALI's refusal to take a position. I 
cannot say that the law was "relatively clear" under US Gypsum, 
although Chiarella's conduct was certainly egregious. The signs 
7 
posted by Pandick are of course not determinative. I would therefore 
reverse on this issue. 
~ -----------------~~ 
3. I simply don't see any basis for requiring specific 
intent under Rule 10b-5. Hochfelder makes no such demand, and the 
congressional policy and statutory structure militate against any 
such limiting requirement. 
4. The exact status of the privilege under New York law is 
a puzzle to me. If the statement would in fact have been excluded at 
all New York criminal trials, I would find this a difficult question. 
The policy shown by Proposed Rule 502 and the self-incrimination 
concern would make me lean toward exclusion. But the New York labor 
commissioner releases such statements to the FBI and expressly 
authorized the use of Chiarella's statement below. In these 
circumstances, it seems absurd to hold that it should have been 
excluded out of deference to state law. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1202, United States v. Chiarella 
I believe that a review of the iury instructions 
supports the conclusion of Mr. Justice Stevens that the jury was 
never presented with the theory that now forms the basis of the 
SG's argument-that petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring 
corporation that is actionable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. 
criminal 
After some general 
trial, the iudqe 
Securities Acts of 1933 
instructions on a iury's duty in a 
explained the purposes of the 
and 1934. He emphasized that the 
"philosophy ... at the heart of the securities laws is one of full 
and fair disclosure of material facts to prospective purchasers 
of securities. R. at 676. In this vein, the iudqe stated that: 
The charges in this case involve allegations that 
Vincent Chiarella traded on the basis of material non-
public information without disclosing this confidential 
information. In simple terms, the charge is that 
Chiarella wrongfully took advantage of information he 
acquired in the course of his confidential position at 
Pandick Press and secretly used that information when 
he knew other people trading in the securities market 
did not have access to the same information that he had 
at a time when he knew that information W3S material to 
the value of the stock. 
R. at 677. 
After the judge read the indictment, which restates the 
language of Rule 10b-5 and details the financial transactions at 
issue here, he read the lanqauge of 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to the 
jury. The jury was told that in order to find 
~-'­
the defedant 
guilty it must find that Chiarella either (1) employed any 
device, scheme or artifice to defraud or (2) engaged in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operated or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person. R. at 681. 
The judge stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan 
to obtain money by trick or deceit, and that "a failure by 
Chiarella to disclose material, non-public information in 
connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit." 
R. at 683. Accordingly, the iury was instructed that Chiarella 
employed a scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose .•. material 
non-public information in connection with the purchases of the 
stock." R. at 685-86. 
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that Chiarella's 
conduct would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person if 
"Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchased securities 
without disclosing material, non-public information would have 
or did have the effect of operating as a fraud upon a seller." 
R. at 686. The judge had earlier stated that fraud "embraces 
all the means which human ingenuity can devise and which are 
resorted to by one individual to gain an advantage over another 
by false misrepresentation, suggestions or by suppression of 
truth." R. at 683. 
The judge then instructed the jury that an element of 
the offense was that the acts be committed knowingly and 
willingly. In the course of these instructions, the judge 
suggested the "central issue .•• is what was Mr. Chiarella's state 
of mind when he was engaged in the transactions 
involved ... knowing that this violated company pol icy? Did he 
have any realization that he was doing a wrongful act or 
not? .•. Had Mr. Chiarella not seen the notices posted next to his 
time clock and elsewhere for many months, as he testified?" R. 
at 682. 
In sum, the jury instructions were premised upon the 
theory that Chian~lla violated 10(b) merely by his failure to 
disclose material, non-public information to sellers when he 
bought the stock of target corporations. Although the 
instructions briefly mention the company policy against use of 
confidential information, that discussion is part of the 
instruction on the requisite state of mind for the offense. The 
jury was never instructed that violation of a dutv to the 
printer's customers could constitute actionable fraud. 
The question of Chiarella's duty to the customers of 
his employer was mentioned at other stages of the trial. In its 
opinion denying a motion to dismiss the indictment, the trial 
judge compared Chiarella's conduct in using information to 
embezzelment committed by a bank employee. And the prosecution 
apparently relied upon a similar theme in its closing argument. 
The prosecution's argument lead Chiarella's attorney to make an 
unsuccesful request that the trial judge explictlv instruct the 
jury that the tender offeror was not a victim of fraudulent 
activity. R. at 701. Nevertheless, the jury was not instructed 
that violation of a duty to the acquiring corporation would be a 
fraud reached by section 10(b). 
Because a criminal conviction may not be affirmed on 
the basis of a theory not presented to a jury, see Rewis v. 
United States, 401 u:s. 808, 814 (1971), the SG's theory need 
not be reached in this case. Even if it is thought that the 
SG's theory was presented in addition to the parity-of-
information theory, a criminal conviction may not be upheld on 
the basis of an alternative theory which the jury may not have 
adopted. See United States~ Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (2d 
Cir. 1978); cf. Leary v. New York, 395 U.S. n, 21-22 (1969); 
Stromberg~ United States, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Thus, this case 
may properly be disposed of simply by holding that the parity-
of-information theory presented to the jury does not properly 
describe conduct actionable under ? ect ion 1 0 (b) . The opinion 
need not decide whether the breach of a duty to an acquiring 
corporation could constitute fraud under section 10(b). 
November 29, 1979 
78-1202 Chiarella 
Dear Potter, Bvron ann Bill: 
At Conference, the three of you and I voted to 
reverse broadly on the qround that the Federal Securities 
Acts are not aoplicable to this tyPe of fraud. The Chief, 
Bill Brennan, Thurqood and Harry voted to affirm CA2's 
sweeoinq opinion 100%. 
John took an intermediate position. Prior to 
Conference John did what I had not done: he checked the 
record and concluded that the jury was instructed only that 
Chiarella breached a duty to the persons from whom he 
purchased shares at the time he oossessed material, non-
public information. John thinks, as we do, that the 
Securities Act~ imposed no duty on Chiarella with respect to 
the sellers - persons with whom he had no relationship 
whatever. Thus, John has told me that he could join an 
opinion reversing the conviction on the only theory submitted 
to the jury. 
He would not reach what may be called the second 
theory: whether petitioner also breached a duty to the 
acquiring corporation that is actionable under ~lO(b) and 
Rule lOb-5. Although John is not at rest on this second 
theory, he considers it to be different because there is an 
identifiable agency relationship between petitioner (throuqh 
his employer Pandick) and the acquirinq corporation. 
I have concluded that John is quite riqht that the 
jury was instructed only on the first theory, namely, that 
the charge was a criminal fraud upon the seller of the 
shares. I therefore think that the proper way to write the 
opinion is in accord with John's views. We would reverse on 
the first theory. There hardly could be a duty imposed by the 
Securities Acts upon Chiarella to disclose information to 
persons with whom he had no relationship - direct or 
indirect. Whether he committed a common law fraud 
under state law is an issue not before us. 
I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by my 
clerk, Jon Sallet, based on his examination of the jury 
instructions. 
Absent dissent, I 
opinion alonq the foreqoinq lines. Unless it can 
this way, I see little chance of a Court opinion. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice \fuite 






November 28, 1979 
78-1202 Chiarella 
Dear John: 
As vou know, the above case has been assiqned to me 
to write. 
I am inclined to accommodate my views to yours, as 
I understand them. Indeed, I now aqree with you as to the 
limited character of the instructions. 
I enclose a draft of a proposed letter to the 
Brothers who also voted to reverse. I would appreciate 
knowinq whether I have correctly stated your position, ann 
whether you would consider favorably an opinion written alonq 
these lines. 
Sincerelv, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
_inpttntt <!Jcurt llf tfrt~h j\fattg 
.. uJrittghm. ~. <!}. 2ll,;tJ!.' 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
November 29, 1979 
Re: 78-1202 - Chiarella 
Dear Lewis: 
In view of your letter and its enclosure, 
I fully agree with your proposal to write an opinion 
along the lines you suggest. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc - Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
,ju.p-rtutt QfO'llrlltf tlt't ~tb ,jtatts 
jiluftinghtt4 ~. ~· 2llc?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
December 3, 1979 
Re: No. 78-1202 - Chiarella 
Dear Lewis: 
I can go along with the approach suggested in your 
letter of November 29th. I would have preferred to see it 
written more broadly, but under the circumstances it just 
can't be, and I will be willing to join an opinion that 
simply expresses no opinion as to whether the breach of a 
duty to an acquiring corporation could constitute fraud 
under§ lO(b) (which I understand to be the recommendation 
of your law clerk, Jon Sallet, from the last sentence of/ 
page 5 of his memorandum). I would be unwilling to join, 
at least for the present, any opinion which stated that 
there was a breach of duty in such circumstances. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart 
and Mr. Justice White 
Sincerely, 
JS 12/19/79 
No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who 
learns from the confidential documents of one corporation that 
it is planning an attempt to secure control of a second 
corporation violates ~ 10(b) of the SAcurities Exchanqe Act of 
1934 if he fails to disclose the impending takeover prior to 
tradinq in the tarqet company's securities. 
T 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 ann 1976 he 
2. 
corporations were concealed by blank spaces or false names. The 
true names were sent to the printer on the night of the final 
printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names 
of the target companies prior to the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. He purchase<'! stock in 
thP. target companies and sold the shares immediately after the 
takeover attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner 
earned slightly more than $30,000 in the course of fourteen 
months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his trading 
activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a consent 
decree with the Commission in which he agreed to return his 
profits to the sellers of the shares.2 On the same day, he was 
<'lischarged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on seventeen 
counts of violating ~ 10(b) of the SecuritiP.s Exchange Act of 
1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.3 After petitioner 
3. 
TI. 
SAction 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 u.s.c. ~ 78i, 
prohibits the use "in connection with the puchase or sale of any 
security ..• rofl any manipulative or decE=>ptivA device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rulE=>s and requlations as 
the Commission may presrribe." Pursuant to this section, the 
SEC promulgated Rule 1 Ob-5 which providAs in pertinent partS 
that 
It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
of interstate commercA, or of the rna ils or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, schemA, or artifice 
to defraud, ror] 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operatA as a fraud 
or a deceit upon any person, in connect ion with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. ~ 240.10b-5 (1979). 
This cnse concerns the legal pffect of the petitioner's 
si.lence. That is, the Dist"t"ict Court's charqe permitted the 
iury to convict the petitionE=>r if it found that he willfully 
failed to inform sellers of tarqet. company sAcurities that he 
4. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the 
language of the statute, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 
185, 197 ( 1976)' ~ 1 0 (b) does not state whether silence may 
constitute a manipulative or deceptive device. ~10(b) was 
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices 
that serve no useful function. Id. at 202, 206. But neither the 
legislative history nor the statute itself offers specific 
guidance for the resolution of this case. When Rule 10b-5 was 
promulgated in 1942, the SEC did not discuss the possibiity 
that failure to provide information might run afoul of~ 10(b).7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of ~ 
10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated 
that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed 
information obtained from a director of the issuer corporation 
who was also employed by the brokPraqe firm. Cady, Roberts & 
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). A corporate insider must abstain from 
trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first 
disclosed all inside information known to him whjch is material 
5. 
~·, at 911. The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from 
two elements: ( 1) The existence of a relationship gi_vinq access 
to inside information intended to be availablP only for a 
corporate purpose, and (2) the unfairnPss of a]lowinq a 
corporatP insider to takA advantage of secret information by 
trading without disclosure. rd., at 912 & n.15.8 
Tho.t the relationship between a corporate insiner and 
the stockholders of his corporation qives rise to a disclosure 
obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common 1 aw, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon 
the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose 
material information prior to consummation of a transaction 
commits fraud only when he is undPr a nuty to do so. And a duty 
to discJose material information arises when onP party has data 
"that the other rparty] is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them."9 In its Cady, Roberts necision, the Commission recognized 
a relationship of trust and confidence existing between the 
6. 
stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supo. 808, 829 
( D • De 1 . 1 9 5 1 ) . 
Federal iudicial necisions have found violations of ~ 
10(b) where corporate insidPrs used undisclosed information for 
thAi r own benefit. E.q., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F.2d 833 (CA2 1968) cert. C\enied 404 u.s. 1005 (197/.). Federal 
cases have emphasized, in accordance with the common law rule, 
that "ftlhe party charged with failinq to disclose market 
in format ion must be under a duty to disclose it," Fr ig i temp 
Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (CA2 
1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock who has no duty to a 
prospective seller because he is neither an insider nor a 
fiduciary has no obligation to reveal material facts. See 
General Time Corp. ~Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 
{CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 u.s. 1026 (1969). 11 
This Court followed the same approarh in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 u.s. 128 (1972). A qroup of 
American Indians formed a corporation to manaqe joint assets 
7. 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. Id~, at 
14 6. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
shareholders in disposing of their stock which they knew wr:1s 
effectively traded in two separate markets--a primary market 
consisting of Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank, 
and a resale market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian 
sellers charged that the employees had violated ~ 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices prevailing 
in the resale market. The Court recognized that no duty of 
disclosure would exist if the employP.es and the bank merely 
acted as transfer agents. But the bank had assumed a duty to 
act on behalf of the shareholdP.rs, and the Indian sellers had 
relied upon the employees when they sold their stock. Id. , at 
152. Because the employees were charged with a responsibility 
to the shareholders, they could not act as market makers 
inducing the Indians to sell their stock without disclosing the 
nature of the non-Indian market. Id. at 152-53. 
In sum, ~ 10b was designed to eliminate fraud in 
8. 
that a duty to disclose arises from a relationship of trust and 
confidence between parties to a transaction. Because corporate 
insiders have a duty to place the shareholder's welfare before 
their own, they may not benefit personally by tradinq on the 
basis of undisclosed information.12 
III 
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating 
~ 10{b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential information from the target company. Rather, he 
obtained "market information" about events which affected the 
price of the target company's securities but did not affect its 
earning power or the conduct of its business.13 Petitioner's use 
of that information was not a fraud under ~ 10{b) unless he was 
subiect to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading. 
By failing to specify any such duty, the trial court effectively 
instructed the iury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; to 
all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The iury was 
told simply to decide whether petitioner used material, non-
9. 
material nonpublic information may not use that information to 
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to 
disclose." 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978)(emphasis in 
original). Although the court said that its test would includE" 
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic 
in format ion, id. at 1 366, its rationale for that 1 imitation is 
unrelated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 Th~ Court 
of Appeals, like the trial court, failea to identify a 
relationship between petitioner and the sellers that could give 
rise to a dutv. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief 
that the federal securities laws have "created a system 
providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and 
intelligent investment decisions." 588 F.2d at 1362. The use of 
material information not generally available is fraudulent, this 
theory suqqests, because such information qives certain buyers 
or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and 
sellers. 
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not 
1 0 • 
the selle~s of the tarqet company securities, for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. He was not their aqent, he was not 
a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed 
their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete 
stranger who dealt w] th the sellers only throuqh impersonal 
market transactions. 
We cannot affirm petitioner's convic;tion without 
recoqnizing a qeneral duty existinq between all pRrticipants in 
market transactions to forqo action based on material, nonpublic 
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which oeparts 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a 
specific relationship between two parties, see n. 9 supra, 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidenc;e emerqes from the 
language or legislative history of section 10(b). Moreov~r, I 
neither the Conqress nor the Commission has ever adopted R 
parity-of-information rule. Instead the problems caused bv the £ 
11. 
member of i3. national securitiP.s exchange from effecting any 
transaction on the exchange for its own account. 15 U.S.C.A. ~ 
7 8 k ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 1 9 7 2-1 9 7 8 S u pp. ) . But Congress has specifically 
exempted from this prohibition spP.cial ists: broker-nE'alers who 
execute orders for customers trading in a specific corporation's 
stock, while at the same time buying and selling that 
corporation's stock on their own behalf. ~ 11(a.)(1)(A), 15 
u.s.c. ~ 78k{a) ( 1) {A); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong. 1st 
SPss. 99 (1975).15 The exception is based upon Congress's 
recognition that specialists contribute to a fair and oroerJy 
marketplace at the same time t.hey exploit. the informational 
advantage that comes from their possession of buy and sell 
orders. Ibid.16 Similarly, the Williams Act17 limits but does 
not completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target 
corpora.tion stock before public announcement of the offer. 
Congress' careful action in the these areas contrasts, and is in 
some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are asked to 
adopt in this case. 
1 2. 
tender offer to institutional investors who are then able to 
purchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is 
made public and the price of shares rises.18 In both 
situations, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target 
corporation on the basis of market information which is unknown 
to the seller. In both situations, the seller's behavior would 
presumably be altered if he had the nonpublic information. 
Significn.ntly, however, the Commission has r1~ ted to bar 
warehousing under its authority to regul~te tender offers19 
after recognizing that act ion under ~ 1 0 (b) would rest on a 
"somewhat different theory" than that underlying insider 
tradinq.20 
We see no basis for applying such new and different 
theories of liability in this case. As we have emphasized 
before, the 19 34 Act cannot be read "more broadly than its 
language and the statutory scheme reasonabl v permit." Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington 47 USLW 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 u.s. 103, 116 (1978). Section 10(b) is 
1 3. 
' 
contrary result is without support in the legislative history of 
§ 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with the careful regulatory 
plan thnt Congress has enacted for regulation of the securities 
markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 4 30 U.S. at 
479.21 
IV 
In its brief to this Court, the United State offers an 
alternative theory to support petitioner's conviction. It 
argues that petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring 
corporation when he acted upon information which he obtained by 
virtue of his position as a printer employed by that 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a 
conviction under § 1 0 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon the 
acquiring corporation and the sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory is valid for it 
was not submitted to the iury. The iury was told that in order 
to find the petitioner guilty it must conclude that he either 
(i) employed a device, scheme or. artifice to defraud, or (ii) 
1 4 • 
connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit." 
Id. at 683. AccordinqJy, the iury was instructed that the 
petitioner employAd a scheme to defraud if he "did not 
disc1ose ... material non-public information in r.onnection with 
thA purchases of the stock." Id. at 685-86. 
Alternatively, the iury was instructed that it could 
convict if "Chiarella's aJleqed conduct of havinq purchased 
securities without (Usc losing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operatinq as a fraud upon a 
seller." Id. at 686. The i udqe had earlier stated that fraud 
"embraces all the means which human inqenuity can devise and 
which are resorted to by onA individual to qain an advantaqe 
over. another by false misrepresentation, suqqestions or bv 
suppression of the truth." Id. at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstratE'! that petitioner was 
convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, 
non-public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the 
15. 
upon the existence of such a duty, whether it has been breached, 
or whether such a breach consitutes a violation of§ 10(b).22 
The iudqment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Of the five transactions, four involved tender 
offers and one concPrned a merqer. United States v. Chiarella, 
588 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.2 (CA2 1978) 
2. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. 
May 24, 1977) 
3. ~ 32(a) of the 1934 Act sanctions criminal penalties 
against any person who willfully violates the Act. 15 U.S.C.A. ~ 
78ff(a) (1978). PPtitioner was charqed with seventeen counts of 
violntinq the Act because he had received seventeen letters 
confirming purchase of shares. 
4. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
5. Only Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) are at issue here. Rule 
10b-5(b) provides that it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the liqht of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
FN2. 
7. See SEC Release No. 1230 (May 21, 1942). 
8. In Cady, Roberts the broker-dealer was liable under 
section 10(b) because he received non-public information from a 
director of the issuer who was also associated with the 
brokeraqe firm. Because the director. could not use inside 
information, neither could the partners of his brokerage firm. 
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). The transactions 
involved in Cady, Roberts invo]ved sale of stock to persons who 
previously may not have been shareholders in the corporation. 
Id. , <'It 913 & n. 21. The Commission embraced the reasoning of 
r-r 
Judqe Learned Hann that "the director of officer assumed a 
fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale: for it would 
be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantaqe of his 
position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary 
although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become 
one." Id., at 914 n.23, quoting Gratz v. Clauqhton, 187 F.2d 46, 
-
49 (CA2 1951), cert. denied 341 u.s. q20 (1951). 
9. Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts ~ 551(2){a). See 
FN3. 
10. See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations~ 838 {1975)(hereinafter Fletcher): 3A Fletcher, ~~ 
1 1 6 8 . 2 , 1 1 7 1 , 1 1 7 4 : 3 L • Loss , S e cur it i e s Reg u 1 at ion 1 4 4 6- 4 8 ( 2 d 
ed. 1961): 6 L. Loss at 3557-58 (1969 Supp.): see also Strong v. 
Repide, 213 u.s. 419, 431-34 (1909): Brophey v. Cities Service 
Co • , 3 1 De 1 . Ch . 2 4 1 , 7 0 A • 2d 5 ( 1 9 4 9 ) . 
11. See also SEC v. Great American 1ndus., Inc., 407 
F.2d 453, 460-461 (CA2 1968), cert. denied 395 u.s. 920 (1969): 
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 lCA7 1963). 
12. "Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held 
liable under 10(b) because they act on the basis of information 
derived from a corporate insider and have a duty not to profit 
from the use of inside information. See Shapiro v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (CA2 1974). 
The tippee's obligation may be viewed as arising from his role 
as a participant after the fact in the insider• s breach of a 
fiduciary duty. Subcomittees of American Bar Association Section 
of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on 
FN4. 
1 2 1 U • P a • L • Re v • 7 9 8 , 7 9 9 ( 1 9 7 3 ) • 
14. The Court of Appeals said that its "requ]ar access 
to market information" test would create R workable rule f 
embracing "those who occupy strategic places in the market 
mechanism." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 
1978). These considerations are insufficient to support a duty 
to disclose. A duty arises from the relationship between 
parties, see nn. 9 & 10 supra and accompanying text, and not 
merelv~~e~-~£~?:~ 
The Court of Appeals also suggested ~hat the acquiring 
corporation itself would not be a "market insider" because a 
tender offeror creates, rather than receives, information and 
takes a substantial economic risk that its offer will be 
unsuccessful. Id., at 1366-1367. Again, the Court of Appeals 
departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a duty. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in 
~k~ J - -j.t. 
a manner a~.e~ our analysis here, that a tender offeror 






General Tim~ Corp. v. TaJley Industrjes, 403 F.2d 159, 164 (CA2 
1968), cert. deni~d, 393 u.s. 1026 (1969). 
15. 2 Secur.iti~s and Exchange Commission, Report of 
the Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th 
Conq. 1st. Sess. 57-58, (1963)(hereinafter Special Study). 
Because of the compilation of buy and sell orders collected in a 
specinlist's "book," the specialist's transactions on his own 
behalf are based on material, nonpublic information indicating 
consumer desire for a particular issue. Id., at 76. 
16. The spPcialist provides liquidity and continuity to 
the market by buying or selling for his own account. During any 
one period of tra~ing there may not be enough customers who wish 
to buy or sell a sped fie stock in order to allow continuous 
trading at prices reflecting the true value of stock. Without 
the intervention of specialists, an investor might not be able 
to find a purchaser offering the going rate at the time he 
wishes to sell. The seller would be forced either to wait for 
another buyer to enter the market, which reduces the liauiditY 
FN6. 
positioners, registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, 
and risk arbitrageurs from~ 11's general prohibition on member 
trading. 15 U.S.C.A. ~ 78k{a)(1){A)-{D) (1978): SeeS. Rep. No. 
94-75 at 99: see also Securities Exchange - Act Release No. 34-
9 9 50 , 3 8 Fed . Reg . 3 9 0 2 , 3 9 1 8 { 1 9 7 3 ) . 
17. 15 U.S.C. E; 78m(d}(1) permits a tender offeror to 
purchase 5% of the target company's stock prior to disclosure of 
its plans for acquisition. 
18. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra n.16, 
at 811-812. 
19. SEC Proposed Rule~ 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-88 
(1979). 
20. SEC InstitutionaJ Investor Study Report, B.R. 
Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. xxxii { 1971). See Dooley, 
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 
{forthcoming issue). 
21. The Court of Appeals correctly noten that Iii 10{b) 
should not be construed more narrowly in criminal actions than 
FN7. 
probation. Id~, at 1373, 1378 (Meskill, J., dissentinq). 
22. The conviction would have to be reversecl even if\ 
the jury had been instructed that it could convict petitioner j 
either (1) because of his failure to disclose mRter.ial nonpublic 
I 
I 
information to seller or (2) because of the breach of a duty to 
the acquiring corporation. We may not uphold a criminal 
conviction if it is impossible to ascertain whether the 
defendant has been punished for non-criminal conduct. Uni tP.d 
States v. Gallaqher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978): see Leary 
v. New York, 395 u.s. 6, 31-32 (1969): Stromberq v. California, 







Attached is a copy of ehiarella with your chanqes 
and additional changes made by the four of us. Of particular 
note are the following chanqes: 
(1) The addition of secondary sources to notes 10, 
11 & Hi. 
(2) The Affiliated 5te discussion now refers to the 
defendants as managers or officers. The Court's opinion 
refers to them as managers, officers, and employees. 
(3) Note 20 is now simply descriptive. Althouqh I 
believe that the CA2 principle is compatible with the rule of 
leniency, there is no reason to "decide" that issue in this 
case. 
I am told by the library that Professor Loss' 
treatise has not been updated since 1969, althouqh they say 
he published a pamphlet within the past few weeks that 
contains general views on the securities laws. I am 
attempting now to obtain that work. 
3 
t-;t-8o 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-1202 
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
U 't d St te Appeals for the Second me a s. c· 't IrCUl , 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corpora-
tion violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the target company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976 he 
"Worked as a "markup man" in the composing room o 
Pandick Press, a financial printer · · 
mong documents that petitioner handled were five announce-
ments of corporate takeover bids. When these documents 
were delivered to the printer, the identities of the acquiring 
and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or 
false names. The true names were sent to tbe printer on the 
night of the final printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
he target companies before the final printing from other 
formation containeq in the documents. e purcliase s oc 
n the target companies and sold the shares immediately after , 
he takeover attempts were made public.1 By this method, 
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petitioner realized t in of slightly more than $30,000 in the 
course of 14 months. Subsequently, the Sf'curities and Ex-
change Commission (Commission or SEC) began an investi-
gation of his trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner 
entered into ~ent decree with the Commission in which 
he agreed to return his profits to the sellers of the shares.~ 
On the same day, he was discharged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of 
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.a After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the in clictmen t.' he was brought 
to trial and convicted on all counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted 
certiorari, 441 U. S. -- (1079). and '""e now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78j. prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission .may prescribf'." Pursuant to this section, 
tho SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 which provides in perti-
nent part 5 that -------
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or incli~ 
n mrrgrr. United States v. Chiar!'lla. 58S F. 2n 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2 
Hl78). 
2 SEC v. Chiarella, Xo. 77 Civ. 258-.! (GLG) (RDNY :\by 24, Hl77). 
3 Reciion 32 (a) of thr Hl:-34 Art. sanriion~ criminal penaltie~ again~! an~· 
prr~on who willfully violnlrs the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (HJ72-
197S Rupp.). Petitioner wa~ charged with 17 counts of Yiolating thr Art 
hecnn.::e ho had received 17 lcttrrs confirming purclwse of !'harP:<. 
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Snpp. 05 (SDNY 1978). ~ 
5 Only Rules lOb-5 (a) and (r) arc nt issur here. Rule lOb--5 (b~ 
pro,·ideR thnt. it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statemenl of a 
material fact or to omit t o statr a maicrial fnct necessary in order to 
78-1202-0PINION 
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rectly, by the usc of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
" (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifico to 
defraud, [or] 
"(c) To engage in any act. practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1970). 
This cai"e concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
thr potitioner if it founcl that he willfully failed to inform 
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
coming takeover bid that \Yould make their shares 1norc 
valuable . .: In order to decide whether silence in such cir-
cumstances violates§ 10 (b). it is necessary to revie·w the lun-
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts. 
Althotwh the starting point of onr inquiry is the language 
of the statute. Ernst & Ernst Y. llochfelder, 425 F. S. 185, 197 
(1076) , § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may consti-
tute a manipulative or dcccpti,:e clnicr. Section 10 (b) \\"as 
desig•1cd as a ct;tch-all clauso to prev0nt fraudulent practices. 
!d. , at 202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of 
this case. When Rule 10b-5 " ·as promulgated in 1!)42. the ____..-
mnk0 the ::;tatements made, in thC' light of th0 circumstance::: und0r ll"hi <" h 
the~· were mad0, not mislendil'g." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (h) (1970). TllC' 
portion of the indictment ha::;0d on this provi~ion was di~mi~"cd h0 rn u~e 
tlw petitioncr made no st3tC'mr nt ~ at nil in comwction with tlw pm<"h:lHC' 
of stock. 
" Hccord, at 682- 683, 686. 
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REC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of~ 10 (b). 7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of 
~ 10 (b) "·hen it held that a broker-dealer and his firm vio-
lated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
1 information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation who was a registered representative of the broker-
age firm. Jn Cady, Roberts (C· Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961), 
the Commission decided that a corporate insider must abstain 
from. trading in the shares of his corporation unlf'ss he has 
first disclosf'd all material inside information known to him. 
The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from 
(( r a ln affirmativr duty to disclose rnaterial information 
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
'insic!Prs.' particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must discloBc material facts which arc known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment." !d., 
at 911. 
\ j I The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from . ///1 n ,~q 
~) The existence of a relationship access to ins1 e "1Jf'a 1 
information intended to be available only for a corporate 
\ ·, ~ ( purpose, and (} ) the unfairness of allowing a corporate _1 _ 
insider to take advantage of ~ information by trading 4/it!j 
without disclosure. !d., at 912, and 11. 15.8 "" c __ 
/ 
7 Src SEC' Rrlra~e No. 8230 (l\'l:ay 21. 1042). 
~In c-;fdl{. Rob-" rt s. tllf• brokrr-rl r·d:• r \Y:I~ J;al>IP llNlrr ~ 10 (b) hr('tnl~(' 
it rrcPivrd lJOnpublic information from a corporate insirlPr of thP isPuPr. 
Sinrr the insider could not usp thP information, neither could the 11artners 
in the brokrrago firm with which he was a~soriated. Cady, Robel'ts & 
Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 ( Hl61). The tran~artion in Cady, Roberts involved 
sale of 10.tock to per~ons who previouftly may not ha vc been ~harcholder,; 
in tho corporation. !d., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced 
the '""'"'""of .Jmtge Le.u,ed lh"d lho1 "the <h'"etoc oc offiocc """~ 
7&-J 202-0PINIO~ 
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosu re obli-
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentntion made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the fal!"c statcment is fraudulent. But one who fails to 
disclose matrrial information prior to the consummation of a 
.J. transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
~ t. \{, -,l.. { so. And tt duty to disclose H1!ilt~rial inftH"IR!itiQl~arisrs when 
\l._l_h_h_&_r_v.e_~t_•_IS"'....JL-----,o::-:l ::-::1e::l::)a::r:-t~y?h-:a:-s"tl(hrhr "that the other [party] is entitled to know 
because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and ronfi-
dPnce betwcrn them." 0 In its Cady, Roberts decision, the 
Commission recognized a rC'lationship of trust and con-
fidence between the sharPho1ders of a corporatio11 allcl those 
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason 
of their position with that corporation.10 This relatiollship 
gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of 
preventing a corporate insider from tak ring l advanta?;C' of the ..._ ___ _ 
n fiduciary rrh1tion to thr bu~·pr IJ~· thr \' err ~ale: for il ''"mdd he n 
sorry distinction to allow him to u~r the advantage of hi ,; pol'ition to 
induce the bu~·er into the po~ition of a brneficiar~· nlthongh hr "·a~ for-
hiddc•n to c'o ~o u JH' l' the lm~·cr h·tcl br,.ome on r. " Jd .. at Pl~. n. :?:l, 
fJuoting Gratz Y. Clavghton. 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (C.'\2 1051). crrt. drniPd, 
341 U.S. 920 (1051). 
"Tirst:ltrmrllt of ih r L~l'l' ~d , Tl ; rt~ §:i.il (2)(a) (10711 ). 8Pr' .lamt·~ & 
Gray, Misreprr~rntation-Pa rt II, 37 Mel. L. Rev. 488, 52:3-527 (1071\). 
As rrgards f-:ec uritir* transactions, thr Amrricnn Law In~titutr rrrognizr~ 
that. "silence wh rn there is a duty to Rpeak may br a fraudulrnt act." 
ALI, Federal Sreuritirs Code § 262 (b) (Proposrd Official Draft 1978) . 
10 Srr 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§ 838 (1975) (hrrrinafter Flctchrr); 3A Flrtcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, J 174; 
3 L. Loss, Scemitirs Hrgulation 14-!6- 14+8 (2d eel. 1961); 5 L. Los~, at 
35.57-3558 (1069 S.l,!l2p.). Sre al~o Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 431-
434 1909 · Bra hfi v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5 
(1010). Srt• gl'!H'rall~· Note, Hnlr JOl-5: Elrm"nt ol a Privnte Higltt o 
Action, 42 ~Yll L. Bt•v. 511. 552-55:~. ancln. 71 (J06S): 75 Han'. L. Hrv. 
14-W, 1450 (]9(\2) ; Dnum & Phillip~, The Implication of Carly. Roberts, 
17 Bu~. Law.C 039,945 (1962) . 
I 
l 
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uninformed ninority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica 
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951). 
-·The Federal courts have found violations of ~ 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d 830 (C'A2 1968). cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "rt]he party charged with failing to dis-
close market information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Frigite1np Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 
F. 2ct 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159. 164 (CA2 1068) , cert. deniecl. 
393 U.S. 1026 (1969)." 
This Court followPd the same approach in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 ( 1972). A group of 
American Indians formrd a corporation to manage joint assets 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock 
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its 
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the 
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation rrquested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. Id. , 
at 146. Two of the hank's assistant managers aided the 
shnreholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
~yas traded in two 8rpara te markets-a primary market of _____-
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale~ 
11 SPf' ::l.,o SEC v. Grrat American Indus .. lnr .. 407 F. 2d 4Pi:) JI)O 
"' (CA2 1968). reri. denied, 305 U. S. 920 (1060): Kohler v. Kohler Co ., 
31\l "F'. 2d fH1, G:37-63R (CA7 HJG:)): Noir, supra n. 10. 42 NYU L. Hr1·. 
n t 5.'i·t: :.'\ ok Thr Rrg11lntion of Co:·por~1r Trncler Offrr Undrr Frdrr:tl 
Srcurit.irs Law: A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 350, 373-374 (1966). 
Rrr geJwr:dl~' Note. CiYil tinbilii,· under Hulr X-10b-5, 42 Va. L. l1e1·. 
537, 554-561 (1956). 
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers 
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
10 duty of disclosure would exist if t.J:Te. ofEgeps an~~ 1 J ~ 1 
bank merely acted as a transfer agent. But the bank,£.hacl 
assumed a duty to act on behalf of the shareholders. and the 
Indian sellers had relied upon its personnel when they sold 
their stock. Id., at 152. Because these officers of the bank 
were charged with a responsibility to the shareholders, they 
could not act as market makers incli~eing the Inclians to sell 
their stock 1vithout disclosing the lffl:'4i'ttl'oe-~~~ 
market. !d., at 152-153. 
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have es-
tablished that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under ~ 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trad-
ing guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's IYclfare before their own. will 
110t benefit personally through fraudulent use of material 
non public information.'" 
'" "Tipprr,;" of rorpor:1tr in~idrr~ ha1·r brrn held liablr nnctrr § 10 (b) 
brr:m'<r they have a duty not to profit from thr usr of i1 . ~idr information 
ihat they know is confidrntial and know ,;hould know cnmr from a 
corporate insider, Shapiro v. ltf errill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner ce· Smith. -+95 
F. 2d 228, 237<!38 (CA2 Hl71). Thr tipprr's obligation h:1.· brrn Yir\\'rd 
a~ arising from hici role a~ a participant. aftrr the fact in ihr inRider'~ 
hrrach of a fiducia1-:-· dut~·. Subcommittrrs of American Bar A~~oeia tion 
Srction of Corporation. Bankin~J:, and Bu~inrss Law, Comment Lcttrr on 
l\fatrrial, Non-P11blic Inform:1tion (Oct. 15, 1973) rcprintrd in BNA, 
Srruritirs Rrp;11lation & L:tw Rrport No. 233, at. D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, Hl74). 
78-12W-OPINION 
8 CHIARELLA v. UNITED STATES 
III 
In this case. the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential information from the target company. 
1\Ioreover. the "market information" upon which he relied 
clicl not concern the earning power or operations of the target 
company. but only the plans of the acquiring company.' " 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
~ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to dis-
c1ose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failccl to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner O\ved a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed. to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he ln1ew other people 
trading in the securities market did not have access to the 
same information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that "r a] nyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpuhllc infon11ati.on may not use that infor-
mation to trade in securities \Yithout incurring an affirmative 
fll<ty to disrlor-e." 588 F . 2d l:i58, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis 
in original). A lthm;gh the comt sairl that its test would include 
only persons who regularly receive material non public infor-
mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-
lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court of 
1 " See Fleischer, l\1nndhrim & ::\furphy, An Initial Inquiry into thC' RC'-
~pon~ibilit~· to Disr·lo~r ~1n.rkct Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79 , 709 
(1073). 
1 ' The Court of A pprals said tlw t its "rrgular access to market in-
formation" te~t would rreato a workable rule embracing "those who 
occupy ... strategic placr~ in the markrt mechanism." United States 
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2cl 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considrrations 
arc insufficient to ~upport. a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the 
relation~hip bet\YCC'n partiel', 8ec nn. 0 and 10, supra, and accompanying 
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the 
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal 
access to information necessary for reasoned and inte1ligent 
i11vestmcnt ch'cisions." 588 F. 2cl, at 1362. The usc by any-
one of material information not generally available is fra11clu-
lent, this theory suggrsts, because such information gives 
crrtaill buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less in-
formed buyers and sellPrs. 
This r0asoning suffers from two defects. First, not every 
instancr of financial unfairness eonst!tutcs frandPlent ach\'ity 
under § 10 (b). See Santa F'e Industries I nc. v. Green. 430 
U. S. 462. 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to 
make sil0nce fr:-tiH1ulPnt ·--n rluty to disclose--is absent in this 
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship ''"ith 
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was 
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed th0ir tr11st and confidence. He was, in fact, a com-
1rxt, nnd not mrrrl~· from onr'~ abilit~· to nrquirr information brt'au~r of 
hi~ position in t hr m1rket. 
The Court of AppenlR abo f'tlf!gr~trd thnt thr acquiring corpor:1tion 
it~rlf would not hr n "markrt in~idrr" hrrnnsr n tendrr offrror rreatrR, 
rathrr thnn rrrci,·rs, in[ormntinn nml takr~ n ~ubstnntinl rconomic risk 
thnt. its offer will be un~uccr"~ful. Id .. at 18nG-1807. Agni11, the Conrt 
of 1\.ppeal~ depnrtrd from 1hr nnnl~·pis appropri~1te to rrrognition of a 
dut~·. Thr Comt of Appc·1lR for thr Srcond C'irC'uit prcYiou~ly hrlrl, in 
:c mn11ncr C"n~i-drnt wilh our nnnl~·sis here, that a tenclrr oiTcror clors not 
yjo]ate § ](I (h) when it mnke~; preannrnwcrmC'I't purchn~rs p:-eriscly 
.{)('rnme thrrr i;-; 110 rcla t ion~hip bet wrrn t hr offeror nnd thr Rrllrr: 
"\Vc know o[ no rule of law ... thnt a purcku:;rr of stock, who wnR not 
nn 'insidrr' :•nd had 110 fiduciu~· rPlation to n pw~pective sellrr, hnd an~· 
obli[.!;fltion to revenl circum~tnnrl'R that might rnii'c n srller's dcmnnds nnd 
thuR abort thr 8alr." General Time Corp. v. Talleu Industrirs, 403 F. 2d 
150, 164 (CA2 106R), crrt. drnird, 393 U.S. 1026 (1069). 
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
personal market transactions. 
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general du, between all participants in market 
transactions to foro·o based on material, nonpublie informa-
twn. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from 
a specific relationship between two parties. sec n. 9. Stl]Jra, 
shou d not be undertaken absf'nt some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence cmNges from the lan-
guage or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither 
the Conp:ress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. Instead the problems caused by mis-
use of market information have heen addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mar-
ket info"mation may not harm operation of the securities mar-
kets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not 
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target 
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer: ___.-
Cm'!?:rcss· careful action in this nnrl other ar<'as ln contra~ts. an~ 
1 " 15 U. R C. § 78m (d) (J) pNmit~ a trnclrr ofTrror to purrha~r 5~ 
of thP target comp:m,·'~ stor·k prior to di;1Cio"nre of it~ plans for 
arCJui~ition. 
1 " ~rrtion 11 of thr Hl34 Art grnrrall~- forbid8 a mrmbcr of a national 
Rrcuritics exrhange from effrrting am· tr:msaction on the exchangr for it~ 
mm account. 15 U.S.('_ A. §78k(n)(J) (Hl72-1978 Rupp.). But 
Congress has specificall_,. rxPmptrd sprrialist~ from this prohibition-brokrr-
dralrrs who execute order~ for custom('!'~ trading in a specific coqwmtion':> 
~t 'l rk. while nt the ~arne timr bu~·ing and ~<rlling that corporntinn'H stock 
O!l tlwir own brhalf. §ll(a)(l)(A), l.'i U.S. C. A. §7Rk(a)(l)(A) 
(Hl72--J!l78 8upp.); scr S. Rrp. No. 0-1-75, 94th Cong., 1st Se~~-. !1!1 
(1075): 2 Securities and Exchangr Commi<sion, Rrpnrt of the Rprrial 
Rtud~· of Securitirs lVIarket~->, IT. R. Doc. ~o. 95, 88th Cong., bt. Sr . ;s., 
.57- 5fi., 7() (1!)63). SPe grnrrally S. Robbin:;, Tlw SrrmitiC's MarketH 
Hll-193 (1966). Tlw exce]Jtion is baRrel upon Congrrs~' rrcognition 
!hot '""''"''''' contdbute too '"'' ood o'dcd)· m"kelplocc ot iho "m/ 
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1s m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we arC' 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted 
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "\Varehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to ~ • 
puchasP Ftock in thP target company before the tender. off0r is ~ ~ {.J:AAJ Q.tJ ILII 
ade public and the price of shares rises. 17 In•4H~t~ sill€! 6 te. ~ r;.!IV.q 
· . a bnyer of f'ccurities purchases stock in a target cor- W 0 I I 
poration on the basis of market information which is unknown 
to the seller. In both situations. the seller's behavior presum-
a ly wonld b0 Dlterec if he hDcl th0 nonpublic information. 
Significantly, ho\vever. the Commission has acted to bar ware-
honc:in<?: uncl0r ih autl: ority to r0rr·nlfl te tendcr 0Ff0rs '~ after 
recognizing that action under ~ 10 (b) would rest on a "some-
'"hat. different theory" than that previot1sly used to regulate 
insider tradin~· as fraudulent activity.1n 
We see no basi<> for a11plying such a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before. the 
HJ04 Act. cannot bf' rr::td "'morr broadly than it:o languag:r and ____-~ 
1he 8tatutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross &~ 
Cn. v. Redingto!'. 47 r. R. L. \Y. 4732. 4735 (Jm1e 18. 1079). 
t imc t hr~· rxploit t h" infonm1 ion:tl nrh·:1ntagC' that. come" from thPir po~­
Rrs~irn of hnY and ~rl! onlrr~. .. nt 7S-.SO. Similar conrern~ with 
w nne toning of thr m:>. rket prompted Congrr~~ to exrmpt market 
makrr~. hlock positionr r~, rrgi~trrrd odd-lnt dealer~ , bon:t fidr n rbitrnv:rnr~, 
and risk arbitr:urrur~ from§ ll's rrrnrrnl 11rohibition on mrmber trading. 
11) F. S.C. 1\. §78k(a)(l)(A)-{D) (1972- Hl78 Supp); srcS. Rrp. ;\To. 
04-75 . at 90. Sre al-<o Srrnri1ir~ Exrhange Art R<'lra~r ~o. ~-1-00,')0, 38 
F<'d. Reg. 3902. 3\ll.S (1973). 
17 F!ei~rlwr, l\'fundhrim & l\inrph~·. supra n. 16, at 811-812. 
JRf=;F,C ProJ~o,;rd Ruk ~240.1-lr-2. 44 Frd. Rrg. 0987-0088 (1070). 
1 ~ 1 f?EC Tn"tituli on,11 In':c~tnr 8111d.1· R"port, IT. R. Do". ~o. 0:?-tH. 
02d Cong., 1st Srs~., xxxii ( 1971). 
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quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) ~described as a catch-all provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b) 
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent \vith 
,---~ 
the carefu_!L_e~ttltt~ePy plan that Congress has enacted for reg-
1ilation of'tt1e securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S., at 479. 20 
IV 
In its brirf to this Court, the Fnitecl State's offers an altrrna-
tive theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporatio~n when 
he acted upon information that he obtained by v· ·e of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed y tho 
corporation. The breach of this d11ty is said to· support a 
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiring corporation and the sellers. 
We need not dC'cide whethN this theory has mC'rit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule 10b-5, that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business \vhich operated or would operate as a fmud or 
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial judge-----------
stated that a "scheme to defraud'' is a plan to obtain money 
20 The Court of AppcalR ~trttrd that § 10 (b) should no! br ron~trurd 
morr narrmdy in criminal actions than in ciYil enforrrmcn! action~. 
5:-.,•; F. 2d, at 1:l!iS, n. W . Yr! it i>< worth noting that thiR i:-; appniTn11y 
the first case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon n pur-
rha><rr for § 10 (b) nondisclo~ure. Petitioner was sentenced to a yrar 
in prison, suspended except. for onr moni h, and a .five-yrar term of 
probation. Id, at 1373, 1378 (Me~kill, .J., di~senting). 
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by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose 
matcrinl, non--public infonnation in connection ,\·ith his pur-
chase of stock wm•ld coustitute deceit." !d., at 683. Aceol'd-
ingly, the jury was instructed that the petitio11cr employed a 
sche1110 to defraud if he "did not disclose ... material liOn-
public information in connecti011 with thP purchases of the 
~tock." !d., at 685-686. 
Alternatively. the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "Chiarella's allogcd conduct of having purchased se-
curities without disclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a frnud 
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that 
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can 
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an 
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, sugges-
tions or by snppression of the truth." !d., at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con-
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on tho 
nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone 
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal 
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn 
v. United States , 471JSLW 4607, 4609 (Juno 4, 1970), we will 
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it 
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes ~ 
violation of ~ 10 (b). 21 
- - ·-
" 1 The com·iction would hnvr to br rrYrr,;ed even if lhe jury hnd brrn 
in~tructrcl that it could convict petitionrr rithcr ( 1) bccau~r of hi~ fnil-
urc to disclose mnlrrial, nonpublic informntion to orller or (2) brcausc of 
the breach of a. dut)· to the 11cquiring corporation. We mny not uphold 
a crimind conviction if it i~ impossiblr to ascertain whether the defend- ~ 
ant has been puniohcd for noncriminnl conduct. United States v. Gal-
lagher, 576 F. 2cl 1028. 1046 (CA2 1978); sre Leary v. New York. 305 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370 
(1931). 
'J.'o: 'l'n~ L::LJ.di. J uSt1ce 
Mr . Justice Brannan 
llr . Justice Stewart 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESulated: ----
No. 78-1202 
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
U .t d St te Appeals for the Second me a s. c· 't IrCUl , 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corpora-
tion violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the target company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he 
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room 
of Pandick Press, a financial printer located in New York City. 
Among documents that petitioner handled were five announce-
ments of corporate takeover bids. When these documents 
were delivered to the printer, the identities of the acquiring 
and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or 
false names. The true names were sent to the printer on the 
night of the final printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
the target companies before the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing 
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target com-
panies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover 
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2 CHIARELLA v. UNITED ST .ATES 
attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner 
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 
14 months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange Com-
HllSSion (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his 
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a 
consent decree with the Cormnission in which he agreed to 
return his profits to the sellers of the shares! On the same 
clay. he was discharged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of 
violating ~ 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.~ After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, 1 he was brought 
to trial and convicted on all counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We grantee! 
certiorari, 441 U. S. - (1979) , and we now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the 1034 Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78j. prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity . . . [ ofl any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe." Pursnant to this section, 
the SEC promulgated Rule lOb- 5 which provides in perti-
nent pnrt 5 that 
"It shaH be unlawful for any person, directly or imli-
1 Of the five tran8action~, four involvrd tender offrrs and one concerned 
n merger. United States v. ('hiorrlla . . ')SS F. 2d J358, l~G~ , n. 2 (C.I\2 
1978). 
2 SEC Y. Chiarella. No. 77 CiY. 21534 (GLC) (SDNY 1\Jay 24, 1977). 
:J Section 32 (a) of tho 1934 Act s:tnc tionc; criminal penaltirs against any 
prr:•on who willfully violate~ thr Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (1972-
1!178 Snpp .). Petitionrr \\"as charged with 17 crtmtR of Yiolating the Act 
hrf':t n ~o he had received 17 let lrrs confirming purclu1Re of shareR. 
4 United States v. Chiarella, 4.'50 F. Supp. 95 (SDNY 1078). 
fi Only Rulrs lOb-5 (n) and (c) nrr nt j f(~llr here. Rule lOb-5 (b) 
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rectly, by the use of any nwans or instrumentality of 
interstate commercr, or of the mails or of any farility 
of any national securities exchange, 
11 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artificr to · 
defraud, [or] 
11 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of nny security." 17 C:FR § 240.10b-5 (1979). 
This case concerns thr legal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
the petitim1rr if it fonnd that he ·willfully failed to inform 
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
comin~ takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valuable.6 In order to decide " ·hether silence in such cir-
cumstancrs violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to rPview the lan .. 
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language 
of the statutr. Ernst & Ernsl Y. Jlochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whrther silence may consti-
tute a maniptlluti,·r or drrrptivr clrvire. Section 10 (b) was 
clrsigncd as a ratch-ull clau~r to nrrvent fraudnlrnt prncticrs. 
!d., at 202, 206. But neithrr thr legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords sprcific guidance for the resolution of 
this c::tse. When Rulr 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the 
pro,·ides that ii ~hall be unlawful "r iJo mnke nny untrue st::drment of a 
mairrial fact or to omii. lo 8ifltP a mairrinl fact. necrssary in ordrr to 
makP the sintements madr, in ihr lip:ht of the circumctanres under whirh 
the~· were made, not mi~lc;Hling." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (b) (1970). Thr 
portion of the indirtml'nt ba;;rd on ihis provision was cli~misscd brrau~e 
thP petitioner made no sbiC'mrni~ a1 all in connection with t11C' pmrhasr 
or ~tack. 
"Record, at 682-G 3, 6 G. 
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REC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of~ 10 (b). 7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of 
~ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm vio-
lated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
closed information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation \Vho was also a registE'rcd representative of the 
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 
(] 061). the Commission decided that a corporate insider must 
abstain from traclin!-!: in the shares of his corporation unless 
he has firi:'t disclosed all material inside information known to 
him. The obligation to disclosE' or abstain derives from 
"[a]n affirmative duty to rlisclose material information 
[which 1 has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
'insiders.' particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known. would affect their investment .iudgment." !d., 
at 911. 
Tho Commission emphasized that tho duty arose from 
(i) The existence of a rcbtionship afford ing acce~:s to inside 
information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose. nnd (ii) tho unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
without disclosure. !d., at 912, and n. 15.8 
7 Sec SEC Rclea~c No. :3230 (May 21, 1942). 
' Tn Cady. J.'ob ,rts. t hP hrokrr-dealrr w l' liable under § 10 (b) bc('aH~P 
it. received nonpublic information from a corporate insjder of the is~uer. 
Rinrc the insider could not usc the information, neither could the partners 
in the brokcrnge firm with which be wa:-; as,:ociated. Cady, Roberts & 
C'o., 40 S. E. C. 907 ( 1061). The t ran~action in Cady, Roberts involved 
~ale of stock to J1Crsons who previou:-;ly may noL have been ~harchold er;; 
in tho corpomtion . Id ., at 913, and n. 2l. The Commis ion cmbrarccl 
the reasoning: of .J uclp:r Lc:ll'nrd Hand that "the director or offieN n~:-;umcd 
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli-
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fail s to 
cl.iscJose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is undcr a duty to do 
so . And the duty to clisc1 0f"<' aris<'s when one party has infor-
mation "that the ot1ler rpnrtyl is Pntitlecl to know because 
of a fiduciary or s~n1 il:w relation of trust and confickncc 
betwc011 thcm.''" Tn its Cady. RolJerts decision. the C'om.-
mission r<>cogniz<>cl a rrlntionshir> of trust and confidence 
betwN•n tlw si-Jart'holders of n corporation ancl those insidrrs 
who ]1/H'f' ohtainrd C011ficlential information by rc'ason of thr.ir 
poF"ition with thnt corporation.10 This rPlatiom:hip ~ivf"' ri r<> 
to :1. dutv to rli scloc:r h~'rauc:;p of th<> "nccrsf:ity of prevrntinq; a 
corporate insidrr from takrinr:l ndvantflgf' of the uninfornwd 
a fiduciary rebtion to the bu~·rr hr ihr nry ~n l r; for it would hr n 
Rorr~' distinct ion to allow him to u~e the ndvan!nge of his pol'iiion to 
induce the bu~·er into the po~ii ion of n brnrfiriar~· nlthm1gh he wnR for-
hiddrn to ,ln ~n onr·r tlw hll\'l'l' h:• r! hc':·omr onP." !d .. ni !ll.t. n ~.j 
quoting Gratz v. Clm1ghton. 187 F. 2cl 40, 49 (Ci\2 Hl,') l), crrt. drnierl, 
8+1 U. S. 920 (Hl51) . 
n HrRt·Ji rnwn i of tl ,r l ·m 2d. Tori,; ~ ').')1 (2)(n) (Hl70). Rr~' .T:>mr~ & 
Grnr, MiRrrprr~rntniion-Pnrt TT, 87 Mel. L. Rrv. 4 R, 523-527 (lfl7R). 
/\H reg11rclR 'ePuritie~ tr. n~nc1ion~, t],,, .\m"rir;;" Law Tn~iiiPi<' rrro:rnize~ 
thnt. "silence when there is n duiy to Fprnk mn~' br n fraudulent nri ." 
AU, F edernl Srrurities Code § 202 (b) (Propo8rrl Official Draft 1 978). 
10 Ree 3 W. Flrtchcr, C~·rloprclin of the Lmv of Private Corpor:~tionR 
§ 888 (Hl75 ) (herrinnfter Fletrher); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171 , 1174: 
8 L. LoRR, Sf'rmiiir.~ Regulation 1440- 1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at 
811.'57-3558 (1969 Supp.). See also 8trona v. Repide. 213 U.S. 419, 481-
4:34 (l!l09): BrophJI v. Cities 81'n•ir·r Co .. 81 Drl. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d fi 
(1049). ~ef' <rrnernll~· 'otr Ru!C' lO!).fl: I <: I rmf'ni~ of a PriYntr Ri~J:hi of 
Action. 43 ·yp L. Rrv .. 'i-!1, 55:2-R.'l:~. nnd n. 71 (HJGR); 75 Hnrv. L. R ev. 
1 l•l!l . 14.'\0 (Jq02): Dnum & Vhilli]lH, Thr Tmplir:1tion of Cad!J, Roberts. 
17 Bu~. L:m, a:m. 94!i (1!lG2). 
t 
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minority stockholders." S7Jeed Y. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. 
Supp. 808. 829 (Del. 1951). 
The Federal courts have found violations of ~ 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d 833 (CA2 Hl68), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "[tlhe party charged with failing to dis-
close market information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Ftmd, Inc., 524 
F. 2cl 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal ma.terial facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968). cert. denied, 
393 U. 8. 1026 (1969).11 
This Court follow0el tho same approach in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of 
Amr:·irnn Indians formed a rorporntion to manage joint as:::ds 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stork 
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its 
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the 
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. !d., 
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
was trndrd in two sPparate markets--a primary market of 
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale 
11 8rG :1!:-o SEC v. Grrat Amnir·mt Indus .. Int .. 407 F. 2d 4 .~8 , ·100 
(C ,\2 19G8). crrt. clenird, 89.'5 TT. 8. 920 (1960): Kohler v. Kohler Co .. 
:i10 F. 2cl G:3.t, 6:~7-688 (C ·\7 19ftl): ~\olr, wpm n. 10. 42 NYH L. Rr,·. 
:1t M-1-: ;\o te . Thr Regulation of Corpor:1tr Trndcr Offer Under Feden1l 
Rrcuritics Law: A Nrw Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373-374 (1966). 
SrP gPn r rally Notr. Ci,·il LiahiliiY undC'r Rule X-10b-5, 42 Va. L. Rr,·. 
537, 554-561 (1956). 
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. India11 sellers 
charged that the assistant n1anagers had violated ~ 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
no duty of disclosure \YOuld exist if the bank merely lwei acted 
as a transfer agent. But Lhe bank also had assumed a duty to 
act on behalf of thr shareholclrrf'. ancl the Indian sellers had 
relied upon it'5 prrsonnel when thev sold their stock. ! d., at 
LS2. Because the:o0 offirrrs of the bank were chnrgecl with n 
responsibility to the Rhar0holdrrs. tlwv could 11ot act a" mnrh't 
m.ak0rs inducin;r thr Inclinns to sell their stock without clis·-
closing the existcnc0 of thr mor<' fnYorn.blr non-Indian mnrkrt. 
ld .. nt 1.~2-153. 
Thus, ndminiPtrRtivc ancl .iuclicial interpretations have es-
tablished that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities may oprrate as a fraud actionable undrr ~ 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislatiYe his-
tory specifically addressing thr legality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premisrcl upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidrnce between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a dut~' to disclose prior to trad-
ing guarantees that corporate jnsiclrrs, \Yho have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's welfare before thcjr own. will 
not benefit persona11y through fraudulrnt usc of materjal 
nonpublic information.'" 
12 "Tippers" of rorporatr in~idrr~ han' lwrn held liable undN § 10 (b) 
hrrnu~r they have a dut~· not to profit from t.hr u~r of in~idc informnti011 
that they knmy i:1 eonfidl'ntinl nnd kiJow or Nhould know cnmr !'rom n 
rorporatc insider, Shapiro v. 1\Ji'rril/ Lynch. Piercl'. Fenner & Smith. 495 
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 Hl7-~). The tippre's obligation hns hrt'n Yie\\'rd 
:1'' :lrif'ing from hi,; role as :1 11articipnnt nftcr the fact in thr insidrr's 
hrrnch of a fiducinry dut~·. Rubrommittres of American Bnr A~Nocia t ion 
flection of Corporation, Banking, .~ncl T3u~iness Lmv, Comment. Let lrr on 
l\Tntrrinl, Non-Public Informntion (Oet. 15, 197:'l) reprinted in BNA, 
Rc'rnrities Rrgulntion & Lrm Report. No. 233. nt. D-1, D-2 (,Jan. 2, 1974). 
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III 
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
110 confidential information from the target company. 
Moreover. the "market information" upon which he relied 
clicl not concern the earning power or operations of the' target 
company. but only the plans of the acquiring company.l:l 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
~ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to dis-
dose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failC'd to specify any such duty. In effect. the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people 
trafling in the securities market did not have access to the 
sam.e information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that "[alrzyone--corporate insickr or not- who regnlarly re-
ceives material nonp11blic information may not usc that infor-
mation to trndP in secnritiC's without incurring an affirmative 
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 13.58, 1~65 (C/1.2 1978) (emphasis 
in orig:ino l). A lthongh the ronrt RBicl that its test would include 
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic infor-
mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-
lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court of 
1 ~ See Fleischer, Mnndheim & Murphy, An Inilial Inquiry into the Rc-
Apon~ibilit~· to DiHdo~e J\Inrkct Information, 121 U. Pn. L. Rrv. 70S, 709 
(107::!). 
11 The Court of Apprals Raid that its "regular access to mnrket in-
formation" te,.;;t would create a workablr rule emhrncing "thrse who 
orcupy ... strntegic pbres in the market mechanism." United States 
Y. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 13G5 (CA2 197 ) . These consicleration8 
arc insuiftcient to support a duty to di~close. A duty arises from the 
relationRhip betwcrn partieR, ~cc nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying 
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Appeals, like the trial court. failed to identify a relationship 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belie£ that the 
federal securities l::ms have "created a system providing rqun.l 
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent 
investment decisions.'' 588 F. 2cl, at 1:i62. The usc by :my-
one of material information not generally available is frn tldu-
lent, this theory suggests. because' such information givrs 
certain buyers or sellers an nnfair advantage over less in-
formed buyers and sellers. 
This rea~oni nv, snffers from two defects. First. not rn•ry 
instancr> of financial unfairness ronstitutes fraudulent acti,·ih· 
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to 
mako silence fraudulent-a duty to diPclosc-i~ absent in this 
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with 
the sc11ers of the target con1pany's serurities. for petitioner had 
no 11rior dealings with them. He vvas not their agent. he ITns 
not a fiduciary. he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact. a com-
trxt, and not mrrrl~· from onr\ ahilit~· to :'rquirr information hrr:111~r of 
his position in tlw market. 
Thr. Comt of Apprals al,:o suggr.,trd thnt tlw nr(jniring rorpor:dion 
itsrlf would not hr n "mnrkrt insidrr" brr:m~P a trncler off"ror rrrntr~, 
rathf'r than rPrr i1 rR, information :~nd !:1 kr~ a ~ubstantial rronomir ri~k 
tint it~ offrr will he unsurerPRfnl. !d .. at 1~66-13G7. Again, thr Comt 
of Apprals drpart rd from the nnal~·j,;is nppropriate to rceogniti0n of a 
clutr. Thr Court of A ppc:1l~ for t hr Srroll(l C'ir;·uit pre'. ious]y hrlcl. in 
:t mannrr ronPi~tent with om nn:~l~·~is hrrr. that a trnder offrror dor~ not 
1·iolatr § 10 (b) whrn it mnkrs preannonnrrmrnt purrhRsrs prrri~rly 
hrean~r thrrr i~ no relation~hip hrt wrrn thr offpror and the srllrr: 
" We know of no rulr of la'\\· ... that n purchaser of stock, who waR not 
an 'insiclrr' nnd h:1d no fiduri:tr~· relat ion to a prosprrtive sclkr, had :1n~· 
obligation to re1 raJ eirrumstanrrs that might. mi>·c a seller's drmnnds nncl 
thus abort. thr snlr." General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, 400 F. 2d 
159, 164 (CA2 HH'iR), eert. drnird, 393 U. R. 1026 (1069). 
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
personal market transactions. 
\V'e cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which 
cleparts r::~rlically from thP established doctrine that duty ari!'cs 
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9, supra, 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
rongressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lan-
guage or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither 
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. 1nstcad the problems caused by mis-
use of market infonnation have been addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mar-
ket information may not harm operation of the securities mar-
kets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not 
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target 
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer. 
C'onpTe:-s' carcfulartion in thif' ::md other areas 1 " contrasts. and 
1"15 U.S. C. §7,m (d)(l) ]Wrmif~ n. frndrr offeror to 11urrhase 5% 
of the target compan~·',; stork prior to discloH1rc of its phmf' for 
n rqn i~ition. 
1" ::::rction 11 of the Hl34 Ad grnrrnll~· forbids n member 0f a national 
securities e'\ch:mg:c from effecting nnY frnnsnrtion on thr rxchnnge for if~ 
own ncconnt. 15 U.S. C. A. §7Rk(n)(l) (Hl72-197R 8upp). But 
Congress hns specificnllv exempted specinlif'ts from this prohibit ion-brokrr-
denlers who rxecute orders for customers trnding in a specific corporation's 
stork. while at the snme time bu~·ing and selling that corporntion's stork 
on their own behalf. § 11 (a )(l) ( L\.), 15 U. S. C. A. § 7Rk (n) (l) (A) 
( J072-l07R 8npp.); see S. Rep. No. 04-75, 94th Cong., 1st 8es~., 99 
(107.'i): 2 SecnritieR anrl Exchrmge Commi~sion, RPport of the Special 
8tndv of Securities Markets, H. R. Dor. No. 95, 88th Cong .. 1st. Sess., 
!'i7-.'iR. 7(\ (Hlfi3). See gcnen1lly R. Robbins, The Securities MnrketR 
Hll-Hl::l (1966). The exception iR bnsed upon Congress' recognition 
that specialists contribute to a fnir nne! order]~, marketplace at the same 
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is in some tension, with the broad rule of liability we arc 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was c01wictccl 
is at odds with the Commission's view of ~ 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "\:Varehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
t0nder offer to institutional investors who then arc able to 
p11cha~e ~<tock in the target company before the tcnd0r offer is 
mack public and the price of shares ri8eS.17 Tn this case, a~ in 
"·ar0housing, a buyer of s0curitic's purchases stock in a targ0t 
corporation on the basis of marke t information which is 
1111knom1 to the scllrr. In hotll of th ese sitnntions. the seller's 
b rhr vi or pref:umnhly wou ld he altered if he had the nonpuhlic 
infonnation . Significantly, however , tlw C'ommission ku; 
acted to bar "·arehonsin~ under its authoritv to r0p:ulate t011dcr 
offf'rR" after rccogni:;.ing that action under ~ 10 (b) \Yould 
r0st on a " somewhat different throry" than thnt previou~ly 
11 SC' rl to rC')'~nhte in"icler trading os fraudulent ncti,·ity.1 n 
We s0e no basis for applying sncl1 a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasi7.ed before. the 
1084 "\,..t rannot he r0ad "'mor0 broarllv than it s lan_znap;0 and 
the statutory srheme reasonably permit.'" Tourhe Ross & 
iimr ihrY C''(ploit ihr inform:1tionnl ndY[Ill!:qrr thnt romr' from ihrir po~­
Rr~~ioll of lmy :mel >'Pll orriN . -. 2 8r•;·mili•'' and Fwbu·gr Comm:,, irm, 
R r pol"l of t l1 r Rprr i:d Stud~· of P.••c·mil iP>' :\hrkrt'. IT. H . noc. '\o. flfi. 
f::Si h C'nn;::., 1 ~t sr~.- I al 7fl-SO. f- imililr ('()11('(' 1"11~ with thC' function in g of 
ih r m:'l·krt promptrcl C'onr;•w' lo rwmpt m:ukrt m:tkrrs, blor-k po,il ioiJN>', 
rrgi>trrrd odd-lot dr:li<'r', ho•1:1 fid r :nhilr;tgru r~, :1nd ri~k nrhit r:1r-;rm" 
from~ 11 '~ grnrr: tl prohihitioll n1. mrmhrr trading . 1!i 1'. 8. C .. \.§ 7Sk 
( :1 ) (1) (A 1-(D) (1072-197S ~ ll] lJl.): ~pr· 8. Hrp. :.ro. 0-1-i!i. :1 1 PO . Sri' 
:d>'o Rrruritir~ Exrh:1111!r \C"I Hr•];•:t'r '\o . :3-!- P9.'i0, ~~ FC'd. Hrg. :l!10:!.. 
8!)1S (l !173) . 
17 Flci~rhrr , Mundhrim & Murphv, SU]J1'a n. 16, at 811-812. 
1 " SEC Proposed Rulr ~ 240.14r-2. 44 Frd. Rrg. 9!1R7-99R8 (Hl70). 
10 1 m:<:C Tn~tiluiionnl Tnvr~lor Stud~· Hc'Jlmt , H. H. Dor . Xo. 02- o-1 , 
92d Cong ., 1st Srs~., xxxii (1971). 
78-1202-0PINJON 
12 CHIARELLA v. UNITED STATES 
Co. v. Redington, 47 F. S. L. \Y. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) is aptly dPscribecl as a catch-all provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure. there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under ~ 10 (b) 
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with 
the carefnl plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of 
the securities markd~. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 
480 r . S .. at 470. 2 " 
IV 
Tn its brief to this Court. the United States offers an alterna-
tive theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when 
lw acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a. 
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiring corporation and the sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule 10b-5. that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, schrme or 
artifice to defrau d or ( ii) engaged in an act. practice , or course 
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. R ecord, at 681. The trial judge 
20 The Court of Appeals ~tatcd that § 10 (b) should not be construed 
more narrowly in criminal action8 than in civil enforcement actions. 
5SS F. 2d, at 1:368, n. Hl. Yet it i::; worth not ing llmt this is ap]Jarcntly 
the first case in which criminal liability bas been imposed ur1on a pur-
chaser for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. Petitioner was sentenced to a year 
in prison , suspended except for one month, and a five-~·ear term of 
probation. !d., at 1373, 1378 (lVIc~kill, J., di ~~enting) . 
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stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money 
by trick or deceit and that "a failnre by Chiarella to disclose 
mat0rial. non-public information in connection with his pur-
chase of i"tock would constitute deceit." !d., at 683. Accord-
ingly, the jury '':as instructed that the petition<'r employ0d a 
scheme to derraucl if he "clicl 11ot disclose ... material non-
public information in connection with the pmchases of the 
stock." !d. , at 685-686. 
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having rmrehased se-
curities without clisclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud 
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated tlwt 
fraud "embraces all the means which human inge1wity can 
devise and which are re!"orted to by one individual to gain an 
advantage over another by false misrepresentation. sugges-
tions or by suppression of tho truth." !d., at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con-
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the 
nature or clements of a duty owed by petitioner to m1yone 
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal 
conviction on thr basis of a theory not presented to the jury, 
Rewis v. [!nited States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn 
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607. 4609 (June 4. HJ79), we will 
not specnlatr upon whether such a duty exists, \Yhether it 
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a 
violation of ~ 10 (b) .21 
21 The rom·ir1 ion would h:wc 1 o hr rrvrr~rd C'\'C'll if 1 he .i u r~· hnd brrn 
in~tmctecl thnt it could com·ict petitioner either (1) becau~r of hi,; fnil-
uro to disclo~c mnterinl, nonpublic inform:1.iion to ~rller or (2) brrnnsr of 
the breach of n clnty to tlw ncquiring corporntion. We mn~' not uphold 
a rriminnl eonyir1 ion if it is impos,;iblr to asrrrtain whet her thr clrfcnd-
nnt hns been puni~hrd for nonrriminnl conduct. United States Y. Gal-
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
lagher, 576 F. 2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); see Leary v. New York, 395 
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370 
(1931). 
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Court. 
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Re: 78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
As you may recall from Conference, I was prepared to 
affirm the conviction and file a dissent along the lines 
of Dean Keeton's observation that "any time information is 
acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should 
be a duty to disclose the information." Keeton, Fraud, 15 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1936). Here, Chiarella, literally in 
the shadow of the warning signs in the print shop, 
acquired private information by illegal means --
misappropriating nonpublic information entrusted in him in 
the utmost confidence by the acquiring company. I 
strongly believe this illegal conduct imposed upon him a 
duty to disclose or to abstain from trading on the 
information; his failure to abide by the 
disclose-or-abstain rule violated Rule 10-b-5. 
Your t houghtful opinion now shifts the emphasis and 
basis of reversal. Since (1) the mere possession of 
non-public information is not sufficient to create a duty 
to disclose, and (2) the "Keeton theory" was not submitted 
to the jury, you have made a good case for reversal. 
Nonetheless, I am unable to join your opinion as now 
drafted. At page 7, the opinion suggests that liability 
for nondisclosure must be "predicated upon a ... duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties to a transaction." 
Similarly, at page 9, the opinion speaks of "a 
relationship between petitioner and the sellers that could 
give rise to a duty." My concern obviously is that this 
language can be read to undermine the notion that an 
absolute duty to disclose-or-abstain arises from the very 
act of misappropriating nonpublic information. Your 
language gives me pause. Possibly we can work out an 
accommodation. 
Your focus on what was not submitted to the jury was 
not -- at least in my recall -- explored in any depth in 
Conference. I will try to put together some specific 
language that would clear this up for me. 
-2-
I could not accept any idea that '"blue collar" fraud 
is less culpable than a "white collar" variety. I do not 
read you as suggesting anything like that but it should be 
affirmatively negated if possible. 
More later. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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opinion which I will be happy to join. I am considering 
filing a separate concurrence along the lines of the 
enclosed draft but will not make a definite decision 
until after I see what the dissenters have to say. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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MR. ,JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
~~ 
Before liabi 1 i ty, civn or ~, ; s imposed, it ; s 
necessary to identify the duty that the defenoant has _.....,..___ 
breached. Arguably when this petitioner bought securities in 
the open market, he violated (a) a duty to disclose anc fb) a 
duty of silence. I agree with the Court's explanation of why 
this petitioner owed no duty of disclosure to the sellers from 
whom he purchased target company stock, that his conviction 
rests on the erroneous premise that he did owe them such a 
duty, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must 
therefore be reversed. In short, I join the Court's opinion. 
The Court correctly does not address the question whether 
the petitioner's breach of his duty of silence--a outy he 
unquestionably owed to his empJoyer and to his employer's 
customers--could give rise to liability, either civil or 
criminal, under Rule 10 (b) (5). If we assume he breached that --
duty when he purchased target company securities, a strong 
argument can be made that his action constituted "a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security." Two persons victimized by the frau(! on that 
theory are those to whom he owed the duty of silence, name1y, 
the ~panies who entrusted confid~ntial informa!:i-on to 
his employers. NevertheJess--and contrary to views I expressed 
as a circuit judge--~/ those persons would not be ab1e to 
recover damages from petitioner for vio1ating Ru1e 10 (b) f5) 
because they were neither purchasers nor se11ers of target 
company securities. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 u.s. 723. However, neither that case nor this definitive 1 v 
answers the question whether this petitioner's breach of his 
duty of silence in connection with his purchases of securities 
constituted a v i olation of Rule 10 (b) (5) .~ 1 I think the 
Court wisely leaves that question for another day. I write 
merely to emphasize the fact that we have not necessarily 
placed any stamp of approval on what this petitioner did; we 
have merely held that his cr i minal convict i on cannot rest on 
the theory that he breached a duty he did not owe. 
1/ See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance ~or.p., 4q0 F.2d nS4 
(~A7 1973), a case c1tea with approval 4n MR. JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN'S dissent :i.n Blu~_fhip StamE_~ v. Manor Drug StoE_~.!. 
421 u.s. 723, 77J. 
2/ The limitation on the right to recover pecuniary damages in 
a-private action identified in Blue Chip, supra, is not 
necessarily coextensive with the-rTmits-of the rule itself. 
See, e.9_., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 u.s. , , 42 n. 
28, 4~n~ 3~7, n. 33. 
J~/M~ Jllr.Nri&__}&u_ ~CBG~ wfd.J" 
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THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
January 31, 1980 
Re: 78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
I will add the following at an appropriate place 
in my dissent. 
Chiarella's counsel in closing argument said: 
"Let me say right up front, too, Mr. Chiarella 
got on the stand and he conceded, he said 
candidly, 'I used clues I got while I was at 
work. I looked at these various documents and 
I deciphered them and I decoded them and I 
used that informatioR as a basis for purchasing 
stock. I There is no question about that. We 
don't have to go through a hullabaloo about that. 
It is something he concedes. There is no 
mystery about that." 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference ~ 
f ·.1~~ 
~~. . . ;r-- {;Jl_j 
Feb~uary 4, 19 80 
No. 78-1202 Chiarella v. United States 
Dear John: 
Now th8t we have SPen th2 ChiPf 1 S oiss~nt, I 
certainly havP no obiection to your co1'1curdnq noinjon. 
I have a slight prefer~nce for not emphasizing that 
the result may have been different if liability had been 
premised on a duty to the acquiring comp<my , t=IS I .'!m by no 
means sure that 10(b) should be extendPd this far beyond its 
clear purposes at the time of its enactment in 1934. As we 
are talking ahout criminal liability, I am inclined to think 
we should leave it to Conqress to draft ~ more refin~d and 
specific criminal statute . To be sure, you leave the 
ques tion for another day. But with a five to four vote by 
the Court, I would prefer - I think - not to invite a 
judicial rather th~n a legislative consideration of the 
quest. ion. 
NevPrthel0ss , thes2 are rethPr Personal thoughts , 
and I do not in any sens~ interpose them as an objection to 
your concurr1ng opinion . 
I repeat my indebtedness to you for making me 
focus, at ~n earl.y ooint in timP , on thP rel~tively n arrow 
way in which this case was submi tted to the jury. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
LFP/lab 
February 4, 1980 
No. 78-1202 Chiarella v. United States 
Dear Chi e f: 
Thank you for you~ note of January 31st ~~vising me 
of the addition you will make to your dissent. Inci~~ntally, 
I am remind~d that I failed - inadvertently - to rPsoond to 
your letter of J~nuary 4. 
You may re~all that w~ had a bri~f discussion of 
this case in your C~?mb~rs, at which tima it bnc~me cleer 
that wo w~rn too far apart to "bridqe thP gan". If I wer _ in 
Congr~~s, I proh~bly would suopor~ a carPfully dr~wn criminal 
st a ~utP th~t would makP it a crimP for one to do what 
Chi~rella did. But it is clPar (at least tom~) that 
Congress nevpr h~~ the slightest intention - back in 1933 and 
1914 - to extend the s~curitiPS Acts to this typp of 
situation. 
~ftPr ~11, th~ qovprnment seeks to imoosP criminal 
liAbility un~cr thP extr3nrdin~rily vnque lnnquage of on0 
section of ~ statute th,t w9s en~cted to protect the Public 
from manipulation of thP securities markets by insidors. 
Before crimin~l liability is imposed by th~ courts, T think 
the ConqrPss should face UP to this question, and ~raft a 
pron~r criminal statute that puts people on notic~. 
I add that I do not a~mire Mr. Chiarella any more 
than you do. 
Sincerely, 
· The C~ief Justice 
LFP/lab 
7L -.a.--to k "-~.J .a;f / ial-JILl 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States 
I discussed this case with Jeff Rosen, one of the 
Brennan clerks, on Friday. The Brennan position is likely to be 
that we are correct in our reading of the jury instructions and 
the result, and we are correct that mere possession of material 
non-public information does not make out a 10(b) violation, but 
that our emphasis on the existence of a relationship between 
buyer and seller ~ps farther than we need to go in this case. 
Thus, Justice Brennan is likely to state that he agree with the 
Chief's formulation of the scope of 10(b). I believe that 
Justice Brennan will circulate a memorandum to the Conference 
L.. 
expressing these views. Justice Brennan may believe that there 
is enough distance between our position and Justice Stevens' 
that we can be persuaded to adopt some language changes. 
I explained to Jeff that you were reluctant to make 
changes because we already had a Court. I did not suggest that 
we had already seen the Stevens concurrence. 
I think the best course at this point is to consult the 
Stevens chambers about changes that should be made to respond to 
the Chief's dissent, and, once those are made, then sit still to 
await the effect of the Brennan memo. Unless Justice Stevens is 
moved, I suspect that the result will be that Justice Brennan 
will write a short opinion concurring in the result. 
Justice Blackmun apparently is writing a dissent which 
will argue that 10(b) incorporates a parity-of-information rule 
with limited exceptions for bona fide business activities. I 
believe that we will be able to fend off such an attack simply 
by noting that there is no evidence that Congress intended such 
a result in 1934. 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
,jnpuntt C!fcnrl cf tfrt ~b .§taft~ 
~lp:ttgLrn. ~.a}. 2!l&fJl.~ 
February 5, 1980 
Memorandum to: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Powell 
RE: No. 78-1202 Chiarella v. United States 
At conference I indicated that I would be with the 
dissent in the above, but I now find myself halfway between 
the positions set forth in your two opinions. On the 
securities law issue, while I agree with Lewis that the 
mere use in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities of material nonpublic information does not 
violate Section 10 (b) or Rule 10 (b) (5), I am unable to 
subscribe to those portions of his opinion wfi1ch ·suggest 
that - 'b violation of these provisions rna be made out . 
absent a bre c o s . 1p etween the 
de en e o I a ree that a dut to 
disclose or abstain from trading may s em on y rom some 
sor o re at1ons 1p. Rather, it seems to me that the 
Chief is correct to suggest that whenever someone 
improperly obtains information, or converts to his own use 
information to which he has access under limited conditions 
which do not permit such conversion, use of that 
information in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities violates Section lO(b). In consequence, I am of 
the view that on the facts of this case Chiarella probably 
could have been convicted of violating the securities laws. 
The problem, as Lewis suggests, is that the theory 
under which Chiarella was convicted is not the one sketched 
out above and in the Chief's opinion. Nowhere in the 







-- . . -· 
Chiarella had misappropriated information or wrongfully 
converted it to his own use. And suggestions {often 
ambiguous ones at that) in the indictment and the 
prosecutor's remarks are not, for me, an adequate 
substitute. Like all of us, I am privately confident that 
a jury that was properly instructed would not have dallied 
on the wrongfulness point. But that confidence does not 
permit us in effect to direct a verdict of guilty on one 
element of a criminal offense. And neither reference to 
the harmless error doctrine nor some theory of constructive 
stipulation cures the defect. Accordingly, I can only vote 
to reverse the conviction. 
Were Lewis' opinion more narrowly cast, I might be able 
to agree in substance as well as result. But I believe the 
present draft will be widely read as rejecting the theory 
of liability set forth by the Chief {I refer particularly 
to language on page 6, the second sentence of the full 
paragraph on page 7 and much of page 9). Therefore, unless 
the present opinions change, I intend to circulate a brief 
statement concurring in the Court's result on 
jury-instruction grounds but expressing my disagreement 
with all language in the opinion that appears inconsistent 
with the Chief's statement of the law. 

















February 6, 1980 
Dear 
Thank you for your memorandum of February 5 
addressed to the Chief and me. 
Althouqh I welcome your concurrence in mv view as 
to what was submitted to the iurv, I am afraid we remain in 
disagreement - as we were at Conference - as to the necessity 
for breach of some duty arising from an identifiable 
relationship. No one has suqqested, not even the SEC, that 
any evidence exists of a conqressional intent to extend 
liabiity under SlO(b) of the '34 Act to the universe of 
people who buv and sell securities. The common 
understanding, until fairly recent years, was to the 
contrary. 
But before imposinq a criminal liability that 
apparently was never considered hy Congress - and 
particularly before imposinq it under lanquaqe as imprecise 
as §10(b) - I would think it desirable to have congressional 
hearings and a carefully drafted statute that would afford 
reasonable notice to criminal defendants. 
I nevertheless am happy to have you 




To: 'l'r1 e Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brenna.D 
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Mr. Justice White 
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Mr. Justice Blaclouun 
Mr. Justjce Rshnqu1s1. 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
~RAFT 
From: Mr. Justice Powell 
JAN 3 1900 
Circulated: ____________ __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESirculated: ----
No. 78-1202 
Vincent F. Chiarella Petitioner I On Writ of Certiorari to the 
· · v. ' ' United States Court of 
U 't d St t Appeals for the Second me a es. c· 't lrCUl • 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corpora-
tion violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the target company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he 
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room 
I 
of Pan dick Press, a financial printer located in We'' ¥6tk Ciby. 
Among documents that petitioner handled were five announce-
ments of corporate takeover bids. When these documents 
were delivered to the printer, the identities of the acquiring 
and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or 
false names. The true names were sent to the printer on the 
night of the final printing. 
- The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
the target companies before the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing 
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target:~.:~ / 
parries and sold the shares immediately after the tak/ 
7 -1202-0PINION 
2 CIIIARELL.\ v. UNITED STATES 
attempts were mack public.' By this method, petitioner 
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the coursr of 
14 months. Rubsequcntly, the Securities and Exchange Com.-
misswn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his 
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a 
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to 
return his profits to the ~<'l1ers of the shares. 2 On the same 
day, he "·as dischargecl by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner >ms indicted on 17 counts of 
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and S:P;C Rule 10b-5.'1 After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the indictment. 1 he v-·as brought 
to trial and convicted on all counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted 
certiorari, 441 U. S. - (1979), and we now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U. S. C'. ~ 78j, prohibits 
the nse "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity ... [ofl any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulntions as 
the Commission may prescribe." Pursnant to this section, 
the SEC promulgated Rnle 10b-5 which provides in perti-
nrnt part 5 that 
"It shall be unlawfnl for any person, directly or indi-
1 Of the fiye transaction~, four invol\·ed tender offers and OIJP concerned 
n merger. United States v. C'hiarrlla. 5RR F. 2d 1358, 1063, n. 2 (CA2 
1978). 
2 8RC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2504 (CLG) (SDNY Mn)' 24, Hl77). 
"Section 32 (a) of the 1034 Art. ~rtnct ions rrimimtl penalties ngnin~t an)' 
pe··~on who willfully viola! e;; the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 7~ff (H) (Hl72-
107R Supp.). Petitioner was charged with 17 counls of violating the Act 
heran~e he had received 17 Irttprs confirming purchasP of sharPs. 
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Snpp. 95 (SDNY 1978). 
5 OnlY Rules 10b-5 (n) and (c) nrc nt issne here. Rule lOb-5 (b) 
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rectly, by the usc of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
" (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, [or] 
" (c) To engage in any act, practice, or comse of busi-
ness which opNates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purcha~c 
or sale of any E"ecmit?." 17 CF·R ~240.10b-5 (1979). 
This case concerns the lrgal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to inform 
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
coming takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valtlable.6 In order to decide whether silence in such cir-
cumstances violates ~ 10 (b). it is necessary to review the lan-
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language 
of the statute. Ernst & Ernst. Y. Tlo chfelder, 425 U. 8. 185, 107 
(1976), § 10 (b) doC's n ol state whC'thcr silence may consti-
tute' n manipu b ti ve or ckcC'ptiYc de,·icC'. Section lO (b) wns 
designer! as a catch-nll ebll"<' to nrC'vcnt fraudulent practiees. 
!d., at 202, 206. But 11either the legislative history nor thC' 
statute itself affords spC'cific guiclanco for the resolution of 
this case. When Rule 10b- 5 was promulgated in 1942. the 
provides that it sha ll br unbwful "ftlo make nny untrnr s!ntPmrn! of n 
matrrial fact or to omit to Rtntr a ma!rrial fact nrcrss:n~· in ordrr to 
rna kc the statements mndr, in 1 hr light of l hr circum~tnncrs undrr whir·h 
the~· were made, 110t mi~lr:Hling." 17 CFH §240.10b-5 (b) (1970). The 
portion of the indictmrnt h~Krrl on this provision was di~mi~srd hrcam:e 
thP petitioner made no Rl:1trmrnt~ nt nll in comwction with lhr purf'hnilr 
of Rtock. 
6 Record, at 682-683, 68G. 
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of~ 10 (b). 7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of 
~ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm vio-
lated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
closed information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation who was alf'o a registered representa.tive of the 
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 
(1061), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must 
abf':tain from trading in the shares of his corporation un l0ss 
he has first clisclosc>cl all material inside information know1J to 
him. T~w obligation to disclose or abstain derives from 
"[Bl n affirmative duty to disclose material information 
r which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal a.nd which. if 
known, would affect their investment judgment." l d., 
at 911. 
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from 
(i) The existence of a relationship affording acce:::s to inside 
information in tended to be available only for a corporate 
purnose, and ( ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading ~ ..... 
without disclosure. !d. , at 912, and n. 15.8 / 
7 Sec SEC Rclea~r No . 3230 (May 21, 1942). 
' In Cad!/. Robt rts. ihr hrokrr-dc:•lrr w1~ liablr under§ 10 (l>) beeau~e 
it. rrreived nonpublic information from n corporate insider of the issuer. 
Siner the insider could not usc ihr information, nrithrr could the partnrrR 
in ihr brokerage firm with whirh he was associated. Cady, Roberts cC· 
Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961). The transaction in Cady, Roberts involved 
f'nlr of stock to persons who previous]~' rna~· not have been shareholders 
in the corporation. !d., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced 
thr n•asoning of .Tudfir Lcanwd Hand that, ''ihc director or offic·cr a~~umrcl/ 
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That the relationship brtwren a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli-
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the false statement is fraurlulent. But one who falls to 
disclose material infonnation prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to clo 
so. Ancl th<' dut:v to dic:wln~<' Brisrs ll"ltc'lJ one party has infor-
mation "that the oth<'r r pmt\' l is cniitlrd to know becan:::e 
of a fidnriar:v or Rimilar rrlation of trust and confirlr1wc 
beh,·e<'n thrm.''" Tn its Crrdy. Rol>erls drrision, the Com-
mit:sion rcf'o;rnized [1 rrln t iom:hip of trust and cot1fidencc 
h<'hH'Pn tlw ~·harc>holcl crc:; of n corpora ti on and tho:'lr in:::idPrs 
who hav<' obtainC'd connclcntinl informntion bv reason of thrir 
position with that corporat ion .' 0 This r<'lntion ship givf'" ri~'C' 
to n rlut~" to di sf'losc' bncnusc of tlw "nrc<'ssitv of prcv:'nti'l<?; a ~ 
corp0ratP insidrr fr01n inkringl ndvantf'ge of the nninfornwd / 
:1 Aducinr.v rclntion io thr hu~·rr lJ,- ihr vrr~· ~nlr; for ii would br n 
!"nrn· distinrti011 i o allow him to u~r thr ndYnnt np:r of hi~ po.~ition to 
indurp tlw lmyrr into thr pn~ition of n hrnrfirinr~· nlthough hr \\·n~ for-
biddrn tn ro ~n flltr•(' 1Jw h11Y>T li.,d hrCOP1" 0'1" " fr{, :11 DU 1!. :~:1 . 
(Jnoiing Gmtz Y. Claughton. 1~7 F. 2d 40,40 (C'•\2 lDfil), rrrt. drnicd, 
~.n U. ::::. 020 (Hl51). 
0 nr,·t tt( mrnt nl" +!tr T.n\Y ~?d, Torts ~ !)!")] (~) (:t) (1D70)' RP(' .T:mw~ r\: 
Om~', Misrrprc.<rntation-Pnrt TT, ~7 Md. L. Hr'' · 4~~ . 523-.'i27 (Hl78). 
11~ rrr~rd~ ~ermiiir:< tr:•n-ar' i(JI'~, t hr Am""ic:tn T ·tw h~titute rrcou:nir.r~ 
thnt "~ilenre whrn ihere is n dut~· to "pcnk mn~· be n fr:wdulcnt net." 
.<\ TI, F ederal Rrrmitirs Cock § 202 (b) (Prf>JlO"rd Offici:-~1 Drnft 1978). 
10 Scr 3 W. Fletcher, C~·rloprdin of thr Lnw of Privnte Corpor!ltion" 
§ 838 (1975) (hrreinnfter Flrtrhrr); 3A Fleirhcr, §§ 1168.2, 1171. 1174: 
3 L. Lo~~. S"ruritir~ Regulniion 14.16-144~ (2d rd. Hl51); 0 L. Loss. nt 
35.57-3558 (1969 Rupp.). Rrr nlRo Strong v. Rrride. 213 U. R. 419, 431-
.:t:H (1000): Rroph11 v. Cities 8rrrir·r r'o., :n nt·l. Ch. 211, 70 <\. 2d fi 
n . 8rr grnrra ll:,· Kotr, Hulr 10 -.'i: l·~lc·m"nt< of n Pri1:•tr Hiv.ht of 
Artion. 4?. 1\'YTT L. Hrv . .'i~l. .'1fi2-!i!i3, nnd JJ. 71 (190~); 75 TTnrv. L. Rev. 
144\l, 14.'i0 (Hl02): Dnum & ]'hillipR, Thr TmpliPnti (111 nf ('nd7J, Robrrls. ./ 
17 Tins. I.:w, f\~0, 045 (106:.?). ./ 
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minority :-tockholclers." Speed Y. Transamerica Corp., 99 :F. 
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951). 
The Federal courts have found violations of ~ 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d 830 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have en1phasizcd, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to dis-
close n1arket information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Ji'vnd, Tnc., 524 
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal rnateria.l facts. Sec General Time Corp. v. Talley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2cl 159, 164 (CA2 1968), ccrt. denied, 
~93U.R. 1026 (1969).11 
This Court follo,ved the same approach in Affil·iated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 ( 1972). A gronp of 
.'\'nrriC'nn Tnrlian<: formrd a cornoration to manage joint as:-rts 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock 
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its 
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the 
corporate assets and tho difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders tho importance of retaining the stock. I d., 
at 146. T"·o of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
was trarl r fl in t"·o ~cparato markets-a primary market of 
Indians selling to non-Indians through th0 bank and a resale 
11 Sr" ~~~ -o SEC , .. Grral AmNiNm Indus., flu·., 407 F. 2d ~5:1 , .)(\() 
(C'A2 HlOR ) . Cf' l'1. denied, ~!).~ n. R. !)20 (196!1); Kohler v. Kohle1' C'o .. 
:)1!1 F. 2d fi;}.+. o:H-fl~R (C'A7 HlG~): );o1P, sunra n. 10. 42 ~YU L. HrY. 
nt 55-t: "\'nt.•. The Regulation of Corpornlr Trndcr OfTN 1Tndrr Frdrral 
Rrruritirs Lnw: A Nrw Chnllrngo for Rule lOb-5 ~59, sn-374 (1956). 
Rrr grzwr:tll y Notr, Civil I.inhilit~· undrr Rule X-lOb-5, 42 Vn. L. Hrv. 
587, 554-561 (1956). 
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers 
charged that the assistant managers had violated ~ 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
110 duty of dif:closnre ,,·oulcl exist if the ban!· merely had acted 
as a transfrr agent. Bnt the bank also had nssumecl a duty to 
art on behalf of tlte shnrrholclers. Hnrl tlw Tndian sellers had 
rrlied 11pon it<; personnel \\'hen they sold their stock. !d., at 
152. Dccausr- these officers of the bank were charged "·ith a 
resnonsibility to the shareholcl f'r!", thry ronld not art as mnrkd 
Plakers inrlucing th(' Tnclinm; to S~'ll their stoek "·ithont dis-
c1,~ing the rxistcnre of lhe more fnyorDhk non-1ncli8n market. 
I rl .. at 152-153. 
Thus. administrative and judicial interpretations have es-
tablished that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities rnay operate as a fraurl actionable under ~ 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the leg-ality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premised upon a duty to clisclosr arising from 
a relationship of trust and ronficlrncc between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a du tv to disclose prior to trad-
ing g;uarantecs that corporate insiders, who hnve an obli~a­
tion to place the sharr'holdcr's welfare before their own. w1ll 
not benefit personally through fra.uclulcn t 11Se of materin 1 
nonpublic information.'~ 
12 "TippPc~" of rorporntr in~idrr~ h:tY<' lwen held linblc nuclrr § 10 (b) 
hrr:-~u~r they haYc :1 duty not to profit from thP u~r of inside' inform:-~tion 
that thry know i ~ roJifld('lttial and know or ,,·!wuld know r·amP l'rm11 a 
eorporate insider. Shapiro v. Merrill J..,ynrh. Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 495 
F. 2d 228, 237<!3~ (CA2 HlH). Tlw tippee's oblif;:lt ion hns lm'n Yir\\'rd 
;,~ ari~ing from hi~ role ns a participant aftrr tlw fnrt in thr insider'~ 
hrr:-~ch of a fiduci:-tr)' dut)' . Subcommiitrrs of American Bar Association 
Rrrtion of Corporation, Banking, and Businc~s LmY, Commrnt Lcttrr on 
1\Ltterial, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 19n) rcprintrd in BNA, 
RrcuritiC'H Rcgubtion & Law Rrport. No. 233, at. D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, 1974). 
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III 
In this case, the petitioner \\'aS convicted of violating ~ 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential information from the target company. 
1\!foreover, the "market information" upon which he relied 
dict not concern the earning power or operations of the target 
romrany, but only the plans of the acquiring company.' 3 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
~ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to clis-
clo~e it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply \\'aS told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other peo11le 
trading in the securities market did not have access to the 
same information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that "[(llnyone-corpomte insider or not- who reg1larly re-
ccivPs mntr!·ial nonpublic information may not use that infor-
mation to tradP in scruritif'"l without incurring an affirmatiYc 
dut.v to disclose." 588 F. 2d 13fi8, 1365 (CA2 1078) (emphasis 
in original). A lthour;h tlw rourt said that it::: test would include 
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic infor-
mation. 1·d .. at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-
lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court of 
13 See Flei,:cher, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry int{) the Rr-
sponsibilit~· to DiHrloHP Market Informntion, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 7!10 
(1073). 
14 The Court of AppPals said that itR "regular access to market in-
formation" test. would create n worknblr rule embracing "thosP who 
occupy ... ~tratPg i c placeR in the markrt merhani~m." United Statl's 
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1:358, 13G5 (CA2 1978). Thrse eonsiderationH 
are insufficirnt to support a duty to diRclose. A duty arises from 1hr 
relationship bet\reen partieR, ~re nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying 
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationsllip 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solcly upon its belief that the 
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal 
access to information necessary for reasoned and intR11igent 
investment clrcisions." 588 F. 2cl, nt 1:~62. The usc by nny-
one of materinl information not p;en0rally nvailahlc is fra 1 Jcln-
lcnt, this theory suggrsts, becaus0 such information gives 
c0rtain b11ycrs or sellers an unfair advantage over less in-
formed buycrs and sellers. 
This rNtmn ing suff~'rs from two ddc~"'ts. Firr:t. not c'vrry 
instancr of financial unfairness ctmc::t;tutr's frauclnlcnt activity 
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Ind1.Jstries Inc . v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second. the clement required to 
make silrncc framlulent-n duty to discloi?r-is ahsf'nt 1n this 
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with 
the scllcrs of the target company's securities. for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. lie was not their agent, he '"as 
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
])laced their tmst and confidence. ITe was. in fact. n, com-
tf'xt, and not mere!~· from one'~ nhilitY to :lr(]nire information hcr:J 11-' C' of 
his position in thf' market. 
The Court of Appeals nl"o Flil!g(·.-drd that thr ar(]11i rinr.; corporaiiclJl 
it~rlf would not bn n "mnrkl' i in~ickr" hrr•: 111~r ~ trndcr offeror Cl'":ltr~, 
rathrr thnn rc rri ,·c;;; , infNmnti on nnd i:lkr~ :1 ~nbstnnii::tl cconomir ri~k 
thnt. its offer IYill be unsu ccr,:~ful. !d .. :~1 l~(iri-13G7. A~nin, thr Comt 
of AppcnlR depnrtrd from the nn:dY~iR npproprinte to recognition of a 
dut .1'. The Comt of Appenl" for th(' Pcrond Circuit preYimnly h(' ld . in 
a mamF'r cr>m'i~tcnt with our :mn l~·~i~ here, that a tender offeror doc~ not 
,·iolnte § 10 (h) when it mnkcq prcnnnPunrcment. pnrcha~cR pr('ri. cl~· 
because there i~ no relation~ hip het\Y('f'n the offeror nnd the Rcllrr: 
"\Ve know of no rule of lnw ... ihnt n pnrcha~cr of stock, who wa~ not 
an 'insider' and hnrl no fidu r· i ,\J'~· rclnt ion to n prosprctive Reller, lwd <illY 
ohligntion to rc1rnl circum~tanccR thnt might rni ~e n Reller's demnnd ~ and 
thus nhort thf' Rn lc." Genfral Tirnf Corp. v. Talley Tndustries, 40.1 F. :ld 
Jfi9, 104 (CA2 1068), cert. denied , 30~ U. R. 1026 (1069). 
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
personal market transactions. 
\Ve cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general duty between all participants in market 
tram:actions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information. Formulation of such a broad duty. "·hich 
drparts radically from tre cstahlishrd doctrine that duty :>rises 
from a specific relationship bet\Yren two parties, seen. 9. supro, 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lan-
guage or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neithrr 
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. Instead the problems caused by mis-
use of market information have been addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mar-
ket information may not harm operation of the securities mar-
kets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not 
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target 
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer. 
C'r111p:n'"S' careful action in this nnd other arras 1" contrasts. and 
'" 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1) permit~ n tender offeror to purrh::tse fi% 
of tho tnm:et comp:m,·'~ ~fork prior to di~cloPme of its plnn~ for 
nc(]niPition . 
JG Section 11 of the 1934 Art generally forbids n member of n nntionnl 
srcurit irs rxchnnge from effrrting nm· trnnsnrt ion on the rxchnngr for it;:; 
own ncconnt. 15 U. S. C. A. §7Rk (n)(l) (1972-197S Snpp.). Bnt 
Congress has specificnll~r rxempted sprrialists from this prohibition-brokrr-
drnlrrs who Pxecute orders for rustomrrs trnding in fL specific corporation's 
st0ck. while at the ~amc time bn~·ing and selling that corpor11tion's stork 
on their own behalf . §11 (n)(l)(A), 15 U.S. C. A. §7Rk(n)(J)(A) 
(Hl72-J97R Supp.): sre S. Rrp. No. !14-75, 94th Cong .. 1st Ses8., 99 
(1075): 2 SecmitirR and Exrhangr Commission, RPport of tl1c Special 
Rtuclv of 8ecurities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., 
fi7-5S. 76 (1963). Set' generally S. Robbins, The Srcurities Markets 
1!11-193 (1966). The excrption is based upon CongresR' rrcognition 
thnt specialists contribute to a fnir and orderly marketplace at the same 
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is in some tension, with the broad rule of liability we arc 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted 
is at odds with the Commission's view of ~ 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "\Varehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to 
puchase stock in tl•C' targot company bdorc the tenclor offer is 
mflcle pvblic and the price of shares riscs.17 Tn tl1is case. ns in 
\Yarchousing, a buyor of SC'curitiPs purchases stock in a targC't 
corporation on the basis of rn!lrkrt information which is 
1'1llmown to tlw snllrr. In hotlt of these sitnations. the SPllC'r's 
brh~vior nres11mablv wm:lcl be altered if he hacl tlw nonpuhlic 
jpformation. Rignificflntlv, however. tlw Commission hm; 
acted to bar " ·c.rrhousinp.: undrr its authority to regulate t<'mkr 
offPrs 18 after rccognizin.g that nrtion tmdC'r ~ 10 (b) \Yonld 
rC'st on a "sonle,Yhat differ~'T1t theor~'" than that prPviom;ly 
l"::cr1 t.o rf'.q;'JJntP inl"idrr trading as frnuclulcnt activity. 11' 
We SPeno basis for applying such a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, tho 
1084 Act rnm1ot be rrfHl "'more brnrdlv than its langnnr.·o nnd 
the statutory scheme reasonably 11crmit.'" Tourhe Ross & 
timr tbcy e.;-·ploit thr informaiionnl nch·nntn~r th:\1 come~ from ihrir pos-
sr~.,ion of bur ;1]1(] ,:•·ll ordi' f•'· 2 Scr·mit i·''' nnd Exck1 ngr Commi:-,,irm, 
Tirport of thr Swci:il 81 tid\" of Sr~mitirf· :\f:trk<•l:'. Tf. n. nne. ~(). 0:i, 
RSth Con~ .. bt Se''", nt· 7.<::;- SO. ~imilnr rc JH'rrns wiih il:r f1nJdi oni1'g of 
i hr Plnrket prrnnn1 rd CfJll.~:rr~" to r·;rmpt m~ukct rna kers hhrk po,ii ion"r". 
rcgi,irrerl. orld --lnt drnlrr". ho' ''' firlr <~rhil r:lgC'\Jr,, ~llld ri>'k ;;rhit r:1grm;; 
from § 11', gen;' r:d ]Jrohihi1 ion on mrmhrr trnrlin~. 15 LT. S. C . /1. § 7Sk 
(n)(l)!A)-(D) (1972-Fl7'i 8npp): "rr 8. TIPp. No. !l·l -7.'i, n1 09. Srr 
nl>'o 8rruritiP" Exrh:1ngr .c\:·1 T\r]P;i'C' No. 81--0950, 3.'i Frd. Hcp:. ;)!)0:?, 
80] , (1973). 
17 Fleischer, Mundhrim & Murph)·. s1.1pm n. lG, nt 811-812. 
1 "8EC Proposed Rnlr §240.1-k-2. 44 Frd. Rr~. 99f\7-90f\R (1!17!1). 
10 1 SEC Institutional Im·e:-tnr Siud)' Tiepnrl , H. n. Dor. 1'\n. !12-G~, 
92d Con g., 1st Srss., xxxii ( 1971). 
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Co. v. Redinoton, 47 F. S. L. \Y. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 43G U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it 
catches m11st be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under ~ 10 (b) 
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with 
the careful plan that C'ongrrss has enacted for regulation of 
the E=ecuritics markets. C'f. Snnta Fe Industries Inc. Y. Green, 
430 P. 8 .. at 470. 2 " 
IV 
In its brief to this Court, the rnitecl States offers an alterna-
tive theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that 
JICtitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when 
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a 
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiring corporation and the sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule 10b-5, that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) cmployrd a device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial juclgP ~ 
~o The Court of Appeals stated that § 10 (b) should not be con~trucd 
more narrowly in criminal action;; than in civil enforcement action~. 
5S'> F. 2d, at 1:368, n. lG. Yet it iH worth noting that this is appnrrnily 
the first case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon a pur-
chaRcr for § 10 (b) nondisclo~urc. Pctitionrr was sentenced to a yrar 
in priRon, susprnclcd except for one month, and a five-year trrm of 
probation. !d., al 1373, 1378 (Me~ kill, J., di~~rnting). // 
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stated that a "scheme to defraud'' is a plan to obtain money 
by trick or clrccit and that "a failure by Chimella to disclose 
material. non-public information in ronneetion \Yith his pur-
chase of stock would constitutr clecrit." !d., at 683. Arronl-
in~ly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner f'mployrcl a 
scheme to defraud if he "clicl not disclose ... materinl non-
public infonrw tion in con tlf'Ciion with the purchasrs of the 
stock." !d., at 685-686. 
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchaRf'd Sf'-
curities without disclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a frnucl 
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The jucl11:e earlier had stated that 
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingrnuity ran 
ck'vise and whirh are resortrcl to by one individual to gain an 
advantage over another by false misrepresentation. sngges-
tions or by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con-
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the 
nature or clements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone 
other than tlH' sellers. Because \\'C' cannot affirm a criminal 
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, 
Rewis v. Unil('d States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971). Sf'C Dunn 
v. United States , 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4. 1979), \VC' will 
not. speculatr upon wlwtlwr such a cl uty exists. whether it 
has been breached, or 'YhPtlH'r such a breach constitutrs a 
violation of ~ 10 (b). 21 
21 The r · 'on \\'ould h:n·r lo hr rr,··rr,.:Nl rwn if thr jttr~· h·td 
inHI rurted thnl it rii\11~.0J1'·irl JWI il ionrr cilhrr ( 1) bccaw;' fail-
nrc to disrloBe mntrrinl, non.pin'JH{' jJ.lfonn:-ttion t ~ r (2) brrnusr of 
thr brrnrh of a duty to the arr]ltiri!~_!inn. We ma~· not. uphold 
a rriminnl ron\'irtion i~o~iblr to nc;rr1·t:1'1'ri"-"'~.llH'r the drfrncl-
ant, has ~·•m'!\'fl'ectfor noncriminal conduct. United~ 
21. The dissent of the CHIEF JUSTICE relies upon a 
single phrase from the jury instructions, which states that 
the petitioner held a "confidential position" at Pandick 
Press, to argue that the jury was properly instructed on the 
theory "that a person who has misappropriated material 
nonpublic information has an abSolute duty to disclose that 
information or refrain from trading." Post at 2. The few 
words upon which this thesis {is based do not e~lain to the 
jury the nature and scope of the petitioner's~uty to his 
employer, the nature and scope of petitioner'sf duty, if any, 
to the acquiring corporation, or the elemen~~of the tort of 
misappropriation. Nor do the jury instructions suggest that a 
"confidential postition" is a necessary element of the 
offense for which petitioner was charged. Thus, we do not 
believe that a "misappropriation" theory was included in the 
jury instructions. 
The conviction woud have to be reversed even if the 
jury had been instructed that it could convict the petitioner 
either (1) because of his failure to disclose material, 
nonpublic information to sellers or (2) because of a breach 
of a duty to the acquiring corporation. We may not uphold a 
criminal conviction if it is impossible to ascertain whether 
the defendant has been punished for noncriminal conduct. 
United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); 
see Leary v. New York, 395 u.s. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberq v. 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
laghe~, 576 F. 2d ;· ~~eary ~' Yor'", ~ 
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969 ' mJI21;@ Ih4htltj'O)}itd, 2~3 , . ~-370 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-1202 
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, / On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
U 't d St te Appeals for the Second 111 e a s. c· 't lrCUl. 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corpora-
tion violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the target company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he 
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room 
of Pandick Press. a financial printer. Among documents that 
petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate 
takeover bids. When these documents were delivered to the 
printer, the identities of the acquiring and target corporations 
were coucealed by blank spaces or false 11ames. The true 
names \Verr sent to the printer ou the night of the final 
printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
the target companies before the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing 
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target com-
panies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover 
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attempts were made public.1 By this method, petitioner 
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 
14 months. Subsequently. the Securities and Exchange Com-
Imsswn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his 
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a 
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to 
return his profits to the sellers of the shares.2 On the same 
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 ·counts of 
violatiug § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.3 After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the indictment,·1 he was brought 
·to trial and convicted on all counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted 
certiorari, 441 U.S. - (1979), and we now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 ·u. S. C. §·78j, prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
. curity . .. [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this sectiol},. 
the SEC promulgated ·Rule 'IOb-5 which provides in perti-
nent part 5 that. 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 1ndi-
1 Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned 
a merger. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2 
1978). 
2 SEC v. Chiarella, No.-77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY May 24, 1977). 
3 Section 32 (a.) of the 1934 Act ~anctions criminal penalties against any 
person who willfully violates the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (1972-
1978 Supp.) . Petitioner wall rharged with 17 counts of violating· the Act 
beeause he had received 17 letters confirming purchase of shares. 
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978). 
5. Only Rulel:l IOb-5 (a) and (c) are at i&>ue here. Rule IOb-5 (b)!. 
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rectly, by the use of auy means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice .to 
defraud, [or] 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi .. 
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979). 
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
the petitioner if It found that he willfully failed to inform 
se11ers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
coming takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valuable.u In order to decide whether silence in such cit:· 
cumstances violates § 10 (b). it is necessary to review the hn-
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal co~rts. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language 
of the statute, Ernst & Brnst v. H ochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 
( 1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may consti-
tu te a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was 
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices. 
!d., at '202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of 
this case. When Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the 
Jlrovides that it shall be tmhtwful " [t]o mnko any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the ~tatement~ made, in the light of thf' circumstances under which 
they were madE>, not mi:sleading.',. 17 CFR §':.!40.10b-5 (b) (1979). The 
1Jortion of the indictment based on this provi~ion was di;;mi~ed becau~& 
the petitioner made no statement;; at all h\ COlltlection with the purchase-
~f stock. 
lk Record, ~t 682'-6&~, 003;. 
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SEC did 11ot discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of § 10 (b).7 
'l'he SEC took an important step in the development of 
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and _his firm vio-
l~ted that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
closed information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation who was also a registered representative of the 
brokerage firm. Xn Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 
( 1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must 
abstain from trading. in the spares of his corporation unless 
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to 
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from 
"[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information 
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders. ·we, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
. known, would affect their investment judgment." !d., 
at 911. 
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from 
(i) The existence of a relationship affording access to inside 
information intended· t<> be available only for a corporate 
purpose, and (li) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
without disclosure. ld., at 912, and n. 15.8 
7 See SEC Relea:;e No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) . 
8 In Cady, Roberts, the broker-dealer wJs liable under § 10 (b) because 
it received nonpublic information from a corporate insider of the issuer. 
Sinee the in~:;ider could not use the information, neither could the partners 
in the brokerage finn with which he wa:; as:;ociated. Cady, Roberts & 
('o., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961). The tran~>aetion in Cady, Roberts involved 
sale of stock to perHOlll:l who previously may not have been shareholders 
in the corporation . Id., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced" 
Lhe rea~;oning of Judge Learned Hand that "the director or officer assumed. 
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.,That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
'Stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli-
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has infor-
mation "that the other [party] is entitled to know because 
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them." n In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Com-
mission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders 
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their 
position with that corporation.1n This relationship gives rise 
to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventing a 
corporate insider from tak[ing] advantage of the uninformed 
a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale ; for it would be a 
sorry distmction to allow him to use the advantage of hi~ position to 
induce the buyer into the po:>ition of a beneficiary although he wa.s for-
bidden to do :so once the buyer had become one." !d., at 914, n. 23, 
quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cert. denied, 
341 U.S. 920 (1951) . 
9 Restatement of the Law 2d, Tort::;§ 551 (2) (a) (1976). See James & 
Ora.y, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978). 
A::; regards securities transactions, the American Law Institute recognizes 
that "silence when there is a duty to :speak may be a fraudulent act." 
ALI, Federal Securities CodP § 262 (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
10 See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§ 838 (1975) (hereinafter FletchPr); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174; 
3 L. Lo~, Securitie:; Regulation 1446-1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at 
3557-3558 (1969 Supp.) . See also Stmng Y. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 431-
4:~4 (1909) ; Bmphy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5 
(1949) . SP(~ genPrally Not(>, Hulr lO!.r-5 : Elements of a Private Right of" 
Action , 42 NYU L. Rev. 541, 552-553, and n. 71 (1968); 75 Harv. L. Rev. 
1449, 1450 (1962); Daum & Phillips, The Implication of Cady, Roberts,. 
l7 Bn::,. Law, 939, 945 (1962). 
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minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. 
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951). 
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used .. undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 'Co., 401 
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "Tt]he party charged with failing to dis-
close market information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA21975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1026 (1969).11 
This Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of 
American Indians formed a corporation to manage joint assets 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock 
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its 
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the 
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. Id., 
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of 
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale 
11 See abo SEC v. Gr·eat American Indus .. Inc ., 407 F. 2d 453, 460 
(CA2 1968), ccrt . denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 
319 F . 2d 634, 637-6:38 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Rev. 
at 554 ; ote , The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offer Under Federaf 
Securities Law: A NPw Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373-374 (1966) . 
See generally NotP, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-50 42 Va. L. Rev_ 
:!:37.~ 554-561 ( 1956). 
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers 
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted 
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to 
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had 
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. !d., at 
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a 
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market 
makers iuducing the Indians to sell their stock without dis-
closing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market. 
I d., at 152-153. 
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have es-
tablished that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trad-
ing guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will 
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material 
nonpublic information.1 2 
12 "Tippee~" of corporate in~ider~ have been held liable under § 10 (b) 
becatuse they have a duty not to profit. from the use of inside information 
that they know i:> confidential and know m· should know came from a 
corporate insider, Shapiro v. Merrill Lyuch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 
F. 2d 228, 2:37-238 (CA2 1974-) . The tippee's obligation ha~ been viewed 
as ari~ing from hi:s role a · a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar Association 
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on 
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA, 
'Securities Rrgulation & Law Report No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, 1974). 
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III 
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential informatioll from the target company. 
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied 
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target 
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company.1.a 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
§ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to dis-
close it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner O\ved a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people 
trading in the securities market did not have access to the 
same information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that infor-
mation to tmde in securities without incurring an affirmative 
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis 
in original). Although the court said that its test would include 
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic infor-
mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-
lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court of 
'ls See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initinl Inquiry into the Re-
spon~ibility to Di~close Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799 
(1973) . 
14 The Court of Aweals said that. its "regular access to market in..: 
formation" test would create a workable rule embracing "those who 
occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism." United States 
v. Chiarella, 588 F . 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considerations 
are in~uffirient to support a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the 
relationship between parties, see nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying:: 
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the 
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal 
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent 
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by any-
one of material information not generally available is fraudu-
lent, this theory suggests, because such information gives 
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less in-
formed buyers and sellers. 
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every 
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity 
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to 
make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this 
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with 
the sellePs of the target company's securities, for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was 
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trul;lt and confidence. He was, in fact, a com-
text, and not mPrely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the acquiring corporation 
itself would not be a "market insider" because a tender offeror creates, 
rathrr than recPivt>~, information and takes a substantial economic risk 
that its offer will be unsucce::;sful. !d., at 1366-1367. Again, the Court 
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a 
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in 
a manner con~istent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not 
violate § 10 (b) when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely 
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller: 
"We know of no rule of law ... that a purchaser of stock, who was not 
an 'insider' and had no fid1,lciary relation to a prospective seller, had any 
obligation to reveal circu~tances that might raise a seller's demands and 
thus abort the sale." General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, 403 F . 2<! 
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1026 (1969). 
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
personal market trans~ctions. 
· We cannot affirr~ petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general duty between all ·participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information. .Formulation of such a broad duty, which 
departs radically froln the established doctrine that duty arises 
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9, supra, 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lan-
guage or legislative history of '§ 10 (b). Moreover, ·neither 
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. Instead the problems caused by mis-
use of market informatioh 'have been addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mal'-
ket information may not harm operation of the securities· mar-
kets. For example, the Willialns Act 1 ~ limits· but does not 
completely prohibit a Mnder offeror's purchases of target 
·corporation stock before public announcement of the offer. 
·Congress' careful action in this and other areas 16 contrasts, and 
u 15 · U. S. C. § 78m (d)(1) permits a tetider offeror to purchase· 5% 
of the target company's stock prior to 'disclosure of its · plans for 
acquisition. 
16 Section 11 of the 1034 Act generally fo'rbids a member of a national 
securities exchange fro!ii effecting any transaction on the exchange for its 
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (1972-1978 Supp.). But 
· Congress has specifically exemt)tecl specialists from t.his prohibition-broker-
dealers who execute orders for mistomers trading in a specific corporation's 
stock, while at the snl.'ri.e time buying nnd selling that corporation's stock 
on their own behalf. · § 11 (a) (1) (A), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A) 
· (1972-19~8 Supp.); see S. Rep.· No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 99 
(1975); 2 Securities nnd Exchange Commission, Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., 
57-58, 76 (1963) . See generally S. Robbins, The Securities Markets 
191-193 (1966). The exception is bused upon Congress' recognition 
·that specialists con tribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same 
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IS m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted 
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to 
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is 
made public and the price of shares rises.17 In this case, as in 
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target 
corporation on the basis of market information which is 
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's 
behavior presumably would be altered if he had the nonpublic 
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has 
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender 
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would 
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously 
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity.19 
We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the 
1934 Act cannot be read" 'more broadly than its language and 
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross & 
time they rxploit the informational advantage that comes from their pos-
session of buy and ~;ell orde!'!i. 2 Securiti':!s and Exchange Commission, 
Report of tlw Speeial Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of 
the market prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners, 
registrred odd-lot dealers, bonn fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs 
from § ll 's gencrnl prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k 
(a) (1) (A)- (D) (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 99. See 
also Securities Exchange Act Relea!:le No. 34-9950, 38 Fed . Reg. 3902, 
3018 (1973). 
17 Flcii;cher, Mundhcim & Murphy, supra n. 16, at 811-812. 
18 SEC Proposrd Rule § 240.14e- 2, 44 Feel. Rf'g. 9987-9988 (1979). 
10 1 SEC Inxtitutional Investor Study Report, R R. Doc. No. 92-64,.. 
fJ2d Cong , l ilt Sf's:::., xxxii (1971). 
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Co. v. R edington, 47 U. S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When all allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b) 
does not arise fro1n the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of §· 10 (h) and would be inconsistent with 
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of 
the securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 
430 U. S., at 479.20 
IV 
In its brief to this Court, the United States offers an alterna-
tive theory to support petitionerrs conviction. It argues that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when 
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a 
conviction under § 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiring corporation and the sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule 100-5, that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) employro a device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud or- (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. Record, at 68L · The trial judge 
w The Court of Appeal,; stated t.hat § 10 (b) should not be constmed 
lnore narrowly in crimil1al actions than in civil enforcement actions. 
588 F . 2d, at 1368, n. 16. Yet it is worth noting that this is apparently 
the .fir.;t case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon a pur-
chaser for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. Petitioner was sentenced to ·a year 
in prison, suspended except for oue month, and a · five-year term of · 
:probation. ' i d., at 1373, 1378 (Meskill, J ., dissenting). 
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statPcl that. a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money 
by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose 
material , nott-public information in connection with his pur-
chase of stock would constitute deceit." Id. , at 683. Accord-
ingly, thP jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a 
scheme to dPfraud if he "did not disclose ... material non-
public information in connection with the purchases of the 
stock." I d., at 685-686. 
Altemativcly. the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "C'hiart>lla's allegt>d conduct of having pur~hased se-
curities without disclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud 
upon a seller." ld., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that 
fmud "embmces all thP means which human ingent1ity can 
devise and which are resorted to by oue individual to gain an 
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, sugges-
tions ot· by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683. 
1~hc jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con-
vic!Rd merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target coq)Orations. The j1.1ry was not instructed on the 
nature or clements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone 
other than the seller·s. Because we cannot affirm a criminal 
eonviction on the basis of a theory 110t presPnted to the jury, 
Rewis v. Un·ited States, 401 U. R. 808, 814 (1971) , see Dunn 
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979) , we will 
not spPculate upon whether such a duty exists. whether it 
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a 
violation of § 10 (b) .21 
21 The di:s;;(•nt of THE CHIEF JusncE reli<'s upon a. Ringle phrase from 
tho jury instruction,;, whid1 !ltate:s thnt t.he pf'titiOIIPI' held a, "confidf'ntiaJ 
position" at. Pandick Prf'~, lo argue that the jury wn::; properly instructed 
on the thPor~· " that a JX'rson who hal'! mis<tppropriated material non-
public i11formntion has an ah,.;o]utc duty to di,.;clo~<c tha.t infornmtion or 
refrain from trading." Pust, at 2. The few wordi;> npon which this th~:,.;j:; 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
is based do not rxplain to the jury the nature and srope of the petitioner's 
duty to hi,; PmployN, the nature and scope of 1)('titioner's duty, if any, 
to the acquiring corporation, or the t>lements of the tort of misappropri-
fLtion. Nor do the jury instructions suggest that a "confidential position" 
is a nccr~~ary element of the offense for which petitioner was charged. 
Thufl, we do not. believe that a "mi~appropria.tion" theory wru; includl'CI in 
the jury im;tructions. 
The conviction would have to be reversed even if the jury had been 
in::;truC'ted that. it could convict the petitioner either (1) because of his 
failure to diowlose material, nonpublic information to sellers or (2) be-
cau,;e of a breach of a duty to the a,cquiring corporation. We may not 
uphold a criminal convietion if it is impossible t<> ascertain wheth<'r the 
defendant hw; lwcn puni~hed for noncriminal conduct,. United States v .. 
Gallagher, 576 F . 2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); ;;ee Leary v. New York, 395 
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Attached is a second draft of my dissent in this 
case. I have moved a paragraph from the end of Part I 
to the end of Part II to accommodate Bill Brennan's 
desire to join Part I. I also have taken the 
opportunity to "beef up" Part II to make clearer my 
view that the jury instructions in this case did not 
impair Chiarella's trial. 
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U 'ted St t Appeals for the Second 
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Mn. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment. 
The Court holds, correctly in my view, that "a duty to 
disclose under § 10 (b) does not arise from the mere posses-
sion of nonpublic market information." Ante, at 12. Prior 
to so holding, however, it suggests that no violation of 
§ 10 (b) could be made out absent a breach of some duty 
arising out of a fiduciary relationship between buyer and seller. 
I cannot subscribe to that suggestion. On the contrary, it 
seems to me that Part I of THE CHIEF JusTICE's dissent, post, 
at---, correctly states the applicable substantive law-
a person violates § 10 (b) whenever he improperly obtains or 
converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he 
then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 
While I agree with Part I of THE CHIEF JusTICE's dissent, 
I am unable to agree with Part II. Rather, I concur in the 
judgment of the majority because I think it clear that the 
legal theory sketched by THE CHIEF JusTICE is not the one 
presented to the jury. As I read them, the instructions in 
effect permitted the jurors to return a verdict of guilty 
merely upon a finding of failure to disclose material nonpublic 
information in connection with the purchase of stock. I can 
find no instruction suggesting that one element of the offense 
was the improper conversion or misappropriation of that 
nonpublic information. Ambiguous suggestions in the indict-
ment and the prosecutor's opening and closing remarks are no 
substitute for the propor instructions. And neither reference 
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to the harmless error doctrine nor some post hoc theory of 
constructive stipulation can cure the defect. The simple 
fact is that to affirm the conviction without an adequate 
instruction would be tantamount to directing a verdict of 
guilty, and that we plainly may not do. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
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Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
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cc: The Conference 
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Mr. Justice Brennar• 
Mr. Ju9tlce Stn''~·J.rt 
Mr. Juntlu ·~ 'ril·l .I 't~-· 
Mr. Ju.!St !ct< !j,; ''Bh~ 1) 
!)-{{-~· 
Mr. Ju>-:ic>• ;11;.•\{w•m 
Mr. Jn,-~: ( ,' It h''"fl •1 i Bt 
~ Mr. JuotHH Stuv..;ns 
From : Mr. Justice Powell 
'\ ]~f 
~DRAFT 
Circulated : ____________ ~ 
Recirculated . E.£JL7 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-1202 
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, / On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v United States Court of 
U 
't d ·St te Appeals for the Second 
me a s. c· 't IrCUl • 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corpora-
tion violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the targeL company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he 
worked as a "markup man'' in the New York composing room 
of Pandick Press. a financial printer. Among documents that 
pe1litioner handled were five announcements of corporate 
takeover bids. When these documents were delivered to the 
printet·, the identities of the acquiring and target corporations 
were concealed by blank spaces or false names. The true 
names were sent to the printer 011 the night of the final 
printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
the target companies before the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing 
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target c~.:; / 
panies and sold the shares immediately after the take/ 
1980 
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attempts were made public.1 By this method, petitioner 
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 
14 months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange Com-
miSSIOn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his 
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a 
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to 
return his profits to the sellers of the shares.2 On the same 
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 ·counts of 
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.3 After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the indictment/ he was brought 
to trial and convicted on all counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted 
certiorari, 441 U. S. - (1979) , and we now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 ·u. S. C. §-78j, prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
. curity . . . L of] any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this section,. 
the SEC promulgated Rule '10b-5 which provides in perti-
nent part" that 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 1ndi-
1 Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned 
a merger. United" States v. Chiarella, 588 F . 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2 
1918). 
~SEC v. Chiarella, No.-77" Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY May 24, 1977) . 
3 Section 32 (a) of the 1934 Act ~anctions rriminal penalties against any 
per~on who willfully violates the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (1972-
1978 Supp.) . Petitioner wa.~ charged with 17 eounts of violating the Act 
be<'ause he had received 11· letters confirming purchase of shares. 
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978) . 
ll.Qnly Rulel:l lOb-5 (a) and (c) are at jl:)l:)ue here. Rule 10b-5 (b)o 
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rectly, by the use of auy means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, [or] 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi .. 
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979). 
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
the petitioner if tt found that he willfully failed to inform 
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
coming takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valuable.0 In order to decide whether silence in such ·cit:· 
cumstances violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to review the "lan-
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language 
of the statute, Ernst & "Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may consti-
tute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was 
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices. 
Id~, at ·202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of 
this case. When Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942, the 
provides that it :-;hall be unhtwfttl "[t]o mak(~ any untme statement of a 
matrrial fact or to omit to slate a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statement:; made, in thr light of the circumstances under which 
they were madr, not mtsleading."" l'i CFR §'240.10b-5 (b) (1979) . The 
1JOI'tion Of the indiCtment based 011 this provi:;ion WU.':! di:;mi:;:;ed becaUS& 
the petitiOner made no statement;:, at all in COllnection with the purchase-
-of :stock. 
a Record, a:t 682-6&~, 600i. 
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of § 10 (b).7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of 
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm vio-
lated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
closed information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation who was also a registered representative of the 
brokerage firm. ln Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 
(1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must 
abstain from -trading. in the shares of his corporation unless 
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to 
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from 
"[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information 
[which] has been traditioually imposed on corporate 
'insiders, ' particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment." !d., 
at 911. 
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from 
(i) The existence of a relationship affording access to inside 
illf'ormation intended· t<> be available only for a corporate 
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of . that information by trading ~ 
without disclosure. ld., at 912, and n. 15.8 ~ 
7 See SEC Relea:;.e No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). 
8 In Cady, Roberts, the broker-dealer WclS liable under § 10 (b) because 
iL received nonpublic information from a corporate insider of the issuer. 
Sin('e the insider could not use the information, neither could the partners 
in the brokerage firm with which he was a~;;ocinted. Cady, Roberts & 
C'o., 40 S. E . C 907· (1961). The tran;;action in Cady, Roberts involved 
sale of stock to pcr,;on:; who previously may not have been shareholders 
in the corporation . !d., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced" 
the rea;;onmg of Judge Learned Hand that "the director or officer assumed. / 
..,./ 
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
'Stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli-
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has infor-
mation "that the other [party] is entitled to know because 
of a fiuuciary or similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them." 0 In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Com-
mission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders 
who have obtai11ed co11fidential information by reason of their 
position with that corporation.10 This relationship gives rise~ 
to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventing a 
corporate insider from tak[ing] advantage of the uninformed 
3 fiduciary relaLion to the:> buyer by the very ~ale; for it would be a 
sorry distmct10n to allow him to use the advantage of his position to 
induce thE' buyl'r into the po1>ition of a beneficiary although he was for-
bidden to do so oncE' thE' buyer had become one." ld., at 914, n. 23, 
quoting Gratz v. Cla'Ughto-n, 187 .F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cerL. denied, 
341 U. S. 920 (1951} . 
0 RP:;tatpment of the Law 2d, Torl8 § 551 (2) (a) (1976). See James & 
Gray, Misrepres!'ntation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978). 
As regards securiti!'s transactions, the American Law Institute recognizes 
that "silence when there is a duty to :;peak may be a fraudulent act." 
ALI, Federal Securities Cod!' § 262 (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
10 See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§ 838 (1975) (h!'reinafter Fletchl'r); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174; 
3 L. Lo8S, Securities Regulation 1446-1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at 
3557-3558 (1969 Supp.) . 'See also 8t10ng 1. Rtpide, 213 U. S. 419";"'431-
. , Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5 
(1949) . Sr(\ grHPrally Not(•, RulP lOlr-5: Elements of a Priva.te Right of' 
Action, 42 ~YU L. Rev. 541, 552-553, and n. 71 (1968); 75 Harv. L. Rev. 
1449, 1450 (1962); Daum & Phillips, Th!> Implication of Cady, Roberts,. 
17 Bn.s. Law, 939, 945 (1962) . 
1b IYl.s urt- olft a 
INSERT ONE No. 7 8-120 2 Add to n. 1 0. 
The dissent of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMON 
suggests that the "special facts" doctrine may be 
applied to find that silence constitutes fraud 
where one party has superior information to 
another. Post, at 3. This Court has never so held. 
In Strong~ Repide, 213 u.s. 419, 431-434 (1909), 
this Court applied the special facts doctrine to 
conclude that a coporate insider had a duty to 
disclose to a shareholder. In that case, the 
maiority shareholder of a corporation secretly 
purchased the stock of another shareholder without 
revealing that the corporation, under the insider's 
direction, was about to sell corporate assets at a 
price that would greatly enhanc~ the value of the 
stock. The decision in Strong v. Repide was 
premised upon the fiduciary duty between the 
corporate insider and the shareholder. See Pepper 
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minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. 
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951). 
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. (J., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968). cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to dis-
close market information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA21975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1026 (1969).11 
This Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of 
America11 Il1dians formed a corporation to manage joint assets 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock 
to its Imlian shareholders and designated a local bank as its ~ 
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the/ 
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. ld., 
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of 
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale 
tJ Sre ul~o SEC v. Great Ame1ican Indus., Inc ., 407 F. 2d 453, 460 
(CA2 1968) , ccrt. denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 
319 F. 2d 13:34, 637-638 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Rev. 
at 554; Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offer Under Federal 
Securities Law : A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 :359, 373-374 (1966) . 
See generally Notr, Civil Liability under Hule X-lOb-50 42 Va. L. Rev_ 
3:37.', 554-561 ( 1956). 
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers 
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted 
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to 
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had 
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. !d., at 
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a 
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market 
makers iuducing the Indians to sell their stock without dis-
closing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market. 
I d., at 152-153. 
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have es-
tablished that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trad-
ing guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will./ 
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material 
nonpublic information.12 
12 "Tippee:>" oJ corporate in~ider~ have been held liable under § 10 (b) ~ 
because they have a duty not to profit from the use ·of inside information/ 
that they know i:s confidential and know or ~hould know came from a 
corporate insider, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 1974) . The tippee's obligation has been viewed 
as ari~ing from hb role as a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar Association 
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on 
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA, 
Securities Rf'gulation & Law Report No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (.Jan. 2, 1974). 
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III 
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential informati011 from the target company. 
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied 
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target 
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company.18 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
§ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to dis-
close it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people 
trading in the securities market did not have access to the 
same information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that "[a] nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that infor-
mation to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative 
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis 
in original). Although the court said that its test would include 
only persous who regularly receive material nonpublic infor- -------
mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-,.,.......--
lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court ot 
18 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Re-
sponsibility to DiHcloHe Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799 ~ 
(1973) . ~ 
14 The Court of Appeals said that its "regular access to market in~ 
formation '' te:;t would create a. workable rule embracing "those who 
occupy . .. strategic places in the market mechanism." United States 
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) . These considerations 
are immffirient to support a duty to di~close. A duty arises from the 
reTationship between parties, :;ee nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying~ 
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the 
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal 
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent 
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by any-
one of material information not generally available is fraudu-
lent, this theory suggests, because such information gives 
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less in-
fonned buyers and sellers. 
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every 
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity 
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to ~ 
make silence fraudulent--a duty to disclose-is absent in this/ 
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with 
the sellePs of the target company's securities, for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was 
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their tru~;~t and confidence. He was, in fact, a com-
text, :md not mPrely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the acquiring corporation 
itself would not be a "market insider" because a tender offeror creates, 
rathrr than receive~, information and takes a substantial economic risk 
that its offer will be unsuccessful. Jd., at 1366-1367. Again, th~ Court 
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a 
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in 
a mannrr consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not 
viola tr § J 0 (b) when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely 
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller: 
"We know of no rul~ of law . .. that a purchaser of stock, who was not 
an 'insider' and had no fid\tciary relation to a prospective seller, had any 
obligation to reveal circu~tances that might raise a seller's demands a/nd 
thus abort the sale." Ge~ral Time Corp. v. Talley lndust1'ies, 4{)3 F. 2d: 
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1026 (1969). 
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
p~rspnal market trans~ctions. 
· We cannot affirm ~petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general duty between all ' participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information. . }~ormulation of such a broad. duty, ·which 
departs radically froln the established doctrine that duty arises 
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9, supra, 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lan-
guage or legislativ~ history of '§ 10 (b). Moreover, neither 
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. Instead the problems caused by mis-
use of market infohnatioh 'have been addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mar-
ket information may not harm operation of the securities mar-
kets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits · but does not 
complet~ly prohibit a Mnder. offeror's purchases of target _______ 
·corporatiOn stock before public announcement of the offer. 
·Congress' careful action in this and other areasVcontrasts, and 
15 · U. S. C. § 78tn (d) (1) permits a terider offeror to purchase · 5% 
of the target company's stock prior to 'disclosure of its · plans for 
acquisition. 
'x7 Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally fo.rbids a member of a national 
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on 'the exchange for its 
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (1972-1978 Supp.). But 
· Congress has specifically exeml_:>ted st)ecialists ftom 'this prohibition-broker-
dealers who execute orders fot ctistomers trading in a specific corporation's 
stock, while at the saffie time btiying and selling that corporation's stock 
on their own behalf. · § 1I (a)(l)(A), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A) 
' (1972-19~8 Supp.); see S. Rep.· No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 99 
(1975) ; 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. N_o. '95, 88th Co~~·· 1st. Sess.,___..---
57-58, 76 (1963) . See generally S. Robbms, The Secuntles Markets 
191-193 (1966) . The exception is based upon Congress' recognition 
:that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly mark~tplace at the . same 
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IS m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted 
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to 
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is 
made public and the price of shares rises.17 In this case, as in 
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target 
corporation on the basis of market information which is 
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's 
behavior presuma.bly would be altered if he had the nonpublic 
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has 
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender 
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would 
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously ~ 
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity.19 / 
We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the 
1934 Act cannot be read" 'more broadly than its language and 
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.' " Touche Ross &: 
time they ell:ploit the informational advantage that comes from their pos-
session of buy and ~ell orders. 2 SecuritiPs and Exchange Commission, 
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 
88th Cong., 1st Se;;s ., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of 
the market prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners, 
regi~tercd odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs 
from § ll's general prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k 
(a) (1) (A)- (D) (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 99. See 
all-'o Securities Exchange Act Relea~e No. 34-9950, 38 Fed. Reg. 3902, 
3018 (1973) 0 
1 7 Fleisc}Jer, Munclheim & Murphy, supra n. 16, at 811-812. 
:18 SEC Propo~ed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-9988 (1979). 
19 1 SEC ln;;titutional Investor Study Report, H: R. Doe. No. 92-64,.. 
!l'ld Cong., lotS...., xx>H (1971), / 
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Co. v. Red'ington, 47 U. S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When a11 allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b) 
does not arise from the mere possession of non public market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of §· 10 (h) and would be inconsistent with 
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of 
the securities markejl.' Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, ~ 
430 U. S., at 479\V/ ~ 
IV 
In its brief to this Court. the United States offers an alterna-
tive theory to support p(•titionerrs conviction. It argues that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when 
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a 
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiril1g corporation and the sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule 10b- 5, that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud or- (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. · The trial judge 
._I_n __ .s_J_J-4-1-......:2():.:::1·The Cottrb of llt}}'lettle Att+ecl th8i § 19 (b) slumld nat he Qenfli! tted 
.ntere tlfd'P8'h ly in c. I itnihc:tl actioftd than in civil enfereelfteHtJ ttetieHs. 
~88 F, 9tl, s.t }gfig, B. 1'8:- Yst it is worth noting that this is apparently 
the fir~t case in which criminWliability has been imposed upon a pur-
chaser for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. Petitioner was sentenced to a year 
in pri~on, suspended except for one month, and a five-year term of' 
:proba.tion. ' I d., at 1373, 1378 (Meskill, .J., dissenting). --
INSERT TWO No. 78-1202 Add to note 20 
~ MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissent would establish the 
following standard for imposing criminal and civil 
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: 
ij~P]ersons having access to confidential 
material information that is not legally 
available to others generally are 
prohibited from engaging in schemes to 
exploit their structural information 
advantage through trading in affected 
securti ties-~~ 1 d ~. 
U This view is not substantially different from the 
Court of Appeals theory that anyone "who regularly 
receives material nonpublic information may not use 
that information to trade in securities without 
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose," supra 
J 
at 8, quoting 588 F.2d} at 1365, and must be 
rejected for the reasons stated in Part III. 
Additionally, a judicial holding that certain 
undefined activities "generally are prohibiteB" by 
§ 10(b) would raise questions whether either 
criminal or civil defendants would be given fair 
notice that they have engaged in illegal activity. 
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statfKl that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money 
by trick or· deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose 
matRrial , non-public information in connection with his pur-
chase of stock would constitute deceit." Id., at 683. Accord-
ingly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a 
scheme to tlefraud if he "did not disclose ... material non-
public information in connection with the purchases of the 
stock." ld., at 685- 686. 
Altemati vely, the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "Chiarella's alleged couduct of having purchased se-
curities without disclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud 
upon a seller·.'' !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that 
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can 
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an 
advantagp over another by false misl'epreseutation, sugges-
tions or by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con- / 
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non:_/'" 
public information to sellers from whom he bought the stocK 
of target corporations. The j~ry was not instructed on the 
nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone 
other than the seller·s. Because we cannot affirm a criminal 
eonviction on the basis of a theory 11ot presented to the jury, 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn 
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979), we will 
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists. whether it 
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a 
violation of § 10 (b).21 
21 The dis,;ent of THE CHIEF JusTrCE reli~ npon a single phrase from 
the jury in"truetiou;;, which statl:';; that the I)('titionl:'r held a "coniidl:'ntiaJ 
position" at Pandick Prrss, to nrgur. that thr j111'y was properly inrstructed 
on t.ho lhPor~· "that n pN:son who has mif'a,ppr·opriiLted mnterial non-
public information has !Ill ah~olut(' duty to di~clo~e that informa.tion or 
refmin frOJil trading." Post, at 2. The few word:;; upon which thi::; the::;js 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
is bused do not rxplain to the jury tl1e nature and srope of the petitioner's 
duty to hi, emplo~·er, the nature and scope of petitioner's duty, if any, 
to the acquiring rorporation, or the elements of the tort of misappropri-
ation. Nor do the jury instructions suggest tha.t a "confidential position" 
is a nccr:,:,;ary elrment of the offense for which petitioner was charged 
Tlmfl, we do not believe that a "mii:ia.ppropria.tion" theory was included i 
the jury instructions. 
The conviction would have to be reversed even if the jury had been 
iustn1cted that. it could convict the rwtitioner either (1) because of his 
failure to dis<'lo,;e material, nonpublic information to sellers or (2) be-
cause of a breach of a duty to the <~cquiring corporation. We ma.y not 
uphold a criminal conviction if it is impossible to ascertain whether the 
deft•ndant has lx>en punished for noncriminal conduct.. United States v .. 
Gallagher, 576 F . 2d 102H, 1046 (CA2 1978); see Leary v. New York, 395 
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369--370, 
(1931) . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78- 1202 
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United State Court of 
U 
. d t te Appeals for the econd 
mte a s. c· 't lrCUl , 
[January -, 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidt>ntial documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to ecure control of a second corpora-
tion violates §' 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the target company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he 
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room 
of Pandick Press, a financial printer. Among documents that 
petitioner handled ·were five announcements of corporate 
takeover bids. When these documents \VCre delivered to the 
printer, tlw identities of the acquiring and target corporations 
were conceakd by blank spaces or false namf's. The true 
names were sent to the printer on the night of the final 
printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
the target companies before the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing 
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target com-
panies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover 
7 1202~0PINION 
CHIARELLA v. UNITED STATES 
attempts \vere made public.1 By this method, petitioner 
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 
14 months. Subsequently. the Securities and Exchange Com-
miSSIOn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his 
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner 0ntcred into a 
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to 
return his profits to the sellers of the shares.2 · On the same 
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of 
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule lOb-5.3 After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the indictment/ he was brought 
to trial and convicted on a11 counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted 
certiorari, 441 U. S.- (1979) , and we now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this section, 
the SEC promulgated Rule lOb- 5 which provides in perti-
nent part fi that 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
1 Of the five transactiOllb , four involved tender offers aud one concerned 
a merger. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F . 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2 
1978). 
2 SRC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY Ma y 24, 1977) . 
3 Section 32 (a) of the 1934 AcL sanction~; criminal penaltie:; again:s t any 
person who willfully violate:> the Act. 1'5 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (1972-
Hl78 Supp ,) . PetitionPr wa,: charged with 17 counts of violating the Act 
berauRe he had received 17 letters confirming purchase of :;hares . 
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978) . 
1 Only lhi,les lOb-5 (a) a.nd (c) are ~~t i~sue here. Rule !Ob-5 (b) 
.. 
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rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, [or] 
" (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979). 
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to inform 
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
coming takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valuable.6 In order to decide whether silence in such cir-
cumstances violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to review the lan-
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language 
of the statute, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may consti-
tute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was 
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices. 
Id., at 202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of 
this case. When Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942, the 
provides that it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any untrue ~tatemeuL of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
makE- the :statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (b) (1979) . The 
portion of the indictment based on this provi:sion wa::; di:smissed because 
the petitioner made no statements at all in connection with the purchase· 
of stock. 
8 Record, at 682-6831 686. 
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of § 10 (b) .7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of 
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm vio-
lated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
closed information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation who was also a registered representative of the 
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 
(1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must 
abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless 
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to 
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from 
"[a] n affirmative duty to disclose material information 
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
'insiders.' particularly officers, directors, or con trolling 
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their positiou but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgme11t. '' !d., 
at 911. 
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from 
( i) The existence of a relationship affording access to inside 
information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose, allCI ( ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
without disclosure. I d., at 912, and n. 15.8 
7 See SEC HeleMc No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) . 
8 In Cady, Roberts. thr broker-dealer wc~s liablr under § 10 (b) bPcause 
it rrreived nonpublic information from <L corporate insider of the issuer. 
Since the insid0r could not use the information, neith0r could the partners 
in the brokerage firm with which he wa:; a~~ociated . C'ady, Roberts & 
Co., 40 S. B. C. 907 (1961). The transaction in Cadu, Roberts involved 
sale of stock to per:;ons who previously may not have been shareholder:; 
in the corporation. !d .. at 913, and n. 21. The Commission emhraeed 
the reasoning of ,l udge Learned Hand that "the director or otticer ;t.~~umecl 
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli~ 
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has infor~ 
mation "that the other [party] is entitled to know because 
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confide11ce 
between them." u In its Cady, Roberts decision. the Com~ 
mission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders 
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their 
position with that corporation.10 This relationship gives rise 
a fiduciary relation tD the buyf'T' by the very sa le; for it would bf' tt 
sorry distinction to aJlow him to use the advantage of hi:; poAition to 
induce the buyer inio the poHition of a. bPneficiary although he was for~ 
bidden to do :;o once the buyer had become one." /d., at 914, n. 23, 
quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cert. dPnied, 
341 U.S. 920 (1951) . 
0 Resiatcm!'nt of the Law 2d, Tort:; § 551 (2) (a) (1976). Se!' .Tame:; & 
Gra.y, MisrPprf'Hentation-Part II, 37 Md. L . Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978). 
A:; rpgards securitie;; tram;action:;, the Am~rican Law In:;titut!' recognizPs 
that "silence when there is a duty to speak may be a fraudulent act." 
ALI, FE>deral Securities Code § 262 (b) (Proposed 01Jicial Draft 1978). 
10 Sec 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§ 838 (1975) (hereinafter Fletcher); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174; 
3 L. Loss, Securities Hegulation 1446--1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at I 
3557-:~558 (19fi\l Supp.). S<'<' abo I:Jruphy v. ('ities Sel"uice Co .. :ll DPl. 
C'h . 2-U , 70 A. 2d 5 (Hl4D). S<'<' g<'llPrally Notr, Hul<' lOb-5: El<·m<'nt,.; 
of a PrivafP Hight of Aeiiou, 42 :XY(T L. Hcv. 5-!1. 552-.55:~. mtd n. 71 
(J9t)k); 75 Han·. L. Hrv. 1-149, H50 (1962); Daum & Phillip~, The 
Implieation of ('ady . Roberts. 17 Bu~. Law, 9:39, H45 (HH)2) . 
Thn di~>~ent. of ·:\fH . .Ju,.;TICB HLACKMUJ\" ~ugge~t:-< that thr "s]Wtial fa!'!:-" 
dortrinr ma~· lw applird to find that. sil<·urc eou~titut('~ fraud whpn· Oil<' 
party has ~u]wrior information to anoth<·r. f>o8t. at :~. Thi~ Court ha,.; 
llf'n•r ~o lwld. ln ,'-'.t1'011Q '· Rcpidl'. 21~ (T. S. 4HJ, -!:H-·t{-! (190\l), thi;; 
Court. applie(l the "'Jlecial fact;; doctrine to eouclud<> that a eorporatc 
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to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventiug a 
corporate insider from tak[ing] advantage of the uninformed 
minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. 
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951). 
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to dis-
close market information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Ji'rigitemp Corp. v. Ji'inancial Dynamics Ji'und, Inc., 524 
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. 'l'alley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1026 (1969).11 
This Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of 
American Indians formed a corporation to manage joint assets 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock 
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its 
in,-idt•r had n. clut~· to cli:-<clo:-<P ton. shareholder. In that ea"P, 1hr majority 
:::ha rrhol<lrr of a c·orpora t e "PC' ret ly pu rcha"rd thP "toC" k of anotlwr 
~harrholder without rPvPaling that till' corpora.tiou, under tlw ill~idc•r's 
direction , wa:-; nbuut. to ::<Pil corporate aS:>l't" at a. prirl' that would grPatl~· 
enhancr. t.lw value· of tlw ::;toek. Tlw ckci:-;iull in Stmny v. ltepide wa;.: 
prrmi,..rd upon tlw fiduf'iar~· duty lwt.wrcn 1hr eurporatr in"idN and the 
8h:trchuldPr. S<·t· Pepper v. Litton, :308 U. 8. 2\:15, ;{07, 11. 15 (HI:{~l). 
11 See also SEC v . G-reat American Indus., luc., 407 F. 2d 453, 460 
(CA2 1968), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co ., 
319 F. 2cl 6:34, 637-638 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Hev. 
at 554; Note, Thr Regulation of Corporate Tender Offer Under Federal 
Securi tit's Law: A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373- 37 4 ( 1966) . 
See generally Note, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 Va. L . Hev, 
537, 554-561 (1956) . 
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transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the 
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. I d., 
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of 
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale 
market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers 
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted 
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to 
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had 
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. I d., at 
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a 
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market 
makers inducing the Indians to sell their stock without dis-
closing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market. 
!d., at 152-153. 
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have es-
tablished that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trad-
ing guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will 
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material 
nonpublic information.12 
12 "Tippces" of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10 (b) 
l~ccause they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside inf01mation: 
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III 
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential information from the target company. 
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied 
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target 
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company.13 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
§ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to dis-
close it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed. to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people 
trading in the securities market did not have access to the 
same information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that " [a] nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that infor-
matiou to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative 
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis 
in original). Although the court said that its test would include 
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic infor-
mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-
that they know il' confidential and know OJ" ~hould know rame from a. 
corporate in:;ider, Shapim v. Men·ill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 1974). The tippee's obligation has been viewed 
as mi;;ing from hi>< role a:s a participant. after the fact in the insider's 
brc•arh of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar As:sociation 
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Busine:;H Law, Comment Letter on 
Material, Non-Public Informn.t.ion (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA, 
Securities Regulation & L'tw Report No. 2;33 , at D-1, D-2 (.Tan. 2, 1974) . 
13 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry intQ the Re-
sponsibility to Disclose Market, Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev . 798, 799. 
(1973). 
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lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court of 
Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the 
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal 
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent 
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by any-
one of material information not generally available is fraudu-
lent, this theory suggests, because such information gives 
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less in-
formed buyers and sellers. 
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every 
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity 
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to 
make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this 
14 The Court of Appeab said that its "regular acce~s to market in-
formation" test would create a. workable rule embracing "these who 
occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism." United States 
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considerations 
are insufficient to support a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the 
relationship between parties, see nn . 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying 
text, and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market. 
The Court of Appeals abo suggested that the acquiring corporation 
it::;elf would not be a "market insider" becau;;e a tender offeror creates, 
rather than receives, information and fnkefi a subsfautial economic risk 
that its offer will be unsuccessful. !d .. at 1366-1367. Again, the Court 
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a 
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previou~ly held, in 
a manner consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not 
violate § 10 (b) when it makes prcannouncemcnt purchase, precisely 
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller: 
"We know of no rule of law ... that a purchaser of stock, who was not 
an ' insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any 
obligation to reveal circum tances that might raise a seller's demands and 
thus abort the sale." General 'l'ime Co1·p. v. 'l'alley Industries, 403 F. 2d 
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). 
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ease. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with 
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was 
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a com-
plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
personal market transactions. 
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material , non public 
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which 
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises 
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9. supra., 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lan-
guage or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither 
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. Iustead the problems caused by mis-
use of market information have been addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mar-
ket information may not harm operation of the securities mar-
kets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not 
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target 
corporation stock before public auuouncement of the offer. 
Congress' careful action in this and other areas 16 contrasts, and 
15 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1) permits a tender offt!ror to purcha~e 5% 
of t he target company's stock prior to disclosure of its plans for 
acquisition. 
16 Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally forbids a member of a national 
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on the exchange for its 
own account . 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (I) (1972-1978 Supp.). But 
Congre;;s has Rpecifically exempted specialist" from this prohibition-broker-
dealers who execute orders for customers trading in a specific corporation's 
stock, while at the same time buying m1d selling that corpora tion 's ~tock 
on their own behalf. § 11 (a ) (1) (A), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A) 
(1972- 1978 Supp.) ; see S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., l ::; t Ses~., 991 
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1s m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted 
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to 
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is 
made public and the price of shares rises.17 In this case, as in 
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target 
corporation on the basis of market information which is 
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's 
behavior presumably would be altered if he had the nonpublic 
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has 
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender 
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would 
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously 
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity.10 
(1975) ; 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Market ,;, H . R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., 
57-58, 76 (196:3). See generally S. Robbins, The Securities Markets 
191-193 (1966). The exception is based upon Congn'ss' recognition 
that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same 
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their pos-
session of buy and sell orders. 2 Securiti~s and Exchange Commi~~ion, 
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H . R. Doc. No. 95, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of 
the market prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block po;;itioners, 
registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs 
from § ll's general prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k 
(a) (1) (A)-(D} (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No . 94-75, at 99. See 
also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9950, 38 Fed . Reg. 3902, 
3918 (1973) . 
17 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, s·upra n. 16, aL 811-812. 
18 SEC Proposed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-9988 (1979). 
10 1 SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H . R Doc. No. 92-64, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess., xxxii (1971) . 
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We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the 
1934 Act cannot be read " 'more broadly than its language and 
. the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross & 
'Co. v. Redington, 47 U. S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103,· 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b) 
does not arise from the mere possession of non public market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with 
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of 
the securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 
430 U. S., at 479.20 
2~ 1\fn . .TusnrE BLACKMUN':-: dis:':rnt would <'~tnbli~h thr following ~tand­
ard for impo:-:ing criminal and civil liberty under § 10 (b) and Rule 
lOb-5: 
"rl'Jrr~on::: haYing arrrss to ronfitlrntinl mnterial informntion thnt. i;;: not 
lcgall~r rwailahlc to othrr~ grnerall~· arr. prohibited from t'ngaging in 
!!ChE>mr;;; to rxploit. thrir l!' lructnral information ad\'antagc through trading, 
in affPdrcl ~eruri tir:-:." Post, at. 7. 
This vi<·w i:-: not. sub"'hmtjflll~· differf'nt from the Comt of Appral,.: throry 
that an~·o11r "who re-gular]~· re<·rivrs mate-rial nonpublir information may 
11ot llt<(1 thnt. information to t.radc ·in :;:prurit.irs without ineurring an 
ftffinnati\'e dut~· to di ::wlo,.:r," supra. nt 8, quot·ing 5~F: F. 2d. at, I:~!i5. and 
mn::;t. br rejrrted for t.hr n'ilo"'OIIf; ,;tated in Pa.rt III. Additionally, :t 
judicial holding that certniu undrfiued a.rt.ivitif's "gPnrrall~· are prohibited" 
by § 10 (b) woul<l rili:-:c Cjll<'stion~ whE>thf'r cithrr· criminal or rivil de-
fendants wo11ld he giv<'n fnir noiir0 that. Owy Ira\'<' <'ngagPd ir1 ili<·gal 
activity. Cf. Gmyned v. City of Bocl.:ford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 
(1072). 
It. is worth noting t.hn.t thi~ i;; n.ppnrrnt.ly th0 fir::;t. rnsr i11 wltieb rriminnl 
liiibility hii:s hem impo:-:Pcl upo11 n, IJUn·hii:-:Pr for § 10 (h) nondi,;clo~ure . 
PP!.itiorwr wa,; ~Pntrnrrd to n, y<•ar in prison, ~u"pmd<·<l rxerpt for one 
month, and a fi1·c-yca.r term of probation. ld., at 13/J, 1378 (l\Ic;;kil!
1 
J.1 dis~entiug) . 
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IV 
In its brief to this Court, the United States offers an alterna-
tive theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when 
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a 
conviction under § 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiring corporation and thE> sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule lOb-5, that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial judge 
stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money 
by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose 
material, non-public information in connection with his pur-
chase of stock would constitute deceit." !d., at 683. Accord-
ingly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a 
scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose ... material non-
public information in connection with the purchases of the 
stock." !d. , at 685-686. 
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchased se-
curities without disclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud 
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that 
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can 
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an 
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, sugges-
tions or by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con-
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
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public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the 
nature or elements of n. duty owed by petitioner to anyone 
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal 
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, 
Rewis v. Un·ited States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971). see Dunn 
v. United Sta.tes, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979), we will 
not speculate upon whetht>r such a duty t>xists, whether it 
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a 
violation of § 10 (b).21 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
21 The di~~rnt of THB C1-11E~' JusTICE relit'S upon a ~inglr phrMr from 
the jill'~' instructions, which ~<tntrs that t.lw petitionrr held a, "confidrntial 
po~itiou" at Pandick Prri'.', to ar~tue tha.t. the jur~· was proper!~· in~t ructed 
on the throry "that a person who has misappropriatl'd material non-
public information hns an ab~olutc duty to disrlo:;e thnt information or 
refrain from tmding." Post, at 2. The few words upon which thi~ theflis 
i::; ba.•rd do not rxplaiu to the jury t.he nature and scope of tlw pPtitioner's 
duty to his ('mplo~·er, the nnturP and scoJW of petitionrr',.- duty, if any, 
to the n.f'qniring corporation, or the r lrnwnts of tJw tort of mi:;a.ppropri-
ation. N'or do t.lw jur~· instruction.~ sugge;;t that n. "confidPntin.l po;;itiun'' 
is a necP~>'ary PlPllH'n( of the otTrnse for whic·h petitioner wa>' ehargPd . 
Tim;:, we do not. belieYe tha l a. "mi~appropria tiou" thPory wa.s included in 
the jmy in><truchom;. 
The ('Onviction would h:wc to hr. revcr~rcl rven il' thr jury had been 
instrurted that. it could convict. the pPtitiorwr ('ither (1) bPcau;;p of hi:s 
failure to clisrlo~c mn.tPrial, nonpubli·c informntion to srllrrs or (2) be-
cause of n breach of a duty to t.hc acquiring corpor<~tion. Wr may not 
uphold a criminal com·ic>tion if it. i, impo,;,.-ible to a .. •cNtain whrtlwr the 
dcl'endnnt has !wen pnni,.;hrcl for norwriminal concllrct.. Cnited States v. 
Gallagher. 576 F . 2d 10:!~ , 1046 (CA2 1978); ~<'e J.eary v. NPw 1'urk, 395 
U. S. 6, 31-32 (HJ69); Stromberg v. Califomia., :283 U. S. 359, 369-370; 
(1931) . 
5- ~ 1 IJ. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a person who learns 
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is 
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corpora-
tion violates §· 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading 
in the target company's securities. 
I 
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he 
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room 
of Pandick Press, a financial printer. Among documents that 
petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate 
takeover bids. When these documents were delivered to the 
printer, the identities of the acquiring and target corporations 
were concealed by blank spaces or false names. The true 
names were sent to the printer on the night of the final 
printing. 
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of 
the target companies before the final printing from other 
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing 
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target com-
panie~ and sold the shares immediately after the takeover 
78-1202-<JPINION 
CHIARELLA v. UNITED STATES 
attempts were made public.1 By this method, petitioner 
11ealized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 
14 months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange Com-
miSSIOn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his 
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a 
eonsent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to 
return his profits to the sellers of the shares.2 • On the same 
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press. 
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of 
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.3 After petitioner unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the indictment/ he was brought 
to trial and convicted on all counts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction. 588 F. ·2d 1358 (1978). We granted 
certio~•ri, 441 U.S. - (1979), and we now reverse. 
II 
Section 10 (b) of the ·1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this section, 
the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 which provides in perti-
nent Jllart fi that 
"lt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
1 Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned 
a mergrr. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2 
Hl78). 
2 SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY May 24, 1977) . 
3 Section 32 (a) of the 1934 Act sanctions criminal penaltie;s again:;t any 
per:;on who willfully violates the Act. r5 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (1972-
1978 Supp.). Petitioner wa:-: charged with 17 counts of violating the Act 
because he hnd received 17 letters confinning purchase of share~ 
4 United States v. Chia1'ella, 450 F . Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978) . 
1 OX1l~ llu.les lOb-5 (a) ~nd (c) are at i:ssue here. Rule lOb-5 (b) 
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rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
" (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, [or] 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979) . 
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence. 
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict 
the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to inform 
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forth-
coming takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valuable.6 In order to decide whether silence in such cir-
cumstances violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to review the lan-
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its 
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts. 
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language 
of the statute, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may consti-
tute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was 
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices. 
ld., at 202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of 
this case. When Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the· 
provides that it. shall be unlawful "rtJo make any untrue ;;tatement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the ;;tatements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not mi;;Jeading." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (b) (1979) . The 
portion of the indictment based on this provision was dismissed because 
the petitioner made no statements at all in connection with the purchat:~e· 
of stock. 
• Record, at 682-683t 686. 
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide 
information might run afoul of§ 10 (b).7 
The SEC took an important step in the development of 
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm vio-
lated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis-
closed information obtained from a director of the issuer 
corporation who was also a registered representa.tive of the 
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 
(1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must 
abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless 
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to 
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from 
"[a] n affirmative duty to disclose material information 
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment." Id., 
at 911. 
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from 
(i) The existence of a rela.tionship affording access to inside 
information intended to be available only · for a corporate 
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
without disclosure. I d., at 912, and n. 15.8 
1 Sec SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) . 
8 In Cady, Roberts, the broker-dealer w:.1s liable under § 10 (b) because 
it received nonpublic information from a corporate insider of the issuer. 
Since the insider could not use the information, neither could the partners 
in the brokerage firm with which he was associated. Cady, Roberts & 
Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961). The transaction in Cady, Roberts involved 
sale of stock to persons who previously may not have been shareholdertl 
in the corporation. · Icl. , at 913, and n . 21. The Commission embraced 
the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand that "the director or officer <lS~umed 
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli-
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law, 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance 
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has infor-
mation "that the other [party] is entitled to know because 
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them." u In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Com-
mission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders 
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their 
position with that corporation.10 This relationship gives rise 
a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a 
sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to 
induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was for-
bidden to do so once the buyer had become one." /d. , at 914, n. 23, 
quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cert. denied, 
341 U. S. 920 (1951). 
9 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts § 551 (2) (a) (1976) . See James & 
Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978). 
As regards securitie::; transactions, the American Law Institute recognizes 
that "silence when there is a duty to speak may be a fraudulent act." 
ALI, Federal Securities Code § 262 (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
10 See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§ 838 (1975) (hereinafter Fletcher); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174; 
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1446-1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at \ 
3557-:3558 ( 1969 Supp.). St>r also B1·ophy v. ('ities Service Co .. 31 Dd. 
Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5 (1949). See g<'nerally Note, Rule lOb-5 : Elrments 
of a Privatr Hight, of Action, 42 NYU L. Hcv. 5-!1, 552-55:3, and n. 71 
(1968); 15 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1450 (1962); Daum & Phillip~, Thr 
Implication of Cady, Roberts. 17 Bu~. Law, 9:~9, 945 (1962). 
The di~srnt. of MR . .Jm.;TICE BLACKMUN suggr:st~ that. thr ":sprcial fact"" 
doctrine may be applied to find that. :silmre con::;titutp:-; fraud wlwrc one 
party has superior information to !tnot her. Post. at 3. This Court hm.: 
never w held. In St11ong v. RC'pide. 21il U.S. 419, 4:H-4:H (1909), this 
Court applied the ::;pecial facts doctrine to conclude that a corpomtc 
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to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventing a 
corporate insider from tak [ing] advantage of the uninformed 
minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. 
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951). 
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for 
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972). 
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to dis-
close market information must be under a duty to disclose 
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock 
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither 
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation 
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley 
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 
393 u. s. 1026 (1969) .11 
'fhis Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of 
American Indians formed a corporation to manage joint assets 
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock 
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its 
in;;ider hall n, duty to disrlo~e to n, shareholder. In that case, the majority 
~;lmrrholder of a corJJOra t e ~ecretly purchased thP stoek of anothPr 
~;hnreholder without. rrvealing that the corporation, under the in:,;ider's 
direction, wa;; abouL to ;;ell rorporate as;;et::; at a. price that would greall~· 
enhance the value of the ~-;to<~k. The deci~-;ion in Stmng v. Repide wa~ 
premi~ed upon the fiduciary dut~· Lwtween thE' corporate in:<ider and the 
t;harehold('r. Sec• Pepper v. Litton, :308 U. S. 295, ;{07, n. 15 (HJ;l~J) . 
11 See also SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc. , 407 F . 2d 453, 460 
(CA2 1968) , cert. denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 
319 F . 2d 634, 637-638 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Rev. 
at 554; Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Qffpr Under Federal 
Securities Law : A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373-374 (1966) . 
See generally Note, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 Va. L , Eev, 
537, 554-561 (1956) . 
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transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the 
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true 
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to 
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. I d., 
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the 
a;hareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew 
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of 
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale 
market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers 
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices 
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that 
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted 
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to 
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had 
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. Id., at 
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a 
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market 
makers inducing the Indians to sell their stock without dis-
closing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market. 
Jd., at 152-153. 
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have es-
tablis~ed that silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) 
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But 
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trad-
ing guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will 
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material 
nonpublic information.12 
12 "Tippees" uf corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10 (b) 
~ecause ~hey have a duty not to protit from the use of inside information 
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III 
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10 
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received 
no confidential information from the target company. 
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied 
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target 
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company.13 
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under 
110 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to dis-
dose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions 
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court 
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; 
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury 
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, 
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people 
trading in the securities market did not have access to the 
eame information." Record, at 677. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding 
that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives materialnonpublic information may not use that infor-
mation to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative 
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis 
in original). Although the court said that its test would include 
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic infor-
mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-
that they know is confidential and know or should know came from a 
corporate insider, Shapiro v. Mm·1'ill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 1974) . The tippee's obligation has been viewed 
as arising from his role as a participant after the Ja,ct in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar Association 
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on 
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA, 
Securities Regulation & Law Report No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, 1974). 
13 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Re-
Eponsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799. 
(1973). 
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lated to the existence of a duty to disclose.14 The Court of 
Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship 
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a 
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the 
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal 
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent 
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by any-
one of material information not generally available is fraudu-
lent, this theory suggests, because such information gives 
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less in-
formed buyers and sellers. 
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every 
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity 
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to 
make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this 
14 The Court of Appeal~ said that its "regular access to market in-
formation" test would create a workable rule embracing "these who 
occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism." United States 
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considerations 
are insufficient to support a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the 
relationship between parties, see nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying 
text, and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the acquiring corporation 
itself would not be a "market insider" becau;;e a tender offeror creates, 
rather than receives, information and takes a substantial economic risk 
that its offer will be unsuccessful. !d., at 1366-1367. Again, the Court 
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a 
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in 
a manner consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not 
violate § 10 (b) when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely 
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller: 
"We know of no rule of law . . . that a purchaser of stock, who was not 
an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any 
obligatiqn to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and 
thus abort the sale." General 'l'ime Corp. v. Talley Industries, 403 F. 2d 
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1026 (1969). 
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tase. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with 
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had 
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was 
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a com-
plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through im-
personal market transactions. 
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recog-
nizing a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which 
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises 
from a specific rela.tionship between two parties, seen. 9, supra, 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
eongressional intent. 
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lan-
r;uage or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither 
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-
of-information rule. Instead the problems caused by mis-
use of market information have been addressed by detailed 
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mar-
ket information may not harm operation of the securities mar-
kets. For example, the Williams Act 1 5 limits but does not 
eompletely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target 
eorporation stock before public announcement of the offer. 
Congress' careful action in this and other areas 16 contrasts, and 
u 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1) permits a tender offeror to purchase 5% 
of the target company's stock prior to disclosure of its plans for 
acquisition . 
16 Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally forbids a member of a national 
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on the exchange for its 
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (1972-1978 Supp.). But 
Congress has specifically exempted specialists from this prohibition-broker-
dealers who execute orders for customers trading in a specific corporation's 
stock, while at the same time buying and selling that corporation 's stock 
on their own behalf. § 11 (a) (1) (A) , 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A) 
' (1972- 1978 Supp.) ; see S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Se:ss., 99J 
78-1202-0PINION 
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IS m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are 
asked to adopt in this case. 
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted 
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied 
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the peti-
tioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a cor-
poration gives advance notice of its intention to launch a 
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to 
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is 
made public and the price of shares rises.17 In this case, as in 
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target 
corporation on the basis of market information which is 
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's 
behavior presumably would be altered if he had the nonpublic 
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has 
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender 
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would 
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously 
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity.1 0 
(1975); 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., 
57-58, 76 (1963). See generally S. Robbins, The Securities Markets 
191-193 (1966). The exception is based upon Congress' recognition 
that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same 
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their pos-
session of buy and sell orders. 2 Securiti'=!s and Exchange Commission, 
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of 
the market promptPd Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners, 
registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs 
from § ll's general prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k 
(a) (1) (A)-(D) (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 99. See 
also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9950, 38 Fed . Reg. 3902, 
3918 (1973) . 
17 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra n. 16, at 811-812. 
18 SEC Proposed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-9988 (1979). 
19 1 SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H . R. Doc. No. 92-64, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess., xxxii (1971) . 
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We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory 
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the 
1934 Act cannot be read" 'more broadly than its language and 
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" · Touche Ross &: 
··co. v. Redington, 47 U.S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979), 
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103,' 116 (1978). Section 
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it 
eatches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b) 
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information. The contrary result is without support in the 
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with 
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of 
the securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 
430 U. 8., at 479.20 
~ Ma. JusTICE BLA'CKMUN'fi dissent would establish the following stand-
ard for imposing criminal nnd civil liberty under § 10 (b) and Rule 
lOb-5: 
"[P]ersons h:wing accrss to confidential material informntion that. is not 
legally a.vajlnblo t() others generally nrc prohibited from rngaging in 
11ehemes to <>xploit their structural information advantHgc through trading 
in affert<'d secnriti('::;," Post, at 7. 
This view i;:; not. subst-antjaJJ~· different from the Court. of Appeals th('OI'Y 
thnt anyone "who regularly rer('ives mn,t<>rinl nonpublic information may 
not use thnt information t() trade 'in s<'Curit.iPS without incurring an 
affirmative duty to disrloi><'," supra, at 8, quot-ing 5R8 F. 2d, at, 1365, and 
must be l'('j!'ct<>d for t·he reasons stated in Pa.rt III. Additionally, a 
juilicial holding tlwt ccrt;tin undefined act.ivities "general!~· arc prohibited" 
by § 10 (b) would raise qu<>~tions wheth<>r either criminHI or civil de-
fendantfl would be given fnir notice thflt, they have engflged in ill<>gal 
acfivity. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 
(1972). 
It is worth noting that this i;; n.ppnrent.ly the fir~t case in which criminal 
liability has hrm impo:<ed upon n. purehn~er for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. 
Prtitioner was sentenced to a yrnr in prison, su~pendecl exrrpt for one 
month, and a five-year tenn of probation. Id., at 1373, 1378 (J.Ieskill, 
J., di..--sentjng) . 
18-1202-0PINION 
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IV 
In its brief to this Court, the United States offers an alterna-
tive theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when 
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a 
conviction under § 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both 
the acquiring corporation and the sellers. 
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was 
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the lan-
guage of Rule lOb-5, that it could convict the petitioner if 
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course 
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial judge 
stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money 
by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose 
material, non-public information in connection with his pur-
chase of stock would constitute deceit." I d., at 683. Accord-
ingly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a 
scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose . .. material non-
public information in connection with the purchases of the 
stock." ld., at 685- 686. 
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could con-
vict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchased se-
flurities without disclosing material, non-public information 
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud 
upon a seller." Id. , at 686. The judge earlier had stated that 
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can 
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an 
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, sugges-
tions or by suppression of the truth." Id. , at 683. 
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con-
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
78-1202-0PINION 
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public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock 
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the 
nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone 
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal 
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn 
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979), we will 
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it 
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a 
violation of § 10 (b). 21 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
11 The dissent of THE CHIEF' JusTICE relies upon a single phrase from 
the jury inst.ructions, which states that the petitioner held n. "confidential 
position" at Pandick Press, to argue that the jury was properly in~tructed 
on the theory "that a person who has misa.ppropria.ted ma.terial non-
public inform~tt.ion has an absolute duty to disclose t.ha.t information or 
refrain from trading." Post, at 2. The few words upon which this thesis 
is based do not l'xplain to the jury the nature and scope of the petitioner's 
duty to his employer, the na.ture and scope of petitioner's duty, if any, 
to the acquiring corporation, or the eleml'nts of the tort of misappropri-
ation. Nor do the jur~· instructions suggest t.lmt. a "confidential po;;ition" 
is a necessrtry l:'lement of the offpnse for which petitioner was charged. 
Thus, we do not believe that a "misappropriation" theory was included in 
the jury instructions. 
The conviction would have to be reversed even if the jury had been 
instructed that it could convict the petitioner either (1) because of his 
failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers or (2) be-
cause of a breach of a duty to the a.cquiring corporation. We may not 
uphold a criminal convi'ction if it is impo,.;..,ible to a..;certain whethl'r the 
defendant has been punished for noncriminal conduct.. United States v. 
Gallagher, 576 F. 2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); :see Leary v. Netv York, 395 
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. Califomia, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370,' 
(1931). 
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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOF 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
No. 78-1202. Argued November 5, 1979-Decided March -, wuv 
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of -1934 (Act) prohibits 
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [of] 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commis-
!'ion may prescribe." Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), promulgated thereunder, makes it unlawful for 
any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or 
to "engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or a deceit .upon any per'on, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." Petitioner, who was employed by 
a financia l printer that had been engaged · by certain corporations to 
print corporate takeover ·bids, deduced the names of the target com-
panies from information contained in documents delivered to the printer 
by the acquiring companies and, without disclosing his· knowledge, pur-
chased stock in the target companies and sold the hares· immediately 
after the takeover attempts were made public. After the SEC began 
an investigation of his trading activities, petitioner entered into a con-
sent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return his profits to the 
sellers of the shares. Thereafter, petitioner was indicted and convicted 
for violating § 10 (b) of the Act and SEC Rule lOb-5. The District 
Court's charge permitted the jury to convict the petitioner if it found 
that he willfully failed to inform sellers of target rompany securities 
that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their 
shares more valuable. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals. 
Held : Petitioner's conduct elid not constitute a violation of § 10 (b) , and 
hence his conviction was improper. Pp. 2-12. 
(a) Administrative and judicial interpretations have established that 
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate 
I 
HENRY C. LIND 
Reporter of Decisions. 
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Syllabus 
as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) despite the absence of statutory 
language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of 
nondisclosure. However, such liability is premised upon a duty to dis-
close (such as that of a corporate insider to hareholders of his cor-
poration) arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction. Pp. 2-7. 
(b) Here, petitioner had no affirmative duty to disclose the in fonna-
tion as to the plans of the acquiring companies. He was not a corporate 
insider, and he received no confidential information from the target 
companies. Nor could any duty arise from petitioner's relation hip 
with the sellers of the target companies' securities, for he had no prior 
·dealings with them, was not their agent, was not a fiduciary, and was 
not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. 
A duty to disclose under § 10 (b) does not arise from the mere posses-
sion of nonpublic market information. Pp. 8-12. 
(c) This Court need not decide whether petitioner's conviction can 
be supported on the alternative theory that he breached a duty to the 
acquiring corporation, since such theory was not submitted to the 
jury. The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted 
merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information 
to sellers from whom he bought the stock of target corporations. The 
conviction cannot be affirmed on the basis of a theory not presented 
to the jury. Pp. 12-14. 
588 F. 2d 1358, reversed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opm10n of the Court., in which STEWART, 
WHITE, REITNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. S'fEVENs, J., filed a con-
curring opinion. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. BLACKMUN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined. 
lfp/ss 3/15/80 78-1202 -Chiarella - v; -U;S; 
This case is here on certiorari to the United State 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
t . . 1 f f' . -::71 • • ......., Pe 1t1oner, an emp oyee o a 1nanc1a or1nt1nq . ...__.., 
firm in New York, was convicted in a criminal prosecutio~f 
violating §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193~and 
Rule lOb-5 adopted pursuant to such Act. His conviction was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit. -·- ....-
As an employee of 
bl . . f . a.+ nonpu 1c 1n ormat1on "a s to 
--4.~~
a. printing firm, he had access / to 
takeover ~s~that were to be 
made to Acertain target corporations. Petitioner used that 
information to purchase stoct_:_ t~':' t_a_r~et companies. ; e 
made these purchases through t~~K Stock Exchange~ but 
did not disclose the nonpublic informatio;/to the sellers of 
the stock. In this way, he made substantial profits. 
The question in the cas~s whether petitioner's 
failure to disclose the nonpublic information lconstituted a 
-s~ 'I ' 
fr~. within the meaninq of 1\ § 10 (b). The answer to this 
question turns/ on whether petitioner owed a ~!.Y .to ~e=ak to 
the sellers from whom he purchased.lfFor reasons stated in 
~~~ 
the opinion of the Court~ we hold that a duty to disclose 
under this statut~oes ~t arise from the mere possessi?n~f 
nonpublic/ market information. -
It also was argued here that petitioner breached a 
ri..4 It>~ 4~~ 
e~ ,~ -
2. 
duty to the acquiring corporation - that is, the corporation 
that ~<ffo ~-~~· make the teRde~ offe~~. But this theory was 
"" not presented to the trial iury, /and accordingly we do not 
I 
decide whether or not such a duty exists. 
Section 10 (b) of the SQgwri ti-es l!:uefiaA'f~ Act/ is 
drawn in quite general terms. This is a criminal 
prosecution,f nd nothing in the legislative history suqqests 
a congressional inten;lto create a~y -;land consequent 
criminal liabilit~ - upon persons such as petitione~who are 
not corporate insiders / not fid:'ciaries, j and not persons in 
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judqment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Stevens has filed a concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice Brennan concurs in the judgment. 
The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whon Mr. Justice 
Marshall joins, also has filed a dissenting opinion. 
No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States 
No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States 
comes to this Court on a writ of ceritorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. The petitioner used nonpublic information 
that he acquired during the course of employment as 
a financial printer to purchase stock in companies 
that were soon to become targets of corporate 
takeover attempts. When the takeover attempts were 
made public, petitioner sold his stock at a profit. 
The petitioner was subsequently convicted of 
violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange Commission 
Rule 10b-5. His conviction was affirmed by the 
Second Circuit. 
We reverse. This case turns on whether the 
petitioner's failure to inform seller's of the 
target company stock that their holdings would soon 
become more valuable is fraudulent within the 
2. 
In this Court, the United States offered 
an alternative theory to support the petitioner's 
conviction. The United States argued that the 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring 
corporation when he used nonpublic information. 
Because this theory was not presented to the trial 
jury, we need not decide whether such a duty 
exists, or whether breach of such a duty is 
actionable under Section 10(b). 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS has filed a concurring 
opinion. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concurs in the 
judgment. THE CHIEF JUSTICE has filed a dissenting 
opinion. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. 
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Suprein.e Court RulesJoi Ptintef _ 
. . .·I . . . -- Jil • • I. 
Rejects Finding 
Of Sto·ck Fraud 
By LINDA GREENHOUSE 
Special to Tbe New YOit: T1Da 
WASHINGTON, March 18-The ·su-
preme Court today reversed the securi-
ties fraud conviction of a · financial 
printer who profited from his advance 
knowledge of corporate takeover bids. 
In an important legal test of the 
scope of the antifraud provisions of the 
Federal securities laws, the Court ab-
solved the printer of wrongdoing when 
he purchased stock in companies that 
were takeover targets. 
By a S.to-3 vote, the Court ruled that 
trading on the basis of "inside," or non-
public, information violates the anti-
fraud provisions only if the trader 
breaches a pre-existing relationship of 
trust with the other party to the trans-
action. 
Ruling a Blow to the S.E.C. 
I 
The printer in this case, employed by 
Pandick Press in New York, . had . no 
such relationship with those who sold 
their shares in the target companies on 
the open market, Associate Justice . 
Lewis F. Powell wrote for the majority. 
"He was not their agent, he was not a 
fiduciary, he was not a person in whom 
the sellers had placed their trust and 
confidence," Justice Powell said. "He 
was, in fact, a complete stranger who 
dealt with the sellers only through im· 
personal market transactions." 
Thz t-pinion, Chiarella v. U.S., No. 78-
1 ~02, was a blow to the Securities and 
E>:cha:,3e Commission, which in some 
recent enforc~ment actions had main- · 
tained that anyone with access to non-
public mar};et information must either 
disclose the information or refrain 
from trading on the basis of it. 
The United States Coun of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit endorsed this in-
terpretation when it affirmed the print-
er's criminal conviction, ruling that 
"anyone - corporate insider or not -
who regularly receives material non-_· 
public information may not use that in-
formation to trade in securities without 
incurring an affirmative duty to dis-
close." . 
\\-rule today's opinion rejected the 
--~ ··- J!! ' I • ..,• ... ;_ i# .J ..... "\1' • 
1 'market insider" category established 
by the Second ,Circuit's opinion, the 
Court appeared to leave the S.E.C. and 
Federal prosecutors considerable 
maneuvering room in future cases. 
, Justice Powell left open the question 
of whether the printer breached a fi-
ducia,ry duty to the companies making 
the tender offers, which hired his em-
ployer to print the prospectuses. Under 
ibis theory, the printer misappropri-
ated privileged information for his own 
use and committed a fraud on the ac-
quiring companies. 
The six-member majority said it was 
barred from reaching this issue be-
cause the prosecution had not pre-
sented that theory to the jury. Three 
Justices disagreed, writing that the 
"misappropriation" theory was in fact 
·before the jury. Chief Justice Warren 
E. Burger said be would affirm the con-
viction on that theory. The two other 
dissenters, Associate Justices Harry A: 
prohibitions. The provisions have long 
been held to apply to "corporate insid-
ers" -officers, directors and majority 
sharefJIIiders who, Justice Powell said 
today. "have an obligation to place the . 
share!lalder's welfare before their 
own!" 
By a:mtrast, Justiee Powell said, , 
there was no claim that Mr. Chiarella 
. was a -c:Orporate insider." Rather, he 
said, "the trial court instructed the 
·jury tiDat petitioner owed a duty to 
everyaae; to all sellers, indeed, to the 
market as a whole." 
Justice Powell continued: "Foi:mu-
latioo of such a broad duty, which de-
parts Ddically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises ·from a spe-
cific Rlationship between two parties, 
should. JM>t be undertaken absent some 
Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall, 
agreed with the Chief Justice but said 
they also believed the printer's conduct 
would have constituted fraud "even if 
he had obtained the blessing of his em-
ployer's principals before embarking 
on his profiteering scheme." 
- explicit. evidence of Congressional in-
Government lawyers indicated today 
that, following the Court's implicit invi-
tation, future prosecutions would be 
based on the misappropriation theory. ' 
Printer Made $30,000 From Trades 
The victor in today's case was Yin· 
cent F. Chiarella. Over a 14-month 
period, he handled announcements of 
four tender offers and one merger and 
made $30,000 by buYing stock in the tar-
get companies and then selling the 
shares as soon as the takeover bids 
were made public. 
The S.E.C., alerted by the New York 
Stock Exchange to the unusual trading 
activity, brought a civil enforcement 
proceeding against Mr. Chiarella. He 
entered a consent decree and returned 1 
his profits. He was then criminally 
prosecuted and convicted of violating 
the antifraud provisions, Section lO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5. 
Those provisions, which prohibit 
fraud or deceit in connection with se-
curities transactions, do not mention 
the word "insider," much less define 
the categories of traders ~d b}: the 
tent." . 
Evidalce of Congressional . intent, 
Justice Powell .said, in fact cuts the 
other way, against a notion of an a~ 
lute cA1ty to insure that all parties have 
equal access to market information. 
For example, under the Williams Act, · 
which regulates tender offers, the ac-
quiring party is allowed to buy up to 5 
percent of the target company's stock 
before revealing the takeover plans. 
·~we hold that a duty to disclose 
undeFSection lO(b) does not arise from 
the mere possession of nonpublic mar-
ket information," Justice Powell con-
cluded. The majority ruling was joined. 
by Associate Justices Potter Stewart, 
Byron R. White, William H. Rehnquist, 
John Paul Stevens and William J. \ 
Brennan Jr. 
THE WALL STREET JOl'R:\'AI., Wl·,hwsday, ~1:trl'h ll.}, 11.}8() ., 
Top Court LimitS 
View Involving 
'lnsid~r. Tra9ffig' . -
. . :.• . . 
It RUles .'in F~vor of Printer 
-· · Who BO~ht St6ck Based 
On Data,Obtained at Job 
.... 
B)l 0 wALL STilEI:T JOURNAL Bta!J R~ 
·WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court took 
a narrow view ·of what constitute( ~'insider 
trading" P,rohibited by anti~a\ld,P~vi~ons 
of federal securities law. . . 
By a six-to-three vote, the Justices re-
_buffed the federal ·government aDd . over· 
turned the criminal conviction of a financial 
printer who bought stock in _companies after 
! learning at the print shop that they were to 
1 be the targets of mergers or attempted take-
; overs. , , · · 
The Justices said the printer,' Vincent 
Chiarella, could be charged with securities 
i fraud only if he had a duty to disclose his 
I 
knowledge of impending transactions to per· 
sons selling him stock. In an opinion by Jus· 
tice Lewis Powell, the high court said Mr. 
Chiarella didn't have a duty to disclose his 
information because he didn't have· "prior 
dealings" with the stock sellers. 
But if the Justices found that Mr. Chi· 
arella didn't have an obligation to those sell· 
ing him stock, they expressly didn't decide 
the separate question .of whether he had a 
duty to his employer and to the print shop's 
customers to refrain from using information 
obtained on the job. 
The reaction from federal regulators and 
securities lawyers yesterday suggested that 
the ruling may have only limited impact on 
the .Securities and Exchange Commission's 
efforts to crack ·down on insider trading. The 
SEC brought a dozen civil suits charging in· 
I 
sider trading last year and has already I 
brought five this year. And in.New York, the 
1 U.S. Attorney' s office, which filed the crimi· 
nal charges against Mr. Chiarella, said it is 1 
"committed to bringing further insider-in· 
formation prosecutions. '' 
Paul Gonson, associate general counsel 
at the SEC, said the decision ·• really seems 
to reinforce quite strongly" the " traditional 
insider " theories of the commission. 
Insider cases usually involve attempts by 
corporate officials trading in stock to profit 
on secret corporate information they have 
obtained because of their positions. 
\ 
The reason the ruling may have on.ly 11m· 
!ted impact is because of the loophole, ad· 
dressed by several Justices wbo wrote sepa· 
rate dissents or concurring views. The 
court's majority said it wouldn't address 
any duty Mr. Chiarella might owe. to 'the 
: print · shop or its customer-comparues, ~ 
1 cause.,-the trial judge in New York didn t 
present that issue to the jury. 
But the majority left open the possibility . 
that if the issue had been before the jury, 
Mr.' Chiarella's conviction might have been 
upheld. JustiCe William Brennan said as 
much in an opinion concurring with the rna· 
jority .. ,.,Justiee John ·sterens, ·also conc~r­
ririg, :s&d that possibility .was ~pen to de-
Date . . -...... :·· :-·!- ........ ; ; 
I ~d three dissenters-ehiefJustice War· 
i ren Burger and Justices Harry Blackrnun 
: and Thurgood Marshall-all said the duty to 
i the employer was · a part of the' case ·and 
I
. could serve as the basis for .a. conviction.: 
, Some analysts said the case reflected a 
1 trend on the part of the Supreme Court. 
Harvey Pitt, former SEC general counsel 
currently in private law practice, noted that 
the particulars of the case were unusual. 
But Mr. Pitt said the case is " another effort 
by the court to restrict the broadest possible 
readings of the federal securities laws." Mr. 
Pitt said the Justices want to "confine the 
application of the securities laws to what ·the 1 
court perceives as the more traditional mores 
of the marketplace." : · . : .. , • I 
The Supreme Court decision reversed a 
ruling by the federal appeals court in New 
York, which had upheld Mr. Chiarella's con· 
viction. That appeals court ruling had ·sent 
tremors through the securities industry, 
which feared that it was so broad that nor· 
mal trading activities would be affected. 
Although the high court ruling limits fed· 
I
! era! officials' ability to act against insider 
trading on the basis of any duty to sellers of 
: stock, some federal officials were heartened 
by other aspects of the case. · 
The opinion, officials said, included the 
first official Supreme Court recognition of a 
landmark 1968 appeals court ruling that up· 
holds federal enforcement efforts against 
corporate officers who use secret inf?rma: 
tion for their own benefit. A footnote m the 
opinion also says the Justices weren't alt.er· 
ing the usual view that persons who rece1:ve 
tips from corporate insiders can be held ha· 
ble under federal securities laws. . 
Officials in the U.S. Attorney's office in 
New York said they would study the · opinion 
to see if it might be possible to prosecute 
Mr. Chiarella again under the theory that he 
owes a duty to his employer and its custom· 
ers. 
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Chiarella Court: Limits on Novel1 Ob-5 Actions 
( 
By Harvey L. Pitt 
Mr. Pill. a former Securities and 
Exchange Commission general colln-
sel. is a partner at Fried. Frank. Har-
ris. Shriver & Kampelman. H e filed 
an amicus curiae brief on behalf of 
the Securities lnd11strv Association in 
the case discussed in. this article. 
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volving information that emanated 
from outside the corporation to 
which the information relates-even 
casual sc rutiny of the majority opin-
ion reflects a decision of far broader 
scope and ·impact. 
vant. "' Vincent Chiarella, a printer. 
deciphered the identity of five public 
companies that were to be the targets 
of acquisition efforts by other com-
panies. This information was gleaned 
from confidential financial documents 
entrusted to Chiarella's employer for 
printing. 
Printer Gleans Info 
"The facts of the case were rather 
simple and. in contrast to other re-
cent securities law decisions ernanat- · 
ing from the Court, largely irrele-
As' a result of hi s sleuthing, Chiar-
ella entered into 17 pre-announce-
ment stock transactions, on various 
stock exchanges. and he made a 
healthy profit of $30,000 for his ef-
forts . Chiarella did not induce any 
trades, make any affirmative state-
ments (false or otherwise}, or have 
any contact with the target company 
shareholders whose stock Chiarella 
purchased. 
The Court did focus on three addi-
tional facts that may have influenced 
its judgment in favor of Chiarella: (I) 
As a result of an SEC consent de-
cree, Chiarella had already disgorged 
the entire $30.000 profit from his 
trades long before he was indicted for 
criminal prosecution ; (2} as a result 
of his creativity, Chiarella was fired 
from his job; and (3) the Court found 
it "worth noting" that this was "ap-
parently the first case in which crimi-
Continued on page 21 To seasoned observers of the Su-
preme Court. it should come as no 
surprise that the Court in Chiarella v. 
U.S., 1 its 23rd securities-law-related 
decision since 1975, continued an un- 'A Simplistic Approach to Recent FTC Cases' 
mistakable trend of restricting the • ---------------
scope and coverage of the federal se-
curities Jaws . 2 But, what surely must 
be viewed as a major surprise is the 
fact that the Burger Court (the Chief 
Justice dissenting), long viewed as a 
so-called "Jaw-and-order" court, 
overturned the criminal conviction of 
a "blue collar" worker, albeit a con-
viction predicated upon a "white col-
lar" crime. 
In many respects, the Chiarella de-
cision reflects the most substantive 
incursion by the Court (as currently 
constituted) into the meaning and ap-
plication of the antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities Jaws general-
ly, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 
JOb-5 particularly. Heretofore , most, 
although surely not all," of the 
Court's post- 1975 securities decisions 
have been confined to such procedur-
.al issues as standing to sue,' the exis-
tence (or, more properly , the non-ex-
istence) of implied remedies.' stan-
dards of proof." venue, 7 the 
definition of the term "security,"' 
and collateral estoppel." 
While it may be tempting to view 
Chiarella as a so-called "market in-
formation" case-that is, a case in-
Continued from page II 
First, although most business prac-
tices are designed to maximize prof-
its , firms usually exclude from their 
options those practices which appear 
to be illegal under current Jaw, even 
though they might be more profitable 
than the others. Hence to say, as Mr. 
Sims does. that an enforcement agen-
cy should not challenge business de-
cisions which are a logical or rational 
response to the firm's competitive sit-
uation is circular. 13 Literally, it 
would limit antitrust to rare irrational 
behavior. 
The critical issue in most cases, 
therefore, usually is not whether the 
practice was rational profit maximi-
zation but rather whether it unrea-
sonably interfered with the competi-
tive process. Resolution of this issue 
may well result in aggressive behav-
ior being held anticompetitive. There-
after, of course, the practice involved 
will be excluded from the set of op-
tions from which firms make profit 
maximizing choices. 
Second, the uncertainty which may 
result in a rational business decision 
----------------------------, 
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being held illegal is inherent in the 
case-by-case development of anti-
trust Jaw. The benefits of case-by-
case adjudication include making no 
new Jaw until a need has been dem-
onstrated, basing decision on a full 
factual record, and fitting relief to the 
peculiar facts of each case. The 
downside of these benefits is that as 
antitrust Jaw evolves, the inevitable 
changes cause uncertainty until 
enough cases have been decided to 
settle most of the new issues. 
For example, in White Motor ," the 
Supreme Court concluded that it did 
. not have enough experience with ver-
tical restraints to establish a per se 
rule. Several years later, the Anti-
trust Division argued in Schwinn 15 
for a rule of presumptive illegality, 
but the Court went further ahd adopt-
ed a per se rule. At that point, many 
firms must have felt that they had 
been second guessed. for various 
business deci sions designed to maxi-
mize profits were suddenly deemed 
per se illegal restraints . 
In Sylvania.'" based on the experi-
ence of ten years. much more exten-
sive ecqnomic analysis than had pre-
viously been available , and substan-
tial criticism of Sclno'inn. the cou rt 
reversed itself and reinstituted a rule 
of reason test for most vertical ar-
rangements. Under the new rule , 
there is substantial uncertainty at the 
moment about which arrangements 
are legal a nd which are not. U n-
doubtcdly , some managements are 
going to be surprised again to find the 
courts disagreeing with an assess-
ment of how profits may be maxi-
mized. 
It is worth keeping in mind, how-
ever, that the develomcnt of the Jaw 
in this fashion is fully consistent with 
the government's historic role of tak-
ing on the most difficult cases in or-
der to advance the Jaw . Some of the 
most innovative complaints, such as 
Philadelphia Nat'/ Bank" and Con-
tainer, ' 8 were filed by the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice "Department. 
Development of the Jaw is a particu-
larly appropriate role for the Federal 
Trade Commission since, unlike 
Sherman Act violations, no penalty is 
associated with violation of the FTC 
Act. 
The practices challenged in these 
recent FTC cases raise important an-
titrust issues which can be resolved 
under a rule of reason approach only 
after considerable enforcement expe-
rience. Rhetoric about second guess-
ing and "Catch 22" is far too simplis-
tic a reaction to them. 
1 £./. du Pont d~ Nemours & Co., Docket 
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Impact of Chiarella Dramatic in Private Actions · 
Continued from page 12 
nal liability has been imposed upon a 
purchaser for § IO(b) nondisclo-
surc."11 
The Court's recitation of these 
facts, which evidences its hostility to-
ward novel and possibly draconian 
applications of the federal securities 
laws, seems consistent with two im-
portant precepts articulated several 
times within the majority opinion-
that it is troublesome to impose Rule 
JOb-5 li abi lity on the basis of a theory 
that can be charactcrizeu as a "novel 
twist" of the common law ,12 and that 
many of the market · problems to 
which Rule JOb-5 conceivably might 
be applied are bes.t "addressed by de-
tailed and sophisticated regula-
tion."'" 
Two Choices 
While "glib generalizations" are an 
occupational hazard to be avoided 
where Rule IOb-5 cases a re in-
volved," the Chiarella decision 
thus broadly suggests the need for 
the SEC, in the future, either to rec-
oncile its proposed applications of 
Rule IOb-5 with the pre-existing sub-
stantive common law of fraud and de-
ceit, or to adopt "detailed and sophis-
ticated regulation[s]'' that will fairly 
apprise proposed defendants or re-
spondents of the activities sought to 
be proscribed . 
As the Court concluued, "a judicial 
holuing that certain undefined activi-
ties 'generally are prohibited' by 
§ JO(b) would rai se questions whether 
either criminal or civil defendants 
would be given fair notice that they 
have engaged in illegal activity."" 
This view-that novel or atypical 
applications of Rule JOb-5 unknown 
at common law may no longer be ac-
tionable'"--draws sustenance not 
only from the Court's repeated refer-
ences to, and reliance upon, common 
cept that finds some support in the 
general legislative history of the Se-
curities Exchange Act." 
Nevertheless. the Court's observa-
tion offers defendants and respon-
dents in SEC investigations and en-
forcement proceedings far greater 
latitude for argumentation than here-
tofore may have been thought to ex-
ist. Careful scrutiny of common law 
principles may well persuade the 
commission or an independent tribu-
nal to modify or reject an im<igina-
In maizy respects, the Chiarella decision reflects the 
most substantive incursion by the Court into the 
meaning and application of the antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws. 
law , 17 but also from the Court's 
rather quotable admonition that 
"Section JO(b) is aptly described as a 
catch-all provision , but what it 
catches must be fraud."" 
This latter observation rejects a 
number of previous appellate deci-
sions,•• as well as some pre-1975 Su-
preme Court decisions;• that had 
held that Section JO(b) and Rule !Ob-
5 were intended to pick up from 
where the common law-ended, a con-
tive, but novel , theory of Rule JOb-5 
liability . 
Moreover, the impact of this facet 
of the Chiarella decision will be felt 
even more dramatically in private 
damage actions, in which Rule JOb-5 
has always been invoked to attempt 
to bring unusual theories of law into 
the federal courts. 22 
Of course, the commission has an 
ample arsenal of specific rules and 
broad rulemaking authority at its dis-
With the tight leasing market 
in the Washington Metropolitan Area, 
you need 
posal. The Chiarella decision may 
encourage the SEC to channel its in-
genuity into new rulemaking ven-
tures , and to invoke other statutes 
and rules to sustain the agencY's the-
ories of law . 
Little "M:trket Information" 
Although Chiarella was widely 
viewed as a "market information" 
case. both by the lower courts" and 
by some commentators, 24 the Su-
preme Court's conclusions in Chiar-
ella have relatively scant connection 
with "market information ," and a 
much greater connection with general 
federal securities fraud under Rule 
!Ob-5. To be sure, the Court did dis-
cuss "market information," a term 
the Court never deigned to define, 
and seemingly concluded that 
-false statements about at 
least some forms of nonpub-
lic, matelial, market informa-
tion may be actionable under 
Rule !Ob-5;" and 
-a failure to disclose cer-
tain forms of material , non-
public, market information 
may be actionable, 26 if the 
person failing to disclose 
such market information was 
either a fiduciary of the buy-
ers or sellers, an agent of the 
buyers or the sellers, or was 
Continued on page 22 
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Chiarella Requires Basis in Common Law Liability 
Continued from page 21 
otherwise a person in whom 
the buyers or sellers had ap-
propriately been induced to 
place their trust and confi-
dence." 
But, the ultimate significance of 
the Chiarella decision will derive 
from its broad holdings about Rule 
IOb-5 generally. 
"market information," starting with 
the passing observation that neither 
the language nor the history of Sec-
tion IO(b) and Rule !Ob-5 indicates 
that "silence may constitute a mani-
pulative or deceptive device ." 29 
While gratuitous comments of this 
kind might ordinarily presage restric-
tions on the applicability of Rule IOb-
5 likely to be articulated in future 
cases, this particular observation 
seems of little moment: The Court 
acknowledged the fact that, both at 
common law and in early SEC en-
forcement actions, insiders who 
J 
established that an ,independent duty 
to disclose exists in any nondisclo-
sure case. And, the Court held that 
such a duty could arise only if the de-
fendant is an · insider, or a fiduciary, 
or a person having "a relationship of 
trust and confidence" with the other 
parties to the transaction. 31 
In this context, the Court noted 
that a noninsider who buys stock 
without disclosing material, nonpub-
lic, information could only be held to 
have a relationship of trust and confi-
dence with shareholders if the nonin-
sider is an agent of, or somehow un-
At the outset, the Court noted that 
subparagraph (b) of Rule IOb-5-
which proscribes the omission of ma-
terial facts necessary to make any 
statements made not misleading-
could have no application where the 
defendant "made no statements at all 
in connection with the purchase of 
stock ." 28 While this hardly seems 
controversial, it does suggest a great-
er need for precision in analyzing 
whether Rule IOb-5 has been violated 
at all, and in determining which, if 
any, of the Rule's provisions have 
been violated. Moreover, this passing 
observation by the Court confirms 
existing doubts whether a defendant's 
actions or implied representations, as 
opposed to actual speech, can be 
deemed to constitute "statements" 
·within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b). 
till Tl t t 
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In addition, throughout most of the 
majority opinion the Court's discus-
sion focused on applicability of Rule 
!Ob-5 to nondisclosure cases, wheth-
er or not the nondisclosures involve 
failed to disclose material, nonpublic, 
information about their own corpora-
tions had been held liable for fraud, if 
the insiders derived that information 
"by reason of their inside position 
with that corporation."'" 
Strict Test 
Nevertheless , the Court laid down 
a rather stringent test, restricting the 
imposition of Rule IOb-5 liability for 
mere silence , unless it could first be 
dertakes to act on behalf of, the sell-
ers. 
Of significance here is the implicit 
view of the Court that, at least in si-
lence cases, both privity and reliance 
are essential elements of a Rule I Ob-5 
cause of action. 32 Thus, the Court 
took pains to note that Rule 1Qb,5 "li-
ability is premised upon a duty to dis-
close arising from a relationship of 
trust and confidence beflveen parties 
to a transaction ."'" 
In rejecting the imposition of any r-------------------------------. liability upon Mr. Chiarella , the 
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Court confirmed this need for privity 
and reliance, finding it significant that 
he "was, in fact, a complete stranger 
who dealt with the sellers only 
through impersonal market transac-
tions."34 The CoUI1 noted that a 
duty to disclose can arise only "from 
the relationship between par-
ties ... " 35 
In part, this aspect of the· Court's 
opinion will make it difficult , if not 
(as a practical matter) virtually im-
possible, for ttie SEC or private liti-
gants to apply Rule IOb-5 to most 
noninsider cases involving mere si-
lence or inaction. Conceivably, the 
failure of non insiders to disclose cer-
tain kinds of market information in a 
face-to-face transaction might be ac-
tionable,>• but the Court certainly 
did not offer would-be plaintiffs any 
encouragement in that regard. 
Aiding and Abetting 
Of even greater potential signifi-
cance is the impact the Chiarella de-
cision is likely to have on SEC aiding 
and abetting cases, and SEC Rule 
JOb-5 cases against corporate attor-
neys, where silence or inaction is of-
ten an essential element of the SEC's 
charges . In those situations, Chiar-
ella may serve to bar !he imposition 
of aiding and abetting liability; in-
deed, it should be recalled that the 
Supreme Court has already shrouded 
the existence of any civil Rule !Ob-5 
aiding and abetting liability with con-
siderable doubt. 31 
To the extent that the courts have 
imposed liability upon one who aids 
and abets another person's violation 
of Rule IOb-5, the decisions have re-
quired a three-pronged showing: (I) a 
violation by the primary tortfeasor; 
(2) actual knowledge by the alleged 
aider and abettor of the unlawful con-
duct by the primary tortfeasor; and 
(3) the alleged rendition, by the aider 
and abettor, of "substantial assis' 
tance" to the primary tortfeasor." 8 
Of course, as recent cases make 
clear, the standards for imposing li-
ability on aiders and abettors may 
surely not be less stringent than the 
standards for imposing liability upon 
a primary tortfeasor in comparable 
circumstances?• Thus, Chiarella 
certainly suggests that, in the ab-
sence of some affirmative and pre-ex-
isting relationship between an alleged, 
aider and abettor and those who were 
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allegedly injured by the aider and 
abettor's silence or inaction, Rule 
lOb-5 liability simply may not exist.•• 
This conclusion may also apply to 
the potential liability of corporate at-
torneys who offer securities Jaw ad-
vice to their corporate clients. Where 
false opinion letters have been given, 
and investors are made aware of 
those opinions, liability under Rule 
lOb-5 has not been deemed inappro-
priate, and may still not be inappro-
priate even after the Chiarella deci-
sion ."• 
But, a different result may obtain 
where a corprate lawyer does not 
take what the SEC may view as ap-
propriate steps to require his or her 
corporate clients to make full disclo-
sure or to redress past disclosure vio-
lations. Assuming that the lawyer's 
specific presence on the corporate 
scene and the lawyer's advice to the 
client are unknown to investors, as is 
often the case, the imposition of Rule 
lOb-5 liability after Chiarella seems 
doubtful. Of such lawyers it surely 
could be said, as the Court said of 
Mr. Chiarella: they "had no prior 
dealings with" investors who might 
sell stock; they are not persons "in 
whom the sellers [have] placed their 
trust and confidence;" and they are, 
"in fact, ... complete stranger[s) to 
the transaction" with no relationship 
to investors ." 
Presumably, in such a situation, 
the SEC might argue that, if a prima-
ry tortfeasor' s violation has been es-
tablished, the concept of aiding and 
abetting should not require the gov-
ernment to establish a pre-existing re-
lationship between a corporate attor-
ney and the. corporation's sharehold-
ers . And, the SEC might urge that 
corporate shareholders are also the 
corporate attorney's clients. 
Whatever moral appeal this line of 
argument has had for the SEC, how-
ever, it cannot be gainsaid that the 
Chiarella decision requires a major 
reevaluation of that theory's under-
pinnings. An attorney who is inactive 
or silent after a client rejects the at-
torney' s advice arguably has in no 
way induced any securities transac-
tion or caused any party to a particu-
lar securities transaction to take ac-
tion in reliance upon the attorney's 
silence. And, it is doubtful whether 
common law would have held such 
' , 
an attorney liable for securities 
fraud." 
Equal Access 
The Chiarella case is significant 
also because of its rejection of a the-
ory often relied upon by the SEC"-
that Rule IOb-5 is designed to pre-
serve the integrity of the securities 
"market as a whole" by fostering "a 
system providing equal access" to 
material. nonpublic, information•• In 
a sweeping passage of its opinion, the 
Court refused to endorse the imposi-
tion of a generic duty under Rul!! IOb-
5 to the securities marketplace , and 
refused, further, to conclude that all 
instances of unequal · access to, or all 
unfair or undisclosed uses of, materi-
al, nonpublic, information, are neces-
sarily unlawful. 
In the absence of the existence of a 
clear duty between a buyer and seller 
that "arises from a specific relation-
ship between two parties," 46 the 
Court refused to formulate "such a 
broad duty, which departs radically 
from ... established [common law] 
doctrine ... ," and for which there is 
no supporting "evidence [that] 
emerges from the language or legisla-
tive history of§ IO(b)."" 
Despite its obviOus and inevitable 
negative impact on the SEC's future 
enforcement program, though, the 
Chiarella decision is not completely 
adverse to the government. The deci-
sion certainly does suggest (although 
it does not precisely so hold)' 8 the 
Court's approval of the application of 
Rule IOb-5 to insiders who do not dis-
close material facts they have learned 
as a result of their inside positions, as 
had been in the Cady, Roberts'" and 
Texas Gulf Sulphur•• cases. 
And, the Court also seems to ac-
cept (although, again, it does not ex-
pressly so hold) that "tippees" of cor-
porate insiders may be held liable, 
under Rule IOb-5, for a failure to dis-
close nonpublic, material , inside in-
formation , but only where the tippees 
(I) receive a profit (2) from the use of 
inside information (3) that the tippee 
knows is confidential and ( 4) that the 
The impact Chiarella is 
expected to have on aiding 
and abetting cases is even 
more significant. 
tippee knows or should have known 
came from a corporate insider ' ' 
Although the Court did not, in so 
many words, embrace these hold-
ings , it seems to have accepted them , 
removing any lingering doubts about 
the SEC's authority to pursue tradi-
tional insider securities fraud. More-
over, as noted earlier, the Court en-
couraged the SEC to utilize its broad 
rulemaking authority to proscribe 
other market-related conduct the 
agency believes is detrimental to the 
integrity and proper functioning of 
the securities markets." 
It is difficult, if not impossible , to 
avoid reading current Supreme Court 
securities law decisions either too 
broadly or too narrowly, depending 
on the reader's affiliation, perspec-
tive and institutional biases . But . 
surely no one could disagree that the 
Chiarella decision is both substan-
tively significant and materially ad-
verse to the SEC's expansive use and 
reliance upon Rule IOb-5 to cope with 
securities-related activities it finds 
objectionable. 
Although the Supreme court con-
tinues to refer to Rule IOb-5 as a 
"catchall,"" such references seem 
now to be artificial and inaccurate . 
And, in light of the result in Chiar-
ella, it must be wondered whether the 
SEC's decision to support the grant 
of a writ of certiorari in the Aaron 
case was a strategic error." 
As between Rule IOb-5 and the 
commission, the former seems these 
days to be catching very lillie, and 
the latter seems to be a "catch-all" 
for the brunt of the Supreme Court's 
antagonism toward broad readings of 
the general antifraud provisions of 
the federal securities laws. After 
twenty-three decisions in less than 
five years, it does not seem to be a 
process that is likely to abate anytime 
soon, in the absence of congressional 
action. 
1 48 U.S.L.W. 4250 (U.S., Mar. 18, 1980) . 
In add ition to the Chiarelfa decision, the 
Court has rendered the following twenty·two 
securities·related decisions: Boeing Co. v. 
Van Gemert, 48 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S .. Feb. 
19, 1980); Transamerica Morlgage Advisors, 
Inc . v. Lewis, 48 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S .. Nov. 
13, 1979); Leroy v. Great Weslem Uniled 
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Touche Ro,-s & 
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 ( 1979) ; Unit· 
ed States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); 
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U .S. 471 (1979);/nterna· 
Iiana/ Brotherhood of Teamsler.s v. Daniel, 
439 U.S. 551 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co .. 
In c. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); S.curities 
and Exchange Commission v. Sloan. 436 
U.S. 103 (1978); £.1. DuPont deNemours and 
Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977); Santa Fe 
lndustrit-s. In c. v. Gr~en, 430 U.S. 462 
(1977) ; Piper v. Chris-Craft lnduslries, Inc ., 
430 U.S. I (1977); TSC Industries. In c. v. 
Northway, In<·., 425 U.S. 438 ( 1976); Radwn· 
ower v. Touche Ross & Co .. 426 U.S. 148 
(1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185 ( 1976); Foremosi-McKennsnn, Inc . v. 
Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232 ( 1976) ; 
United States v. Na1ional Association of Se-
curities Dealers, In c .. 422 U.S . 694 (1975); 
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc ., 
422 U.S. 659 (1975); Rondeau v. Mosinee Pa· 
per Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); United Hous· 
ing Foundation In c. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 
( 1975): Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Securities Inves-
tor Proteclion Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 
(1975). . 
2 See, e.g., Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the 
Williams Act A/ler Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship 
on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. Law. 117, 120. 
162 , 162 (1978); cited with approval in Can· 
non v. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677, 
47 U.S.L.W. 4549, 4554 n. 24 1979). 
3 See Santa Fe Indus., In c. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462 ( 1977) (to be actionable under Rule 
IOb-5. an alleged fraudulent transaction must 
involve either deception or manipulation; the 
mere breach of a fiduciary duty is simply in-
sufficient); United States v. Naftalin, 441 
U.S. 76R (1979) (the antifraud provisions of 
Securities Act § 17(a) are lobe applied broad· 
ly to protect any class of victims, and not just 
investors). 
4 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor DrttK Stores, 
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only an actual purcha<er 
or <Jeller of securities ha s s tanding to maintain 
an implied damage ac tion under Rule 10b·5): 
Piper v. Chri.f-Craftlndustries, In c .. 430 U.S. 
I ( 1977); (a defeated lender offeror lacks 
standing to maintain an implied damage ac~ 
tion under Securith:s Exchange Act 14(e)) . 
5 Trnn.wmrrica MortRORt' Advisors, In c. v. 
Lewis, 48 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S .. Nov. 13 . 
1979) (no damage remedy may be implied for 
violations of the antifraud provisions of the 
Investme nt Advisers Act of 1940); 1fJuche 
Ross & Co. v. RediiiRtOII, 442 U.S. 560 ( 1979) 
(no private damage action may be implied for 
violation'i of Securities Exchange Act Section 
17(a)) . 
"Ernst & Ern>·t v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185 (1976) (Scienter is a necessary element of 
the plaintiff s affirmative case in an implied 
damage action under Rule 10b·5); TSC Indus· 
trie.f, In c. v. Nortlrwlly, In c: .. 426 U.S. 438 
( 1978) (defining the concept of "materiality" 
for purposes of an implied damage action un-
der Securitie.~ Exchange Act Rule 14a-9) . 
7 Lnoy v. Great Western UniJed Corp., 
443 U.S. 173 (1979) (venue for purposes of 
challenging state takeover laws); Radzanown 
v. Touche fl oss & Co .. 426 U.S. 148 (1976) 
(venue for purposes of securities antifraud 
suits against nation!:tl banks). 
8 United /lousing Foundation In c. v. For-
mun, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shares of "stock" 
in a cooperative housing project are not secu~ 
rities); lnlernatimwl Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Du11il'l, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (involun· 
tary. noncontributory, pension plan interests 
are not securities). 
Despite its obvious negative 
impact on the SEC's future 
enforcement, the decision is 
not completely adverse. 
"Park/an• liosi"y Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322 (1979) (contested adjudication of factual 
matters against a defendant in SEC litigation 
collaterally estops the same defendant from 
contesting the samt facts in subsequent pri-
vate litigation) . 
10 In Chiarella, the Court summarized the 
operative facts in three paragraphs . Compare 
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., supra, 
where the Court set forth the facts and back- · 
ground of lhe case in 21 pages, 430 U.S. at 1-
21. 
11 48 U.S .L.W. al 4253 n. 20 (emphasis 
suprlied). 
!d., al 4251. 
13 !d., al 4253. 
14 See Securities and Exchangt Commis-
sion v. Na1ional Securities, Inc ., 393 U.S. 
453. 465 ( 1969) . 
" 48 U .S.L. W. al 4253 n . 20 (emphasis 
supr,lied). 
' This conclusion, which focuses on due 
process and fair notice , thus does not upset , 
but appropriately circumscribes, the vener· 
able notion that the choice between atl hoc 
adjudication and rulem'aking is a choice that 
lies primarily within the inrormed discretion 
of the agency. See Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
209 ( 1947) . Compare Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Final Report of Jhe SEC Major 
Issues Conference l -3 (Jan. 15, 1977) (SEC 
should rely more on rulemaking and interpre-
tive guidance and less on ad hoc enforcement 
activities). 
17 48 U.S.L.W. al 4251, 4252 & n. 14 , 
4253. 
•• !d., al 4253. 
19 See, e.!(., A .T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 
375 F.2d 393. 397 (C.A. 2, 1967); Myzel v. 
Fields. 386 F.2d 718,739 (C.A. 8, 1967), cer· 
1iorari dtnil'd, 390 U.S. 951 (1%8); flooptr v. 
Mountuin States Securilies Corp., 282 F.2d 
195, 201 (C.A. 5, 1960), certiorari denied, 365 
U.S. 814 (1961). But see Frigitemp Corp. v. 
Financial Dynamic::r Fund, In c., 524 F. 2d 
275, 282 (C.A . 2, 1975). 
20. Superintendent of lnsuraru:e v. Ban/..ers 
Life & Casualty Co .. 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); 
Affilialed U1e Ci1iuns v. Uniled Slates, 406 
U.S. 128. 151 (1972); cf. United States v. 
Na(talill, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979). 
21 H.R. Rep . No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess . 5 (1934); S. Rep. No. 792. 73d Cong., 
2d Ses.. 6 (1934) . Of course. there is no 
meaningful legislative history of Section tO(b) 
at all. and there exists somewhat negative ad-
ministrative history surrounding the adoption 
of Rule 10b·5, suggesting thai Rule IOb-5 was 
intended lo fulfill only limited purposes. Su 
Securities Exchange Acl Release No. 3230 
(May 21, 1942) , 13 Fed. 1/eg. 8t83 (Dec. 22, 
1948) . 
22 See, t.g., Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of 
the UJility of Privale Litigation Undtr the 
Federal Securities Laws, 5 Sec. Reg. L. J. l 
(1977). 
23 United Swtes v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 
95 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed. 588 F.2d 1358 (C.A. 
2, 1978) . 
24 See, e.g., Pitt, Judicial Developments in 
Civil Liabilities under the Fedeml Securities 
Laws at 308-341 (Univ. of Calif. Outline, Jan. 
16·18 , 1980) . 
2 ' 48 U.S.L.W. al 4252. 
28 The Court seemingly holds that no cause 
of action can ever be predicated upon market 
information that does ''not concern the earn-
ing power or operations of the target com· 
par:rld: ." 48 U.S.L.W. at 4252. 
28 !d., at 4251 n . 5. 
29 ld .. at 4251. 
30 !d. (emphasis supplied). 
31 !d., al 4252. · · 
32 The Court seemingly ruled out the same 
requirements in affirmative misrepresentation 
cases . Su 48 U.S.L.W. al 4251. 
33 !d., al 4252 (emphasis supplied). 
34 !d. 
35 !d. , al 4252 n. 14. 
36 See n. 26, supra. 
37 See Ernst & Ernst v. flochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185 , 191 n. 7 (1976). 
38 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth , Eastma11 Dillon 
& Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44·46 (C.A. 2), c"-
tiorari denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). 
39 See, t.g., Edwards & Hanly v. Wells 
Fargo Securities Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 
478, 484 (C.A. 2, 1979). certiorari denied, 48 
U.S.L.W. 3463 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1980); Wood-
ward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 
95'\,c.;:·u\.'t~: at 4252. , 
41 See, e.g. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 
(C.A. 2, 1973) . 
'
2 48 U .S.L. W. al 4252. 
43 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§876 (1979). 
"48 U.S .L.W. al 4252. 
"Id. 
' 6 Td., at 4252-4253. 
"!d., al 4253. 
' 8 48 U.S.L.W. at 4251. 
' 9 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 
(1961) . 
$O Securities and Exchangt Commission v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (C.A. 
2, 1968) (en bam.:), certiorari denied, sub 
nom., Coates v. Securities and Exchange 
CummiS>·ion, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
~ 1 lei., at 4252 n. 12. See also, Securities 
ami Exchange Commission v. Monarch 
Fund, 608 F.2d 938 (C. A. 2, 1979). 
"48 U.S.L.W. al 4253 & nn. 15- 18. 
.a Td .. al 4253. 
54 Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Aaron. 605 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir.) certiorari 
granted 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S., Ocl. 15, 
1979) . 
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By John F. Olson 
Mr. Olson is a :partner at Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher. 
After an appropriate gestation pe-
riod, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has given birth to Rule 
J4e-3, 1 which is both the latest in the 
SEC's efforts to regulate tender offers 
and the commission's .resp'onse to the 
Supreme Court's. decision in the 
Chiarella case. 2 
Rule 14e-3 . has four principal pro-
visions: 
..,.. It imposes a duty ·to "disclose or 
refrain" from trading, or causing oth-
' ers to trade, in securities which may 
be subject to a tender offer, on any 
person who has material, non-public 
. information about the offer or pro-
posed offer if the person knows or has 
reason to know that the information 
has been obtained directly or indirect-
ly from the offeror, the target, or their 
respective insiders. (Rule 14e-3(a).) 
,. The rule provides an exemption 
from its .broad reach for multi-service 
financial institutions, such as broker-
dealer firms and banks, which are or-
ganized so that the institution's buy/ 
sell decisions are made by employees 
who arc msulatcd trom mtormat1on 
held by other parts of the firm which, 
as :\l.lv\set"s to t c o cror or the target 
or otherwise, acquire material, non-
public information about a tender of-
fer. 
To take. advantage of this exemp-
tion, the institution must carry the 
burden of showing both that the in-
vestment decision-makers had no ac-
tual knowledge of the non-public in-
formation and that the institution has 
implemented procedures which are 
"reasonable under the circum-
stances" to prevent seepage of mate-
rial information between depart-
ments. (Rule 14e-3(b).) 
Jll> Rule 14e-3 also exempts from its 
reach sales made to the· offeror or its 
agents, although existing restrictions 
· of Rtlle 14e-3, the commission makes 
no bones about the fact that it is in-
tended as a direct response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Chiarella. 
Nine pages of the 42-page release are 
directed to an analysis-some would 
. say a revision-of the majority opin-
ion in Chiarella. 
In that case, Mr. Chiarella, a finan-
cial printer's employee who had de-
ciphered the identity of five tender of-
fer targets on the basis of his own ' 
sleuthing in the print shop, purchased 
shares of the targets to his profit. The 
Supreme Court held that he could not 
the Court quite properly recognized, 
as numerous commentators have 
done, the much greater conceptual· 
and public policy difficulties which 
are inherent in imposing liability for 
non-disclosure of market information 
which docs not originate with the is-
suer or an insider who has fiduciary 
duties to the issuer and its .sharehold-
ers. 
The emphasized language in the 
commission's footnote is an attempt 
to square the SEC's position with the 
(:ourt's holding by assuming away the 



















In its characteiistically 1-/uberesqtte release announcing 
. adoption of Rule 14e-3, the commission makes no 
bones about thefact that it is inte,nded as a direct 
response to· the Supreme Court's decision in 'Chiarella'. 
. ' 
rers unc 
ments. 1 ~ 
Thus, 
disclose 





get, or s 
one of tl 
be sent to jail for criminal violation 
of §lOb of the Securitie.s and --Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule tOb-5. 
The Court held that Mr. Chiarella 
owed no duty · to the sellers of the 
shares, who were strangers to him, to 
break h1s Silence as to tne reasons for 
his purchases. 
In the words of Jnstice Powell, the 
author of the majority op1:1!on, 
"When an allegation of fraud is based 
upon nondisclosure. there can be no 
fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold 
that a duty to disclose under §lO(b) 
does not arise from the mere posses-
sion of nonpublic me!rket informa-
tion."4 (Emphasis supplied.) 
Although the Court itself indicated 
that its holding was not intended to 
undercut true insider trading or insid-
er tippee cases such as Cady, Rob- · 
erts 5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur 6 and the 
Court preserved the reach of § IOb-5 
in cases involving fiduciaries who 
trade with their beneficiaries ,7 the 
SEC apparently is not satisfied with 
,;::m:l 




· Flirtation with Equal Access even in 
It is clear from the · footnote just ample, 
quoted and another 1ootnote ·in· the re- . not rca 
leasc0 that the commission, or at least custo 
the members of the staff ·.vho wrote an issu 
the release, have not given up on their fi>r a tc 
flirtation with a general rule requiring ysis of 
equal access to all kinds of material tion. N 
. information, whether true inside the tra 
("corporate") information or market tender 
information. 
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rs42 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
tion, by itself, does not give rise to a disclosure obligation, nor 
is it enough that Chiarella's trading was "unfair." 22 Judge 
Meskill also criticized the majority's distinction between pre-
announcement purchases by tender offerors and purchases by 
individuals in Chiarella's position, pointing out that rule rob-s 
precedent does not support the view that the degree of economic 
risk assumed by a trader determines his liability.23 
Although the court's refusal to insist on access to the issuing 
corporation represents a novel application of rule rob-s, the 
duty to disclose or abstainfrom trading does not depend on the 
existence of an access relationship.24 It is true that rule rob-s 
prohibits fraud/" and that according to common law fraud 
principles, nondisclosure is actionable only where there is an 
access relationship.26 This fact may partially explain Judge 
Meskill's reluctance to join the majority.27 However, rule rob-s 
prohibits more than ordinary fraud; it was adopted in part 
because existing common law did not provide investors with 
sufficient protection.28 The courts have recognized this remedial 
purpose in interpreting the rule; they have repeatedly insisted 
that it is not simply a codification of common law fraud. 29 As 
Chief Judge Kaufman implies, the question whether a disclose-
22 S88 F.2d at I374-7S· 
23 I d. at 13 7 S. 
24 The rule does not explicitly state that access is required. Indeed, it reg-
ulates trading by "any person." See note r supra. 
25 See id. 
26 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. S30, r6 P.2d S3I (1932) (directors 
and officers have fiduciary duty to disclose facts to a shareholder). There are 
apparently no common law cases imposing disclosure duties on persons without 
access. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note r, at 1446-48; 6 id. at 3SS6-s8. 
Indeed, the majority of jurisdictions have held that access alone will not give 
rise to a duty of disclosure at common law. See 3 id. at 1446. 
27 See 588 F.2d at I374-7S· Judge Meskill cited W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 
TIIE LAw OF TORTS 694-99 (4th ed. r97r), in addition to 3 L. Loss, supra note 
r, at I44S-74; 6 id. at 3SS6-70. 
28 See r A. BROMBERG, supra note r, § 2.2, at 22.6-.8 (discussion of origins 
of rule rob-S). See generally id. at ss-s6. 
29 See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F .2 d I9S, 20r (Sth 
Cir. 1960) (" [rob-s] greatly expands the protection frequently so hemmed in 
by the traditional concepts of common law misrepresentation and deceit, the 
requirement of privity, proof of specific damage, inadequacy of the right of 
rescission"), cert. denied, 36S U.S. 8r4 (r96r); accord, SEC v. Great Am. 
Indus., 407 F.2d 4S3, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (Kaufman, J., concurring); 
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 '(7th Cir. 1963); cj. Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. r28, rsr (1972) (rule should be construed 
flexibly in order to effectuate its remedial purpose). But cj. Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 42S U.S. r&s, 214 (1976) (when statute speaks in "commonly under-
stood terminology of intentional wrongdoing," it should not be extended to cover 
negligent conduct). 
1979] MARKET INSIDERS 1543 
or-abstain duty is appropriate must be answered in light of the 
relevant policies. 
The primary objective of a disclose-or-abstain rule is the 
equalization of access to material information.30 Active pursuit 
of this goal will promote investor confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of the securities market.31 The courts must also recog-
nize, however, the importance of preserving incentives for 
legitimate economic effort, such as gathering new information or 
perceptively analyzing generally available facts. 32 For example, 
trading by the researcher who concludes on the basis of publicly 
available information that a stock is undervalued should be 
permitted; his analysis and subsequent investment in the stock 
will enhance the efficient allocation of resources.33 
The access requirement described by Judge Meskill, which 
covers trading by corporate insiders and their tippees, does im-
plement, within its range of application, the policies which must 
be considered in designing a disclose-or-abstain rule. Imposing 
disclosure obligations on persons with access to the issuing 
corporation increases public confidence in the fairness of the 
securities market. In addition, there is no interference with the 
desire to reward legitimate economic effort.34 The same policies, 
30 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F .2d 228, 
236 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851- 52 
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); cf . Speed v. Transamerica 
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8, 829 (D. Del. I9·5I) (rule is aimed at equalization of 
bargaining positions) . Sec generally 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note I, §§ 12 .1-.2, 
at 267-80 (policies underlying rule rob-s). 
31 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the R es ponsi-
bility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 816 (1973); cf. 
Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 
8o HARV. L. REV. 23, 27 (1966) (impact of insider trading on investor confidence 
in Germany). In addition to promoting investor confidence, strict disclosure 
rules will enhance the efficient allocation of investment resources. See Fleischer, 
Mundheim & Murphy, mpra, at 816. 
32 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 816- 17; Leech, 
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 742 (1956). Several 
decisions have recognized the importance of preserving the incentives for per-
ceptive analysis of generally available facts. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 39'4 U.S. 976 
(1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E .C. 907, 915 (1961). 
33 See S. ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKET 47-49 (1966) . But cf. R. POSNER, 
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 324- 26 (2d ed. 1977) (questioning effectiveness of 
securities analysis). 
34 Depriving corporate insiders and their tippees of the opportunity to ex-
ploit informational advantages will not significantly reduce the corporation's 
incentives to gather new information or to analyze publicly available facts. In 
the case of a mineral discovery, for example, the corporation will still profit 
even if its insiders cannot trade; a disclose-or-abstain rule will not significantly 
reduce investment in exploration. But see H . MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE 
.. . . 
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however, suggest that a disclose-or-abstain rule should also be 
applied to individuals in Chiarella's position, even when they 
obtain information from a source outside the issuing corporation. 
Prohibiting the employees of financial printing firms from trad-
ing on the basis of information acquired during the course of 
their employment will enhance public confidence in the fairness 
of the securities market. Furthermore, prohibiting such trading 
will not interfere with anyone's incentives to gather new informa-
tion or to analyze publicly available facts. Thus, the require-
ment that there be access to the issuing corporation leaves a 
substantial gap in the disclose-or-abstain rules. 
In an effort to close this gap, the Chiarella court created the 
new "market insider" category, defined to include persons who 
regularly receive material nonpublic information. As Chief Judge 
Kaufman intended, the "regular receipt" test will limit trading 
by the "cogs" and "auxiliaries" of the securities industry-
persons who, because they provide vital market services, have 
regular access to nonpublic information.35 More specifically, the 
regular receipt test will certainly cover the employees of financial 
printing firms; it might also be expected to cover the personnel 
of various law firms, financial institutions, and government 
agencies.36 
Although the court's refusal to insist on access to the issuing 
corporation is appropriate, its regular receipt test must still be 
evaluated in light of the policies underlying rule Iob-s. Ordi-
narily, imposing disclose-or-abstain obligations on persons who 
regularly receive nonpublic information will serve these policies. 
In certain situations, however, applying rule Iob-s to market 
insiders will stifle legitimate investigative activity. More spe-
cifically, although the regular receipt test justifiably protects 
trading by tender offerors, it will restrict trading by certain 
tippees of tender offerors, even though it might be argued that 
such trading is desirable. 
As Chief Judge Kaufman was careful to explain, the regular 
receipt test excludes tender offerors from the class of market 
insiders, since they are not the regular recipients of nonpublic 
information concerning any stock but their own. The court's 
conclusion that disclosure obligations should not be imposed on 
STOCK MARKET 131-45 (rg66) (insider trading is the only satisfactory incentive 
for entrepreneurial activities). For a criticism of Manne, see Schotland, Unsafe 
at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 
VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967). 
35 588 F.2d at 1364-65. 
36 Although Chief Judge Kaufman does not mention this point, it would also 
be reasonable to impose disclose-or-abstain obligations on the tippees of market 
insiders. 
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tender offerors is correct, although its reliance on the degree of 
economic risk undertaken as a justification for this conclusion 
is misplaced.37 A more straightforward explanation for the dis-
tinction between tender offerors and persons like Chiarella would 
have emphasized the fact that tender offerors are engaged in 
activity roughly analogous to that of securities analysts; they 
also investigate corporations on the basis of publicly available 
information, in order to determine whether a stock is under-
valued and represents a sound investment.38 This is precisely 
the sort of activity that should be encouraged, since it promotes 
the efficient allocation of investment resources.39 
If a disclose-or-abstain rule were applied to the tender offeror, 
however, the incentives for its investigation of the potential 
target would be substantially reduced. As Chief Judge Kaufman 
noted, under the Williams Act, the tender offeror may purchase 
up to five percent of the shares of the target company before dis-
closing its intention to make a takeover bid.40 Such purchases are 
desirable from the tender offeror's point of view, because they 
reduce the cost of the acquisition plan, and increase the likeli-
hood that it will be able to acquire control of the target. If the 
tender offeror must disclose its intentions even before it reaches 
the five percent limit, however, the cost of its acquisition plan will 
be substantially increased, given the likelihood that announcement 
of the impending takeover bid will have a significant impact on 
the cost of the target's stock. In fact, in some cases, the cost of 
acquiring the necessary shares may be so great that the tender 
offer will collapse.41 
Although the regular receipt test correctly excludes tender 
offerors from the class of market insiders, it will not protect 
3 7 Chief Judge Kaufman explicitly rejected an argument which distinguished 
between persons like Chiarella and tender offerors because the latter have a 
legitimate business purpose and are promoting economic growth. 588 F.2d at 
1368 n.xs. 
38 See generally Barnhill, The Corporate Raider: Contesting Proxy Solicita-
tions and Takeover Offers, 20 Bus. LAw. 763, 764-65 (1965); Brudney, A Note 
on Chilling Tender Offer Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 6o9, 625-34 (x¢7); 
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, II$ U. PA. L. 
REV. 317, 325 (1967); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 
73 ]. PoL. EcoN. uo, u2-13 (1965). 
39 Indeed, the efficiency arguments are stronger with respect to tender offerors 
than they are with respect to securities analysts. Trading by analysts simply 
helps ensure that stock market prices reflect true economic value. Tender offerors 
purchase stock so that they can actually acquire control of a company and 
manage its underutilized assets more efficiently. 
40 See p. 1540 & note I 7 supra. 
41 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 8II. 
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trading by certain tippees of tender offerors.42 In particular, 
Chiarella might be applied to limit the common practice of 
"warehousing," 43 whereby tender offerors obtain the assistance 
of institutional investors in financing their takeover bids.44 If 
the tender offeror lacks the funds necessary to make the preoffer 
market purchases permitted by the Williams Act, it might seek 
a loan from a bank. Frequently, however, banks are not willing 
to finance tender offers unless they are assured that a controlling 
block of the target's stock will be available as security for the 
loan.45 Thus, the tender offeror may urge institutional investors 
to buy stock, with the expectation that their acquisitions 
will be tendered when the takeover bid is announced. In effect, 
warehousing serves as an interim financing device, until the 
tender offeror has acquired control of the target.46 
An institutional investor that frequently engages in ware-
housing would be a market insider, and therefore subject to a 
disclose-or-abstain rule, since it regularly receives nonpublic 
information from tender offerors.47 Arguably, however, a 
42 In most cases, tippees of tender offerors should not be permitted to trade, 
because their trading does not implicate the desire to preserve incentives for 
investigative activity. For example, there is no reason why trading by the 
relative of an employee of a tender offeror should be protected. See generally 
p. IS48 infra. 
43 See generally 4 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. 
No. 92-64, 92d Cong., ISt Sess. 2273 (I97I) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR STUDY]; 5 id . at 2828-29, 2832-37, 2848; Fleischer, Mundheim & 
Murphy, supra note 3I, at 8II-I5. 
44 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 3I, at 8I2-I4; 5 INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 43, at 2828-29, 2836-37, 2848. 
4 5 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 43, at 2828 j Fleischer, Mund-
heim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 814. 
4 6 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 814. It is important 
to recognize that warehousing will probably not be permitted where it constitutes 
part of a scheme to avoid the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. For 
example, it is unlikely that a tender offeror would be allowed to ask each of 
II institutional investors to purchase 5% of the target's stock, thereby ensur-
ing, without announcing its intentions, that the stock necessary to achieve control 
is in friendly hands. See 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 43, at 
2835; E . ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 17, at 25-29. See also Thomas, 
Warehousing, 3 REv. SEc. REG. 975,977 (1970). 
47 Chief Judge Kaufman might be willing to exclude certain persons from the 
class of market insiders when they are engaged in particularly risky trading; 
economic risk was the basis for his distinction between tender offerors and 
persons like Chiarella, see pp. I54o-41 supra. Yet an examination of the degree 
of risk undertaken, which is of dubious analytical value in any event, would be 
of no assistance here; the institutional investor's profits are almost as certain 
as Chiarella's. Of course, its profits are not guaranteed, since the takeover bid 
might be unsuccessful. Because it is unlikely that the stock was overvalued, 
however, the price of the shares acquired probably will not fall below the pur-
chase price even if the bid fails. 
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disclose-or-abstain rule should not be applied to warehousers,48 
since they are simply acting as the tender offerors' agents,49 in 
order to help them reap the benefits of their analysis of the 
target companies.50 Indeed, if a tender offeror cannot obtain 
financing elsewhere, it may be unable to proceed with the take-
over bid.51 Therefore, prohibiting warehousing will interfere 
with the incentives for desirable economic activity. 
Since the court's regular receipt test fails to protect activities 
like warehousing, a narrower rule might be desirable. Specific-
ally, persons who provide services to the securities industry, and 
therefore regularly receive material nonpublic information, could 
be forbidden from using that information other than in con-
nection with the performance of their market function. 52 This 
rule would reflect more clearly the desire to regulate trading by 
the service auxiliaries of the securities industry. It would limit 
trading by persons in Chiarella's position, but would not apply 
to tender offerors. It would not prohibit trading by warehousers, 
since the market service they provide necessitates the purchase 
and sale of securities. 
Even after Chiarella, some unfair trading may still escape 
the net of rule Iob-s. Both Chief Judge Kaufman's definition 
of the market insider category and the definition proposed here 
emphasize regular access to nonpublic information. Thus, since 
48 See E. A:AANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note r7, at 24; [SuMMARY VOLUME] 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 431, at XXXI-XXXIII (disclose-or-
abstain rules should distinguish between warehousers and other tippees of tender 
offerors); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 814-15; Sandler & 
Conwill, Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 Onro ST. L.J, 225, 254 n.r45 
(1969). Some might argue that because warehousing is "unfair," it should be 
prohibited, regardless of the interference with economic incentives. See, e.g., 
Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REv. SEc. REG. 975, 977 (1970) (rob-5 should be used 
to prohibit warehousing). The arguments for and against warehousing will not 
be evaluated in detail here. The arguments in favor of warehousing are com-
pelling, however; thus, for the purposes of this Case Comment, it will be assumed 
that such activity is desirable. 
49 See Sandler & Conwill, supra note 48, at 244 n.r45 (institutional investors 
are agents of offeror and therefore have no greater duty to disclose than principal). 
50 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 8r4-15. 
5 1 See p. 1545 supra. 
52 Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy suggest a similar rule. See Fleischer, 
Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 822 ("it may be realistic to expect that 
a market professional who is given a preferred position in order to fulfill a 
particular market function will use any confidential information received as a 
consequence of his position solely to further his assigned role"). Their analysis 
is not strictly policy-based. They suggest that they are unwilling to depart 
from the notion that there must be some special relationship before a disclose-
or-abstain duty can be imposed, and that the "preferred position" of service 
auxiliaries, plus the public expectation that they will not exploit informational 
advantages, gives rise to such a relationship. ld. at 822-24. 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
neither limits trading by persons who receive such information 
from a source outside the issuing corporation on a single oc-
casion, there is still a gap in the disclose-or-abstain rules. It is 
not clear, however, that a broad rule regulating these individuals 
is desirable. Their trading may have a less significant impact 
on investor confidence in the fairness of the securities market 
than trading by those who receive a continuous flow of nonpublic 
information. Furthermore, if a broad rule were adopted, sig-
nificant administrability problems would arise. Market insiders 
and corporate insiders are readily identified and easily policed,53 
but it would be far more difficult to scrutinize the activities of 
all those who do not regularly receive nonpublic information; 
enforcement would be random and costly.54 Thus, if the courts 
do choose to impose disclose-or-abstain obligations on persons 
outside the corporate or market insider categories, they must 
balance the fairness concerns underlying rule Iob--5, not only 
against the desire to preserve incentives for investigative activity, 
but also against the need for administrability. 
A set of tender offer regulations recently proposed by the 
SEC 55 would impose disclose-or-abstain obligations on all per-
sons who ·have knowledge of an impending takeover bid.56 These 
regulations, which are promulgated under section 14 (e) of the 
Williams Act,57 extend beyond the corporate and market insider 
categories; thus, as the SEC suggests, they will help close the gap 
left in the disclose-or-abstain rules by Chiarella's regular receipt 
test.58 Furthermore, they minimize problems of administrability 
because they are limited to the tender offer context. The pro-
posed regulations are unsatisfactory, however, in that they do 
not preserve incentives for desirable investigative activity. Not 
only is no exception made for warehousing,59 but the SEC ap-
parently intends to foreclose preannouncement trading by the 
tender offeror itself.60 
~3 A tippee trading rule is broader and therefore less administrable, but it is 
at least limited by the requirement that the information must come from an in-
sider. 
04 The SEC would not be able to identify and police all those persons who 
might, on a single occasion, obtain nonpublic information. Reliance on private 
actions as a policing tool would likely result in random enforcement. 
" 44 Fed. Reg. 9954 (1979) (to be codified if approved at 17 C.F.R. § 240). 
~6 See 44 Fed. Reg. at 9976-79, 9987- 88 (proposed rule 14e-2) . Proposed rule 
14e-2 would cover trading by both tender offerors and their tippees. 
~7 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) . 
~8 44 Fed. Reg. 9954, 9977 (1979) · 
50 The rule covering tippees of tender offerors would clearly include ware-
housers, and is therefore overinclusive. In most cases, however, tip pees of tender· 
offerors should be covered. See note 42 supra. 
60 See 44 Fed. Reg. 9954, 9978, 9988 (1979) · 
1979] 
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Chiarella and the SEC tender offer regulations reflect a 
willingness to expand disclose-or-abstain obligations beyond 
traditional categories. In general, this expansion is justified, 
given the central importance of the desire to equalize access to 
material information. In designing new disclose-or-abstain rules, 
however, the courts and the SEC must also recognize the need ~ 
to preserve incentives for desirable economic activity. Both the U 
Chiarella decision and the proposed SEC rules may interfere 
with this goal. 
